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23

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SECURITY CONGRESS

**ULUSLARARASI GÜVENLİK KONGRESİ
BİLDİRİLER TAM METİN KİTABI**

BELİRSİZLİK ÇAĞINDA GÜVENLİK

DERLEYENLER

Fikret Birdişi
Bezen Balamir Coşkun
Chountagi Bekir



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DERNEĞİ YAYINLARI

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International Security Congress 2023

BELİRSİZLİK ÇAĞINDA GÜVENLİK
THE SECURITY IN THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

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2022

**TAM METİNLER
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INTPOLSEC
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONGRESS 2023 (HYBRID)

THE SECURITY IN THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Ibn Haldun University
20-21 October - Istanbul / Türkiye



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PROLOGUE

The world is moving towards an age of greater uncertainty. The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a series of violence, wars, aggressions, and interventions. Decay of the relative stability after the Cold War followed by some radical changes in international politics and security.

A series of events, such as the pandemic and the global economic recession caused the breakdown of 'routines'. Ontological concerns overshadowed the "victory of democracy", thus expectations about the expansion of human rights, freedoms and welfare were not met. All these challenges have made perceptible changes in intellectual and political spheres.

In this regard, this conference aims to explore the future of international security by discussing all axiomatic trends to understand the opportunities and challenges of the new age in the international system.



ÖNSÖZ

Tüm dünya büyük bir belirsizlik çağını deneyimlemekte. Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşü uluslararası sistemde bir dizi savaşı, terör saldırısını ve uluslararası müdahaleleri tetikledi. Soğuk Savaş sonrası ortaya çıkan görece istikrarın bozulması uluslararası siyaset ve güvenlik alanlarında köklü değişikliklere yol açtı. Son dönemde deneyimlediğimiz pandemi ve küresel ekonomik durgunluk gibi bir dizi olay, 'rutinlerin' bozulmasına neden oldu. Ontolojik kaygılar "demokrasinin zaferi"ni gölgede bıraktı, dolayısıyla insan hakları, özgürlükler ve refahın yaygınlaşması yönündeki beklentiler karşılanamadı. Bütün bu meydan okumalar, hem fikri hem de siyasi alanda da gözle görülür değişikliklere yol açtı. Bu bağlamda, bu konferans, uluslararası sistemdeki yeni çağın fırsatlarını ve zorluklarını anlamak için sistemdeki eğilimleri tartışarak uluslararası güvenliğin geleceğini ortaya koymayı amaçlamaktadır.

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Ibn Haldun University
20-21 October - Istanbul / Türkiye

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- Uluslararası Sistem Tartışmaları
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- 100. Yıl Özel Oturumu: Cumhuriyetin 100. Yılında Türkiye'nin Güvenlik Politikaları: Süreklilikler ve Değişimler



INTPOLSEC (HYBRID) INTERNATIONAL SECURITY CONGRESS 2023

THE SECURITY IN THE AGE OF UNCERTAINTY

Ibn Haldun University
20-21 October - Istanbul / Türkiye

INTPOLSEC II. International Security Congress: “Security in the Age of Uncertainty”

The world is moving towards an age of greater uncertainty. The collapse of the Soviet Union triggered a series of violence, wars, aggressions, and interventions. Decay of the relative stability after the Cold War followed by some radical changes in international politics and security.

A series of events, such as the pandemic and the global economic recession caused the breakdown of ‘routines’. Ontological concerns overshadowed the "victory of democracy", thus expectations about the expansion of human rights, freedoms and welfare were not met. All these challenges have made perceptible changes in intellectual and political spheres.

In this regard, this conference aims to explore the future of international security by discussing all axiomatic trends to understand the opportunities and challenges of the new age in the international system. So, INTPOLSEC International Security Congress aims to share philosophical, theoretical, and empirical studies and research in the following concepts and themes:

- New Global Disorder and Security
- Theoretical Approaches: Critical and Post-Theories
- Debates on International System & World Order(s)
- Case studies
- Ukrainian war and global security
- The West and the Rest
- The Regional Security and New Alliances
- European Security
- Asia and Pacific Region
- MENA Region
- Eurasia Security
- Special Topics: Energy, Environment, Technology and Security
- Special Session: Re-visiting Security Debates in Post Disaster Situations
- Special Centennial Session: Transformation of Turkish Security Policy in the 100th Anniversary of the Republic of Türkiye

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Kongre Programı / Congress Program
20 October 2023 / 20 Ekim 2023

9.15 - 09.40 Açılış Konuşmaları

Prof. Dr. Yaşar Sarı, Ibn Haldun Üniversitesi Haydar Aliyev Avrasya Çalışmaları Merkezi
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Assoc. Dr. Bezen Balamir COŞKUN, INTPOLSEC
Prof. Dr. Atilla Arkan (Ibn Haldun Üniversitesi Rektörü)

09.40 - 11.30 Türkiye Cumhuriyetinin 100. Yılı Oturumu

Moderator: Prof. Dr. Yaşar Sarı

Prof. Dr. Faruk Sönmezoğlu, İstanbul Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi

Mr. Araz Aslanlı - Azerbaycan Turizm ve İşletme Üniversitesi, "Geçmişten Geleceğe Türkiye'nin Güney Kafkasya Politikası"

Albina Yun, Central Asia Barometer - Turkey's Image in Central Asia: Unveiling Perceptions

11.45 - 13.15

Panel A1 - New Concepts & Conceptualisations of Security

Chair: Evren Eken (Süleyman Demirel University)

Mehmet Recai Uygur & Fatma Sever (SMK University of Applied Sciences) - Beyond Security Threat: Revisiting Threat Perception in the Era of Polycrisis

Evren Eken (Süleyman Demirel University) - From Ridiculous to Deadly Serious: Iconoclastic Intrusions into Aniconic Cultures

Heba Enajag (Ibn Haldun University International Security, Cyber-Communication, and Censorship)

11.45 - 13.15

Panel A2 - Güvenikte Yeni Yaklaşımlar ve Kavramsallaştırmalar

Panel Başkanı: Didem Buhari (İzmir Katip Çelebi Üniversitesi)

11.45 - 13.15

Panel A2 - Güvenikte Yeni Yaklaşımlar ve Kavramsallaştırmalar

Asım Öztürk (Medeniyet Üniversitesi) - Hibrit Güvenlikten Yeni Nesil Bir Güç Anlayışına: Hibrit Güç

Özge Taşkın & Didem Buhari (İzmir Katip Çelebi Üniversitesi - Deglobalizasyon Tartışmaları ve Avrupa Birliği'nin Rusya Sınırını Güvenlikleştirmesi

Gözde Söğütçü (İstanbul Üniversitesi) - Yeni Tehditler ve Zorlukların Afrika Kıtasının Güvenlik Mimarisine Etkisi

Güler Kalay (Üsküdar Üniversitesi) - 21. yy'da Uluslararası Çatışmaların Jeopolitiği: Yeni Avrasyacılık ve Yeni Atlantikçilik Çerçevesinde Kuramsal Analiz

11.45 - 13.15

Panel A3 - Jeopolitik, Terörizm ve Güvenlik

Panel Başkanı: Emre Baran Pak (Kilis 7 Aralık Üniversitesi)

Gizem Ay Şeker (Akdeniz Üniversitesi) - Çin Halk Cumhuriyeti'nin Enerji Jeopolitiği Bağlamında Dış Politikasının İncelenmesi

Emre Baran Pak (Kilis 7 Aralık Üniversitesi) - Almanya'nın 2023 Yılı Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejisi: Merkel Dönemi Ulusal Güvenlik Stratejileriyle Karşılaştırmalı Bir Değerlendirme

Neslihan Gökdemir Ağar (NBE) - Jeopolitik Dengesizlikler Çağında, Zamanın Ruhunda Rusya ve Dünya Enerji Yapbozu ve Dekarbonizasyon Sürecine Etkileri

Nigora Khodzhamberdieva (Uludağ Üniversitesi) - Rusya'nın ve NATO'nun Dinamik İlişkilerinde Oyun Teorisi Yaklaşımı

Yusuf Zakir Baskın - ABD Ulusal Güvenlik Politikaları; Değişim, Dönüşüm ve Süreklilik

11.45 - 13.15

Eurasian Security Issues Roundtable

Nurlan Muminov (Eurasian Research Institute Almaty)
Khamza Boltaev (University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent) Isломkhon Gafarov
(University of World Economy and Diplomacy, Tashkent) Yaşar Sarı (Ibn Haldun University)
Fikret Birdişli (İnönü University)
Najiba Mustafayeva (Ibn Haldun University)

11.45 - 13.15
Eurasian Security Issues Roundtable
15.00 - 16.30
Panel B1 - NATO, EU, Transatlantic Security
Chair: Fikret Birdiřli (Inönü University)
Fikret Birdiřli (Inönü University) - Sociology of International Organisations (IOs): A Survey on Turkish Military Personnel about NATO
Mustafa Yıldırım (Ibn Haldun University) - How has the relative decline of US leadership in the international system been affecting Türkiye's security policy?
Nurhayat Bekir (Ibn Haldun University) - The Potential Conflict Between Transparency and National Security with AI Applications in the Judiciary
Sinem Ünalđılar (Ege University) - Revitalising Transatlantic Alliance to Manage the China Challenge

15.00 - 16.30
Panel B2 - Türk Dıř Politikası ve Türkiye'nin Güvenlik Politikaları
Panel Başkanı: Fatih Tekin (Inönü Üniversitesi)
Fatih Tekin & Umut Turgut Yıldırım (Inönü Üniversitesi) - Türkiye'de Sağın Güvenlikleřtirme Rezervleri ve Pratikleri
Havva Kök (Üsküdar Üniversitesi) - Türk Dıř Politikasında Atlantikçilik ve Avrasyacılık Etkisi
Sibel Zengin (Geliřim Üniversitesi) - Doęu Akdeniz Denkleminde Türkiye'nin Güvenlik Politikaları: Jeopolitik Kuram Çerçevesinde Coęrafı Konum- Güvenlik İliřkisi

15.00 - 16.30
Panel B3 - Energy Security, Ecological Crises, Climate Change
Chair: Najiba Mustafayeva (Ibn Haldun University)
Najiba Mustafayeva (Ibn Haldun University) - Criminalization of Ecocide: Impetus towards Armenia's International Responsibility

15.00 - 16.30

Panel B3 - Energy Security, Ecological Crises, Climate Change

Olga Zalesskaia (Blagoveshchensk State Pedagogical University) - The threats to environmental security in the transboundary zone of Russia and China

Ayşegül Ün (Altınbaş University) - Green Theory in the Realm of International Security, Peace & Development

15.00 - 16.30

**Istanbul Institute for Advanced Studies Roundtable:
Rivalry and Cooperation in South Caucasus: Prospects and Challenges**

Cenap Çakmak (Anadolu University)
Murat Ustaoglu (Istanbul University)
M. Cüneyt Özşahin (Necmettin Erbakan University)
Zehra Korkmaz Kökdere (Necmettin Erbakan University)
Sait Bozik (Istanbul University)
Murat İstekli (Istanbul University)
Büşra Çil (Istanbul University)

17.00 - 18.30

Panel C1 - Russia in New Global Security Order

Chair: Habibe Özdal (Okan University)

Mirza Asmer Beg (Aligarh Muslim University) - Russia in Ukraine and China's aggression in India: Lessons for Democracies

Habibe Özdal (Okan University) - Turkey-Russia Relations in the Context of Change and Transformation in Turkish Foreign Policy

Gamerman Evgenii (Institute for Comprehensive Analysis of Regional Problems of the Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences) - Ukrainian conflict and its impact on regional security in Northeast Asia

Ahmet Yusuf Özdemir - Frozen Conflicts Fresh Memories; The Volunteer Mobilization from North Caucasus in Russo-Ukrainian War

17.00 - 18.30

Panel C2 - Özel Silahlı Guruplar, ve Yabancı Savaşçılar ve Bölgesel Güvenlik

Panel Başkanı: Chountagi Bekir (Ibn Haldun Üniversitesi)

Chountagi Bekir (Ibn Haldun Üniversitesi) - The Uncertainty of Private Military Companies in the Age of Uncertainty and the Case of Wagner

Emine Çelik - Ukrayna'daki Yabancı Savaşçılar: Potansiyel Radikalleşme Riskleri

Marziye Memmedli (Kahramanmaraş Sütçü imam Üniversitesi) - Rus Dış Politikasında Yeni Bir Araç: Wagner, Kuruluşu, Faaliyeti ve Sonu

Ömer Faruk Karaman (Çanakkale 18 Mart Üniversitesi) - Kırgız Vatandaşların Wagner Grubuna Katılım Süreci ve Toplumdaki Yansımaları

Ahmet Sapmaz (İstanbul Gelişim Üniversitesi) - Rusya-Ukrayna Savaşının Güney Kafkasya'nın Güvenliğine Etkisi

17.00 - 18.30

Panel C3 - Regional Security: Central Asia & Caucasus

Chair: Cavid Veliyev (AIR Center)

Simona Scotti (Topchubashov Center (Azerbaijan) - Navigating Geopolitical Realities: International and Regional Actors in Post-Conflict Security Management of the Caucasus after the Second Karabakh War

Murad Muradoc (Topchubashov Center (Azerbaijan) - Central Asia and South Caucasus: the emergence of a supernova region in Eurasia

Cavid Veliyev (AIR Center) - South Caucasus After Two Wars

Jakub Korejba - Regionalization of Western Eurasia as a result of War in Ukraine. Reasons, Symptoms and Possible Consequences

Online Congress Program / Online Kongre Programı
21 October 2023 / 21 Ekim 2023

9.30 - 11.00
Online Panel 1 - Türk Dış Politikası ve Türkiye'nin Güvenliği https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/7851420910
Chair / Panel Başkanı: Muzaffer Şenel (İstanbul Kültür Üniversitesi)
Muzaffer Şenel (İstanbul Kültür Üniversitesi) - From Hatay to Libya: Strategizing the Türkiye's Policy on Military Deployment Abroad
Marian Karagyozov (Institute of Balkan Studies – Bulgarian Academy of Sciences) - Between militarization and soft power: Turkey's Foreign Policy in most recent times
Fahriye Keskin Karagöl - Güvenikleştirme/Güvenlikdışlaştırma ve Çatışma Çözümü Analitik Çerçevesi Üzerinden 2005 Sonrası Türkiye-Ermenistan İlişkilerinin Analizi
Ferit Malkara (Milli Savunma Üniversitesi) - Doğu Akdeniz'de Güç Mücadelesi: Türkiye-Mısır Yakınlaşmasının Analizi
Canan Katılmış (İnönü Üniversitesi) - Ontolojik Güvensizliğin Türkiye'de Seçmen Davranışı Üzerindeki Etkisi: 14 Mayıs Seçimleri Örneği

9.30 - 11.00
Online Panel 2 - Sakarya University Middle East Institute Panel https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/4568243552
Chair: Ali Balcı (Sakarya University)
Ali Balcı (Sakarya University) - Global Rivalry or Moral Imperative? What Drives China's Stance on Syria in the UN Security Council
Furkan Halit Yolcu (Sakarya University) - From Foe to Hero Under a Decade: How Turkey Became an Ally with the Arabs of the Middle East
Talha İsmail Duman (Sakarya University) - Deadlock in Lebanese politics: How is the competition of regional and global actors affecting the crisis in Lebanon?
Berkan Özgür (Sakarya University) - When the West Hurts: Understanding Algerian foreign policy in North Africa and Beyond

9.30 - 11.00
Online Panel 3 - Environmental Security & Ecological Crises https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/2598562925
Chair: Nurbanu Bulgur (Sakarya University)
Muhammad Manzoor Elahi (Government College University Lahore) - Securitizing Green Energy Cooperation in the Global South: Mapping Decarbonization Beyond Conventional Security Discourse
Steve On (Ibn Haldun University) - The Ecological Crisis and the Global Political Economy
Nurbanu Bulgur (Sakarya University) - The Analysis of International Environment Conferences Held in the Scope of Environmental Security as an Example of Climate Diplomacy

11.15 - 12.30 KEYNOTE SPEAKER https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/7851420910
Prof. Dr. Uddhab Prasad Pyakurel Director of Global Engagement Division of Kathmandu University, Nepal

13.00 - 14.30
Online Panel 4 - New Global Order & Global Security https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/7851420910
Chair: Ahmet Üçağaç (Sakarya University)
Hasan Basri Barit (Koç University), Erman Emirhan (Kadir Has University) - Biden's Democracy Summit: The US' Ontological (In)Security, Domestic Politics and the Weakening Liberal International Order (LIO)
Ahmet Üçağaç (Sakarya University) - Understanding the New Security Alignments in the Emerging Global Order: The Case of Convergence between the Gulf Arab States and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
Smrutirekha Sahu (Jawahar Nehru University) - The Russia-Ukraine War: It's Implications for Global Security
Ana Yousefian (Azad University) - The Global Digital Order and the Opportunities for Asia to Bring Balance between the East and the West
Ali Emamifar & Bahareh Sazmand (University of Tehran) - Empowering Poland's Military Strength: Unveiling the Impact of Ukraine's Conflict or Echoes of History

13.00 - 14.30
Online Panel 4 - New Global Order & Global Security https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/7851420910
Ramzi Bendebka (Department of Political Science, International Islamic University Malaysia) - Russia in the Middle East and North Africa: A Permanent Presence with Renewal Objectives

13.00 - 14.30
Online Panel 5 - Regionalism & Regional Security in New Global Order https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/4568243552
Chair / Pane Başkanı: Abdulfatah Said Mohamed (Hamad Bin Khalifa University)
Abdulfatah Said Mohamed (Hamad Bin Khalifa University) - Sudan's journey toward peace and stability
Ali Sarihan - "Between a Rock and Hard Place: Institutions, Agencies and Ideologies at a centennial anniversary of Russia-Turkey relations"
Lehari Kuppili (Jawaharlal Nehru University) - Regional Security in Central Asia: Need for a new approach and an Institution
Ramakrushna Pradhan & Ruma Das (Guru Ghasidas Vishwavidyalaya University) - A Competitive Model of Regionalism in Eurasia: Playing Field or Battle Field
Seval Şahin (Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi) - France's Quest for Strategic Autonomy in the Context of European Security Architecture: Navigating Convergence and Divergence

13.00 - 14.30
Online Panel 6 - Küresel Güvenlik Mimarisi (1) https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/2598562925
Chair / Pane Başkanı: Özdemir Akbal (Trakya Üniversitesi)
Özdemir Akbal (Trakya Üniversitesi) - Middle Ground Perspektifi: Sistemik Teori için Yeni Olanaklar
Mehtap Atalı Dağtekin (ASBÜ) - Bir Ülke, İki Sistem Yaklaşımı: Çin'in Tavvan'a Yönelik Birleşme Politikasının Dinamikleri
Esmâ Özdaşlı (Burdur Mehmet Akif Ersoy Üniversitesi) - Hindistan-Ermenistan Askeri İş Birliği: Güney Kafkasya'da Yeni Bir İttifak Mı?
Ümit Tetik (Ulusal Güvenlik Araştırmaları Merkezi) - Uluslararası Düzen Tartışmaları Bağlamında Büyük Güç Rekabetinin Teorik Analizi

13.00 - 14.30
Online Panel 6 - Küresel Güvenlik Mimarisi (1) https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/2598562925
Zeynep Elçin Kamalak (Hasan Kalyoncu Üniversitesi) - Küresel Kültürel Düzensizliklerin Uluslararası Güvenlik Tehditleri Kapsamında Değerlendirilmesi
Esen Eser (İnönü Üniversitesi) - Etnik Sorunlar Bağlamında AB'nin Terörizmle Mücadele Politikaları

13.00 - 14.30
WONEMPS Roundtable Ontological Security and the Eastern Mediterranean: Prospects and Challenges https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/7824569683
Feride Aslı Ergül Jorgensen (Ege University) Effie Charalampaki (IIER) İrem Aşkar Karakır (Dokuz Eylül University) Didem Buhari (İzmir Katip Çelebi University) Bezen Balamir Coşkun (TED University)

15.00 - 16.30
Online Panel 7 - Küresel Güvenlik Mimarisi (2) https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/7851420910
Chair / Panel Başkanı: Emre Çıtak (Hitit Üniversitesi)
Emre Çıtak (Hitit Üniversitesi) - Özel Askeri Şirketlerin İstihbarat Faaliyetlerin ve Kapasitelerinin Değerlendirilmesi: Wagner'in 23 Haziran Yürüyüşü Sonrası Döneme Daha Büyük Bir Merceklerle Bakmak
Kamer Kasım (Abant İzzet Baysal Üniversitesi) - Güney Çin Denizi Sorunlarının Bölgesel ve Uluslararası Güvenliğe Etkileri
Sertaç Canalp Korkmaz - Belirsizlikler Çağında Güvenliğin Sağlanması ve Teknolojinin Yeri: ABD'nin Yapay Zekâ Politikası
Onur Limon & Gürdal Limon (Gümüşhane Üniversitesi) & Özgür Demirayak (Selçuk Üniversitesi) - NATO ve Arktik Bölgesi: Yeni Riskler ve Zorluklar
Belma Engin Güder (Çanakkale 18 Mart Üniversitesi) - Afrika'nın 2063 Yılı Hedeflerinde Afrika Kültürünün Rolü
Emine Çelik - Ukrayna'daki Yabancı Savaşçılar: Potansiyel Radikalleşme Riskleri

15.00 - 16.30
Online Panel 8 - Energy Security & Climate Change https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/4568243552
Chair / Panel Başkanı: Çiğdem Pekar (Çanakkale 18 Mart University)
Rahmat Hajimineh, Ebrahim Rezaei Rad (Islamic Azad University) - The Role of Energy in the Ukraine War
Kenan Aslanlı (Yıldırım Beyazıt University) - Driving forces in Russia's nuclear energy ambitions and fluxional energy security setting: the comparative case study of Rosatom's practices in Eastern Europe and the Middle East
Archana Jyoti (Pondicherry University) - Energy Security: Addressing shifting Global Dynamics and Fostering Sustainable Resilience
Çiğdem Pekar (Çanakkale 18 Mart University) - Nuclear Proliferation Risks in the Middle East: Motivations, Capabilities and Nonproliferation Measures
Damla Nur Özdemir (Düzce University) - The Role and Effects of Private Military Companies in Ensuring Energy Security

15.00 - 16.30
Online Panel 9 - Enerji Güvenliği ve İklim Değişikliği https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/2598562925
Chair / Panel Başkanı: Levent Yiğittepe (Karamanoğlu Mehmet Bey Üniversitesi)
Dilek Yaman & Levent Yiğittepe (Karamanoğlu Mehmet Bey Üniversitesi) - Çok Yönlü Tehditlerin Bağlayıcı Gücü: TAPI Projesi ile Afganistan Zayıf Devletinin Bölgesel Enerji Güvenliğine Etkisi
Zehra Aksu - Rusya - Ukrayna Çatışmalarının Ukrayna'nın Enerji Güvenliğine Etkileri
İlke Taşdemir (Uludağ Üniversitesi) - Küresel İklim Krizi Bağlamında Diplomasiyi Tartışmak: İklim Diplomasisi, Tarihsel Gelişimi, Aktörleri ve Pratikleri
Leyla Bingöl Tunç (İnönü Üniversitesi) - İklim Değişikliğinin Suriye'deki Savaş Bağlamında Güvenlikleştirilmesi

15.00 - 16.30 https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/7824569683
Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi Güvenlik Çalışmaları Paneli
Chair / Panel Başkanı: Muzaffer Ercan Yılmaz
Yusuf Sayın - Twitter Diplomasisi Üzerinden Türkiye-İran İlişkilerini Anlamak: Erdoğan ve Ruhani Dönemleri

15.00 - 16.30

<https://ibnhaldun.zoom.us/j/7824569683>

Necmettin Erbakan Üniversitesi Güvenlik Çalışmaları Paneli

Muzaffer Ercan Yılmaz - Soğuk Savaş'ın Ardından "Yeni Dünya Düzeni": İstikrar ve İstikrarsızlık Unsurları

Ahmet Göksel Uluer - Refah Partisi ve Somali'ye İnsani Müdahale: İkilem ve Söylem Arasında İç ve Dış Politikanın Etkileşimi

Büşra Yılmaz - İngiliz Hegemonyasından Amerikan Hegemonyasına: Star Trek ve Doctor Who

Sociology of International Organizations (IOs): A Survey on Turkish Military Personnel about NATO

Fikret Birdiřli²

Abstract

The importance and functionality of International Organizations (IO) are increasing depending on states' growing interaction and interdependency. This reality creates stress on the ontology and durability of IOs. Several works focus on exogenous and endogenous factors to analyze the lifetime and durability of IOs. The sociology of IOs is one of the endogenous works in this context. Nevertheless, these endogenous works also overlook the function of natural persons because according to the general acceptance, IOs consist of only juridical persons. But the functionality of some organizations such as NATO depends on the orientation and motivation of the natural practitioners of the organization. This reality is important in terms of giving an idea about the social support for an organization in the context of theories that focus on the effects of domestic variables on decision-makers, such as neoclassical realism or constructivism.

In this context, this study is based on a questionnaire survey of the views of Turkish soldiers about NATO. The results are precious and unique to guide the decision-makers of both NATO and Türkiye because of restrictions on surveys on military personnel.

Keywords: NATO, Alliance, Türkiye, Turkish Army, Sociology of International Organizations

Introduction

Culture and identity studies have been on the rise in the field of international relations due to the increasing interest in constructivism and postmodern studies in recent years.

While a wide spectrum of understanding which is forming from neorealism and neoclassical realism and extending to the concept of post-truth focuses mostly on the role of culture and identity in-state activities whereas International Organizations are ignored.

However, international organizations, which are the most important actors after the state in the international arena, witness the encounter of cultures in a more concrete way than the international community, which means the meeting of different cultures on the normative level.

Secondly, International organizations, as in states, have a legal personality in the institutional sense and a collective personality in the sociological sense. Legal entity means an identity that is clothed for the organization in respect of founding objectives.

For example, NATO, as a security organization, has a defensive legal entity. The UN, on the other hand, has a pacifist character because of more normative than the other security organizations on security.

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Surely, it's very important to understand what degree embrace organizational goals and aims by the people working in these organizations and operating them, and this reality how the effect the functionality of the IO.

For example, the impact of a senior executive or UN employees who do not adopt the UN's global vision on the collective identity of the organization is a matter that needs to be discussed. In organizational behavior studies, it is emphasized that the ideal goals of the organization will be possible if external and internal customers fall in parallel with the goals of the organization. In this case, international organizations should also be considered within this organizational behavior model.

In organizational behavior studies, culture is used to explain how people make sense of their world. Some others emphasize the importance of absorbing cultural diversity for organizations to survive in an international setting. And additionally some emphasized the perception to shed light on personnel differences. They take consider to the relationship between persons to underline the construction of values, emotions, feelings, and personalities while interacting with others.

Inter-Governmental Organizations (IGO) are an important part of the social and political structure of the international areas. Although IGOs are structured to fulfill functional duties in certain areas, both the change in the functions of states and the current structure of international relations position IGO in a very different place from the beginning and assign different functions to them. These functions are defined as constitutive, regulatory, and procedural functions. Among these functions, particularly constitutive norms also produce agents, give them specific abilities and powers, and determine their basic identities, interests, and preferences. Thus, founding norms are cultural norms belonging to an official community.

At this point, the first and fundamental question of this research is whether IGOs have special functional cultures. The functional culture is the culture created within the framework of the reasons for existence. So, it's unlike the institutional culture that includes the procedures related to the functioning of the institutions, which is called strategic culture in this study.

In any community or organization, has been difficult to explain the process of creating cultural norms and the observable effects of strategic culture. Besides, there is also consensus in the literature that the concept of strategic culture is used to distinguish deep structures in strategic thinking from symbolic or instrumental elements. In this context, in short, strategic culture is the culture that belongs to any strategic community including attitudes and behaviors that shape the threat perceptions, determine the conditions for using force, and structure security policies accordingly.

This content allows strategic culture to apply to communities and organizations such as NATO. Therefore, this research aims to frame and interrogate some of the constative elements of NATO in the context of the strategic culture concept.

Second, this research has been built on the importance of the convergence of actors in an IGO. So the convergence of the expectations of members of any IGO should be closely related to the robustness and life span of any Organization. In this frame, this research focuses on Türkiye. this research aims to understand the convergence of actors and their expectations in NATO as a security community, using Türkiye as a case study. The results of similar research for different countries allow us to understand the organizational ecology of NATO.

The organizational ecology includes the purpose of existence and political portfolios of organizations, the decision-making process, and the purpose of charter and membership policies. Therefore, an inquiry about the functionality of the organization includes the questioning of robustness, effectiveness, or reasons for the dysfunctionality of IGOs (Schneider, 2012)

Hence, this study on Türkiye will enable us to first understand the position of Türkiye, one of the largest conventional powers of NATO, in the ecology of the organization, and then realize the blind spots that affect the strength and resilience of the organization.

About Research

This research is exclusive in terms of both its method and the universe of the research. In this section, the reasons that make the research different are explained in the context of originality and research design.

The Originality of the Research

NATO is a functional security community that has a different feature from the other IGOs. Because most IGOs have two constitutive and functional elements. First, States as the founding will that bring organizations into existence, second founding conventions and norms that determine their functions. But, in NATO, there is military personnel as a third side that enforces NATO's policies. For this reason, in-depth research on NATO must take this third party into account.

So, the originality of this research is that the first time, it was determined Türkiye's perception of NATO was through a survey of Turkish military personnel. Usually, it was impossible to conduct such a survey through military personnel because of due to official and security constraints. Hence, studies on Türkiye's perception of NATO have generally been studies involving politicians, academics, or society. However, one of the main factors affecting the ecology of a security organization is the perceptions of the practitioners about that organization

and its mission. In this respect, this attitude scale, which has not been done until now, will fill an important deficiency regarding NATO in Türkiye.

Design and Pattern of the Research

The pattern of this research can be described as follows: Türkiye's general attitude towards NATO is three-dimensional, as is the case with other members. The first is the official perception of NATO, which can be read through official statements. This is the official policy of the state.

The second is the popular perception of NATO in Türkiye. This is a sociological indicator of the resilience of NATO in respect of Türkiye. Third, the perception of military personnel about NATO as implementers of NATO policies may be an indicator of organizational ecology.

It is possible to find many studies in the literature for the first two. However, due to the practical difficulties and official restrictions of obtaining data from military personnel in Türkiye, there is no research in the literature on the third.

For this reason, the most original aspect of this study is that the survey questions are directed only to the members of the Turkish Armed Forces. In this study, to do this without being subject to official restrictions, survey questions were directed to retired Turkish military personnel including officers and non-commissioned officers.

Methods

This research is based on a questionnaire formed with structured questions that respondents answered based on their knowledge and experience. The survey is based on an online questionnaire aiming to measure the perception of retired officers, NCOs, and other professional soldiers of the Turkish Army about NATO.

The online survey was created through the Google data collection platform and made available to military personnel through a closed Facebook group called "OYAK Information Platform". This platform has around 68.6 thousand military personnel as members, both retired and in-service already in various ranks and services in the Turkish Armed Forces.

OYAK3 (Army Solidarity Organization) is a complementary professional pension fund for military personnel in Türkiye and is a financially and administratively autonomous legal entity subject to private law provisions within the framework of laws.

Every military personnel (officers and NCO) of the Turkish Armed Forces is a compulsory member of OYAK from their enlistment to their retirement. After retirement, members have the option to leave or continue as a mutual fund, and this option is often preferred.

³ <https://www.oyak.com.tr/home-page/> (Reached at: 24.04.2022)

Regarding this situation, the “OYAK Information Platform” was created by an OYAK member to share information and a discussion forum among the members on social media. Therefore, this platform is a civic initiative and membership in the group is voluntary. For this reason, this platform has given the chance to reach the relevant personnel to conduct a survey.

Therefore, the universe of the research consists of Turkish Armed Forces military personnel (officers and NCOs), which can be accessed through the "OYAK Information Platform" Facebook group.

The questionnaire form consists of 40 questions. First, the seven questions contain brief demographic information. The remaining 33 questions are intended to measure the perception of personnel about NATO using the Likert scale.

The questionnaire form was filled out by 543 people, by the simple random sampling method. A sample size of approximately 543 is a sufficient sample size to describe assumptions of nearly any population size at a 95% confidence level, with a 5% margin of error for unknown population sizes. With a 95% confidence level, a standard deviation of 0.5, and a confidence interval (margin of error) of $\pm 5\%$: $((1.96)^2 \times .5(.5)) / (.05)^2$; $(3.8416 \times .25) / .0025$; $.9604 / .0025$ sample size calculated as 384.16.

Since the scale in the research has not been used elsewhere before and was created entirely by the researcher, first of all, reliability and validity tests were performed, and then factor analysis was applied. The data obtained from the survey results are shown with graphics and the obtained findings are interpreted qualitatively.

Validity and reliability results are off the scale and the survey has been shown in Tables 1 and 2. So, the survey is valid and highly reliable according to Cronbach's Alpha rate because of the interval between 0.7 and 1.0

Table 1. Validity Result

Case Processing Summary

		N	%
	Valid	543	100,0
Cases	Excluded	0	,0
	Total	543	100,0

a. Listwise deletion based on all variables in the procedure.

Table 2. Reliability Result

Reliability Statistics

Cronbach's Alpha	N of Items
,848	40

KMO and Bartlett's Test results are 0,889 that prove scale is eligible for Factor Analysis. So, 9 factors were determined in Total Variance Explained. And SPSS program was used to analyze the survey results.

Theoretical Background

International organizations as an actor are a new phenomenon in the international areas compared to the emergence of states. In addition, considering their lifespan, it is seen that they have a very dynamic and flexible structure compared to states. For this reason, the robustness and resilience of international organizations have been the subject of academic research as well as their functions. We live in a world that is getting smaller daily. Many phenomena cause states and societies to get closer. Especially globalization, strengthening the notion of international society which has been fabricated by the gradually developing and becoming more evident in the international arena, will be the product of socialization that occurs in many specific areas from economy to security.

The idea of international society highlights international institutions as one of the construction elements of this phenomenon. ⁴ In the sociological aspect, International institutions are defined as the recognized pattern of behavior or practice around the expectations of actors ⁵. In applied politics, it is widely accepted that this phenomenon may be accompanied by explicit organizations. In this frame, the definition of international institutions includes Intergovernmental Organizations, International Regimes, and sets of norms in the international area.⁶

The crucial point for the definition of international institutions is the convergence of the expectations of actors. So, the convergence of expectations in the security area reveals a security community. Karl Deutsch explains that a security community is a group of people that have integrated with each of them. According to this, the meaning of integration is to have a sense of community, and institutional practices strong enough to assure dependable expectation of peaceful change among its population within a territory. This sense of community constitutes the agreement to resolve social problems through the process of peaceful change. The meaning of peaceful change is the resolution of social problems by normally institutionalized procedures without resorting to large-scale physical force. In this frame, it's understood that any international organization is more than a structural actor because of having intersubjective

⁴ John. Duffield, "What Are International Institutions?," *International Studies Review* 9, no. 1 (2007): 6.

⁵ Oran R. Young, *Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes*, ed. Stephen D. Krasner, *In International Regimes* (Cornell University Press, 1983), 93.

⁶ Duffield, "What Are International Institutions?," 1.

norms. Because although international organizations are structured to perform functional tasks in certain areas, today both the change of functions of the states and the structure of the international areas position the international organizations in a very different place from the beginning and impose them on different functions. These are constitutive, regulative, and procedural functions.

Especially constitutive norms generate agents, endow them with certain capabilities and power and determine their underlying identities, interest, and preference. So, constitutive norms are cultural norms belonging to a formal community. At this point, the question that comes to mind at this point is here can international organizations have strategic cultures.

In any community or entity, the explication of the process that creates cultural norms, and observable effects of strategic culture has been always difficult. Besides, there is consensus that the notion of strategic culture is used to sort out deep structures in strategic thought from symbolic or instrumental elements. In this frame, shortly, strategic culture is the culture that belongs to any strategic community, and it includes traditional attitudes and behaviors that shape the threat perceptions of states or governments, determine the concept of using force, and structure security policies accordingly.⁷ This explanation allows applying strategic culture to institutional communities, especially security communities such as NATO. Hence, in the beginning, this research aims to draw a frame for NATO in the context of strategic culture and explains its elements.

Secondly, this research aims to test the convergence of the expectation of actors as a security community in NATO by using Türkiye as a case study. This allows us to understand the ecology of the Organization. The ecology of any organization includes the purpose of existence of the organization, its political portfolios, its decision-making process, the nature of the contract underpinning the Organization, and its membership policies⁸. But the functionality of the Organization includes questions about the robustness, effectiveness, or reasons for the dysfunctionality of organizations. So, the case of Türkiye will allow us first to understand the situation of the member which is one of the biggest conventional power of NATO, and secondly to explore blind spots which affect on robustness and endurance of the organization.⁹

The originality of this research is that the perception of Türkiye about NATO was determined for the first time through a study involving military personnel. The general attitude scale of

⁷ J.S. Lantis, "Strategic Culture and National Security Policy," *International Studies Review* 4, no. 3 (2002): 87.

⁸ Gary Hooghe, Liesbet; Lenz, Tobias; Marks, *A Theory of International Organizations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press., 2019), 45.

⁹ Christian Schneider, "The Role of Dysfunctional International Organizations in World Politics: The Case of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime" (University of Zurich, 2012), <https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-78260>.

Türkiye toward NATO has three dimensions as it has the other members. First is the formal perception of NATO which may be read through official statements. This is the formal policy of the state. Second, is the perception of citizens about NATO. This is a sociological indicator of the endurance of NATO for the Türkiye aspect. Third, is the perception of the servicemen about NATO as a practitioner of the politics of NATO. In the literature possible to find much research for the first two. But there is no research about the third because of the practical and formal limitations to getting data from military personnel in Türkiye. In this study, these limitations were tried to overcome by applying the survey questions to retired military personnel from the Turkish Armed Forces.

The survey questions do not contain information that would violate privacy, nor do they have qualities that would cause any security violations for the Turkish Armed Forces. The questionnaire form includes only sociological questions to relate the cultural matters which reveal perceptions of NATO, not about the interrogation of the formal policy of Türkiye, the Turkish Armed Forces, or its organizations.

The organizational robustness and endurance of NATO have been interrogated by cross-examination using data obtained from open sources that include NATO's and Türkiye's official statements, and opinion polls on Turkish citizens made by other researchers in this case study. So, the first, main body of the paper contains a theoretical section about strategic culture. Second, this background is followed by analyzing the official statements of both NATO and the Turkish government to determine the ontological structure of the Organization and strategic cultural factors.

Third, the results of the Quantitative Research Report about Türkiye's Political Social Trends Survey National Value conducted by Kadir Has University belongs to 2020 and 2021 have been used for determining the perception of Turkish people about NATO. And finally, the empirical analysis presented the perception of Turkish military persons about NATO. The research has been concluded by the general assessment and offers in the last stage.

Findings of Survey and Assessment

In this section, the findings of the research are explained and evaluated with graphics showing the results. Survey evaluation begins with propositions containing some demographic information. Since the research is based on the Likert scale, the evaluation scale valid for all graphics is as follows.


Scale: 1. Never Agree; 2 Do Not Agree; 3 Undecided; 4 Agree; 5 Totaly Agree

Findings have been categorized into sections of that: demographic information; Integration Rate of Turkish Soldiers into NATO; About General Performance of NATO; NATO, and Turkey; NATO: Alliance of Distrust.

3.1 Demographic Information

Graphic 1. Which one describes you?

Aşağıdakilerden hangisi sizi tanımlar
543 yanıt




	Office	NCO	Noncom	Other	Total
Frequency	65	426	50	2	543
%	12,1	78,5	9,2	0,2	100

12.1% of the respondents are officers, 78.5% are non-commissioned officers, and 9.2% are professional soldier. These rates are also compatible with the personnel distribution within the Turkish Army Forces (TAF). (Graphic1.)

Graphic 2, Which one describes you?

Aşağıdakilerden hangisi sizi tanımlar
543 yanıt




	Retired	In service	Other	Total
Frequency	393	138	12	543
%	72,4	25,4	2,2	100

72.4% of the participants are retired personnel and 25.4% are in active service(Graphic 2). In addition, the service distribution of the participants within the Turkish Army also strengthens the representation rate of the survey. In this context, 37.4% of the respondents are from the Land Forces Command, 33% from the Air Forces Command; 20.1% from the Gendarmerie General Command, and 9.6% from the Naval Forces Command (Graphic 3).

Graphic 3. Armed Forces were Served

Görev yaptığınız ya da yapmış olduğunuz Kuvvet
543 yanıt



	Land Forces	Air Force	Naval Forces	Gendarmerie	Total
Frequency	203	179	52	109	543
%	37,4	33	9,6	20,1	100


56.4% of the responders served in the Turkish Army for more than 25 years, 36.5% served between 15-25 years, and 7.2% of them served between 1-15 years. Therefore, it is seen that the participants remain in the military service enough to reflect the corporate culture of the Turkish Armed Forces.

53.8% of the responders have personally participated in NATO exercises or NATO missions; 23.8% of them had the opportunity to observe the organization from the inside by personally serving in NATO organizations. For this reason, it is seen that the participants have the opportunity to experience working in NATO together with other alliance soldiers. This situation increases the ratio of the answers given to the questionnaire to reflect the real situation about NATO.

3.2. Integration Rate of Turkish Soldiers to NATO


This section interrogates the integration of Turkish military personnel into NATO. Because Türkiye is the only Muslim country in NATO with territories in the Middle East. In this respect, how TAF personnel are perceived and how they feel working in NATO is important for organizational cohesion and resilience. When the answers given by the participants to the questions posed in this direction are taken into account, it is understood that the TAF personnel are not feeling strange and excluded within NATO, and can work in harmony with the military personnel of other countries (Graphic 4,5,6).

Graphic 4. “We worked in harmony with the military of other countries in NATO Missions”



So 63,3% of personnel feel comfortable and in harmony while working with other allied soldiers (Graphic 4). Bu uyum harekâtlara ve tatbikatlara da yansımış, Türk personeli başkaları tarafından herhangi bir dışlanmışlık hissetmemiştir (Graphic 5).


Graphic 5. In NATO Missions, I observed that soldiers from other countries did not exclude Turkish soldiers.



Self-confidence is quite high in Turkish people and Turkish soldiers. Besides, The Turkish Armed Forces are the second largest standing military force in NATO, after the U.S. Armed


Forces, and the thirteenth in the world, with an estimated strength of 775,000 military and paramilitary personnel in 2022. These features lead to a quest for appreciation. For this, 57,1% of responders expressed that felt that soldiers from other countries appreciated Turkish soldiers in NATO Missions (Graphic 6).

Graphic 6. I felt that soldiers from other countries appreciated Turkish soldiers in NATO Missions




The desire to be in harmony with NATO also manifests itself in Turkish soldiers as the desire not to be distinguished in terms of appearance. As a matter of fact, 68.3% of the responders expressed that want their uniforms to be compatible with NATO standards (Graphic 7).

Graphic 7. The uniform of Turkish Soldiers is/must comply with NATO standards



These answers mean that the integration with NATO is internalized by the TAF personnel. Nevertheless, the fact that only 25.2% of the respondents stated that they would be happy to wear the NATO emblem on their uniforms is an indication that this integration does not exceed national pride and sensitivities (Graphic 8).

Graphic 8. Happy to wear the NATO emblem on my uniform



Besides, 44,4 % percentage of Turkish soldiers think that receiving a NATO award provides significant professional career prestige (Graphic 9). And 46,2% percentage think that having served in NATO provides an advantage in appointments and promotions (Graphic 10).

Graphic 9. Receiving a NATO award provides significant professional career prestige.



Graphic 10. Having served in NATO provides an advantage in appointments and promotions




3.3. About General Performance of NATO

This section contains propositions aimed at learning participants' thoughts on NATO's overall performance. These propositions are prepared by taking into account the "security community",

which is the primary function of NATO. Therefore the new vision of NATO such as out of the area has been disregarded in the survey.


Graphic 11. NATO is a deterrence organization for non-member countries.



According to the findings, 54,3% of respondents NATO is a deterrence organization for non-member countries. Only 19,3% think that the deterrence function of NATO is not sufficient (Graphic 11). This proposition aims to understand the effect of NATO on non-members countries internally. Namely, this question involves your own opinion about whether you find some kind of work you do adequately.

Another proposition that continues this questioning from a different angle is shown in graphic 12. Only 29.7% of respondents gave an affirmative answer to a proposal about whether NATO could provide sufficient security for its members against external threats while 37% think the opposite, the undecided rate is 33,3% (Graphic 22).


Graphic 12. NATO could provide sufficient security for its members against external threats



This graphic reflects a hesitation. The fact that NATO has not been faced with a situation that will test Article 5 since it was established is one of the reasons that feeds this indecision. Because 43,5% thinks that NATO is successful in developing training and standard for the


member. The rate of those who find NATO inadequate in this regard is 23.6%, while the rate of those who are undecided is 33% (Graphic 11).

Graphic 11. NATO is successful in developing training and standard for the member.



Another important reason for this hesitation is that 80.1% of the respondents think that NATO is an organization under the influence of the USA (Graphic 12).


Graphic 12. NATO as an organization under the influence of the USA



3.4. NATO and Türkiye


In this section, there are propositions about what the participants think about Türkiye's position in NATO. This interrogation begins with a question that tries to understand Türkiye's position among members countries culturally and geographically. In this frame, 52.3% of the respondents gave a positive answer to the proposition that "Türkiye is a European Country". While the rate of those who thought negatively about this issue remained at 23.9%, the rate of those who were undecided was 23.8%. Positive answers reflect Türkiye's traditional foreign policy vision, which is expressed as "Westernism" (Graphic 13).

Graphic 13. Türkiye is a European country




The following propositions reflect some exceptionalist perceptions about Türkiye and the Turkish army of the respondents. Because 56,8% think that Türkiye is NATO's strongest army (Graphic 14).

Graphic 14. Türkiye is NATO's strongest army




Other propositions reflecting this exceptionalist view are that while the rate of those who think that Turkey is indispensable for NATO is 66% (Graphic 15), the rate of those who think that NATO is indispensable for Turkey is 35.1% (Graphic 16).

Graphic 15. Türkiye is indispensable for NATO




Graphic 16. NATO is indispensable for Türkiye.



It is also noticed that Turkish soldiers have a positive view towards NATO along with this exceptionalist perspective. So, respondents think that being in NATO improves the capabilities of the Turkish army, and it provides prestige for Türkiye.

In this frame respondents, 56.3% think that Being in NATO improves Türkiye's military capabilities while only 21,4% say the opposite (Graphic 17).

Graphic 17. Being in NATO improves Türkiye's military capabilities.



According to the survey, respondents 47,7% think that Being a NATO member provides prestige for Türkiye while 23,9% think the opposite. The rate of undecided people 28% reflects the rate of those who can be gained towards the positive side with good PR work (Graphic 18).

Graphic 18. Being a NATO member provides prestige for Türkiye.




These close percentages may reflect stress on the military personnel which comes from the negative effect of the criticism of politicians about the relationship between NATO and Türkiye, and its negative effect on public opinion, despite of positive practical experience of Turkish soldiers on NATO.

As a matter of fact, 39.4% of the participants responded positively to a suggestion that Turkey should join another security organization instead of NATO, while 36.9% disagreed and 23.8% remained undecided (Graphic 19).

These close percentages may reflect stress on the military personnel which comes from the negative effect of the criticism of politicians about the relationship between NATO and Türkiye, and its negative effect on public opinion, despite of positive practical experience of Turkish soldiers on NATO.

Graphic 19. Türkiye should join another security organization instead of the NATO




Another proposition supporting this view is shown in Graph 20. While 77,7 % of the participants agreed with the proposal that Turkey should use the weapons systems of other countries other than NATO standards, only 10.5% gave a negative answer. The rate of undecided remained at 11%. The results of this proposition are thought to reflect the debates in public that began with Turkey's purchase of the S-400 defense system from Russia.

Graphic 20. Türkiye should use the weapons systems of other countries other than NATO standards




The view of Turkish military personnel on relations between Turkey and NATO almost reflects unilateralism. In other words, Turkish soldiers not only think that Turkey is indispensable for NATO but also believe that Turkey is in harmony with NATO. However, they have serious doubts about whether NATO will fulfill its contractual responsibilities towards Turkey.

Graphic 21. The training standards of the Turkish army are in line with NATO standards.



For example, %66,2 thinks that The training standards of the Turkish army are in line with NATO standards (Graphic 21). Nevertheless, %58,8 of the respondents do not believe that If a country attacks Türkiye, NATO will take action to protect Türkiye (Graphic 22).

Graphic 22. If a country other than NATO attacks Türkiye, NATO will take action to protect Türkiye




However, the rule that if a NATO country is attacked, it will be accepted as an attack on all NATO countries and action will be taken is the most important founding article and existential goal of NATO. The distrust of the military personnel of a NATO country on this principle is an important ontological problem for the organization.

Another proposition that deepens this issue for Türkiye is “NATO Provides Sufficient Assurance for Türkiye Against External Threats”. While the rate of those who agree with this proposition remains at 18.6%, the rate of those who think otherwise is 55.2% (Graphic 23). The rate of those who agreed with the similar proposal, not specifically for Türkiye, but in general, remained at 29.7% (Graphic 12).


The most important historical reason why Türkiye wanted to join NATO was the perception of external threats. The perception that NATO will not fulfill this function as expected in the current situation is a situation that needs to be managed by NATO.

Graphic 23. NATO Provides Sufficient Assurance for Türkiye Against External Threats




When it is necessary to explain this mistrusted situation a little more, 52.5% of the participants gave a positive answer to the proposition “Türkiye may fight with a NATO Country”, 22.1% were undecided, and 25.4% expressed a negative opinion (Graphic 24).

Graphic 24. Türkiye may fight with a NATO Country.



The reason for this insecurity is likely to be the tension between Greece and Türkiye. 41% of respondents think that NATO prevented a war between Türkiye and Greece. While 36.5% of the respondent gave a negative answer to this proposition, 21.9% were undecided (Graphic 25).


Graphic 25. Because Türkiye and Greece are members of NATO Prevents both countries from fighting each other.



3.5. NATO: Alliance of Distrust

The distrust of NATO among the TAF personnel is closely related to the distrust of the allies. Especially, the fact that this manifests itself as a distrust towards countries that weigh NATO is a point that needs to be emphasized. For example, only 4.2% of the participants gave a positive answer to the proposition that the USA was a reliable ally for Türkiye, while 80.3% of them gave a negative opinion (Graphic 26).


Graphic 26. The US is a Reliable Ally for Türkiye




Confidence in the UK under the same proposition is 4%; Confidence in Germany is 15.3%; Confidence in France is 3.2%; Confidence in Italy is 11.6%. Whether this triggers another quest is a question that comes to mind. However, 39.4% of the respondent gave a positive answer to a proposition such as "Türkiye should join other security alliances instead of NATO", 36.9% of them gave a negative view and 23.8% remained undecided. Accordingly, it can be said that despite the low level of trust in NATO among the TAF personnel who participated in the survey, they are quite undecided about an alternative.

As a matter of fact, 8.3% trust in Russia (Graphic 27), one of the possible alternatives, is the leading country of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization; The fact that it is 6.8% for China makes us think that the search for an alternative remains unanswered for TAF personnel (Graphic 28).

Graphic 27. Russia is a reliable ally for Türkiye



Graphic 28. China is a reliable ally for Türkiye



The fact that 77.7% of the respondents gave a positive response to the proposition that "Türkiye should use weapons systems of other countries outside NATO standards" (Graphic 20) can be evaluated as the general average of the distrust of NATO and other allies within NATO, the search for self-confidence and the reflection of public debates among the TAF personnel.

Result and Discussion

As a result, the data obtained from the findings of the survey can be summarized as follows: While the TAF personnel who responded to the survey thought NATO was technically successful and necessary, the trust in NATO among the TAF personnel is lower than that of the

public in Türkiye. Because, in the "Türkiye Trends Survey" conducted by Kadir Has University in 2021, the public's support for NATO membership had been found as 58%.¹⁰

The fact that NATO is seen as an organization under the influence of the USA should play a major role in this negative, or undecided view of the TAF personnel.

In addition, as in the Turkish public, the exceptionalist perspective within the Turkish Armed Forces is reflected in the surveys conducted on these issues as self-confidence and a rather skeptical perspective towards the outside.

As a matter of fact, in the "Türkiye Trends Survey 2021", NATO countries were the lowest among the countries that Türkiye should cooperate with foreign policy, while the other Turkish Republics' option or the idea to act alone was the highest compared to the other options.

Of course, while public support for staying in NATO is high, low support for cooperation with NATO countries seems like a handicap.¹¹

This means that the self-confidence that nurtures exceptionalism in the Turkish Armed Forces and Turkish public opinion is based on an emotional archetype rather than a tangible power.

It is understood that there are no problems with the integration of Turkish soldiers into NATO. Observations and thoughts that Turkish soldiers are appreciated and not ostracized by other foreign soldiers reflect this integration, as well as show that self-confidence, which we define as exceptionalism, has its mainstay.

As for the trust in NATO, the fact that NATO is predominantly thought to be an organization under the influence of the USA and the trust rate of NATO to other leading countries such as England, Germany, Italy, and France is quite low. These findings show that the ontological existence of NATO as a security organization is questionable for Türkiye.

In addition, the recent discussions about NATO over the S-400 may have reflected negatively on the TAF personnel, as well as the public, and may have caused hesitation in the personnel. In this context, it is seen that it is necessary and compulsory for decision-makers to take confidence-building measures in terms of NATO's future and organizational robustness. The most important steps in this regard may be macro objectives such as trying to save NATO from the impression of an organization under American influence, as well as urgent and practical measures such as providing introductory information about NATO to the personnel within the TAF. Because it is known that NATO is a deterrent defense organization and therefore no hot

¹⁰ Mustafa vd. Aydın, "Türkiye Eğilimleri – 2021" (İstanbul, 2022), 91, <https://www.khas.edu.tr/sites/khas.edu.tr/files/inline-files/turkiye-egilimleri-web-basin.pdf>.

¹¹ Aydın, 81.

conflict that will reveal its true performance has not occurred so far. In addition, this situation can be considered NATO's ontological success.

Another success of NATO is in terms of out-of-area activities and military standards. Promotions and information activities that emphasize and highlight this situation can contribute to the positive development of personnel by clarifying their thoughts about NATO while reducing the widespread negative opinion about other allies.

It is important for the strength and resilience of the organization that NATO administrators care about the distrust of the Turkish soldiers, who are the implementers of NATO, towards NATO and the other leading countries of the alliance. Because trust in comrades-in-arms is the foremost principle among the mandatory requirements of military service and professional principles.

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Çok Yönlü Tehditlerin Bağlayıcı Gücü: TAPI Projesi ile Afganistan Zayıf Devletinin Bölgesel Enerji Güvenliğine Etkisi

Dilek YAMAN 12

Levent YİĞİTTEPE 13

Özet

TAPI Doğalgaz Boru Hattı Projesi 1990'lı yıllarda gündeme gelmesine rağmen Güney Asya bölgesindeki istikrarsızlıklardan dolayı sürüncemede kalmıştır. Projenin geçiş güzergâhında bulunan Afganistan'daki güvensizlik ve istikrarsızlık projenin geri planda kalması konusunda önemli etkileri olmuştur. Bu çalışmada, projenin salt enerji işbirliği kapsamında değerlendirilmemesi gerektiği, aynı zamanda paydaş ülkelere bir karşılıklı bağımlılık sağlamasıyla Güney Asya bölgesindeki güvenlik meselelerinde de etkili olabileceği yönünde bir analiz yapılmıştır. Proje devletleri olan Türkmenistan, Afganistan, Pakistan ve Hindistan'a sağlayacağı kazançlar ile bölge istikrarı ve güvenliğine katkısı haricinde, Asya'daki küresel aktörlerinin de buradan çıkarımları olduğu aşikardır. Ayrıca ABD'nin bölgeden çekilmesinin ardından Taliban'ın yönetimi ele geçirmesinden sonra bir 'zayıf devlet' örneği teşkil eden Afganistan'ın çevre ülkelerin güvenliğine etkisi Helman ve Rathner (1992)'in zayıf devletler hipotezi, enerji güvenliğine uyarlanarak açıklanmıştır. Bu hipoteze göre ulusal güvenliği iç baskılar ve siyasi istikrarsızlıklar nedeniyle tehdit altında olan zayıf bir devletteki istikrarsızlığın bölgedeki diğer devletlere sıçraması durumu olasıdır ve bölgede ciddi güvenlik problemlerine yol açabilmektedir. Çevre ülkelerin enerji güvenliğine katkı sağlayabilecek TAPI projesinin zayıf bir devlet olan Afganistan'ın istikrarsızlığı nedeniyle yıllarca gerçekleştirilememiştir.

Bu bağlamda proje 1990'lı yıllarda neden gündeme gelmiş, ancak neden geri planda kalmıştır? Projenin geçiş güzergâhında yer alan Afganistan'daki güvensizlik ve istikrarsızlık nasıl bir engel oluşturmuştur? TAPI Projesi, paydaş ülkeler arasında nasıl bir karşılıklı bağımlılık sağlayabilir? Güney Asya bölgesindeki güvenlik meselelerinde TAPI Projesi nasıl etkili olabilir? Bu proje, Asya'daki küresel aktörler için neden önemlidir? Afganistan'ın istikrarsızlığı nasıl bir "zayıf devlet" örneğini oluşturmuştur? Afganistan'daki istikrarsızlığın çevre ülkelerin güvenliğine etkisi nasıl açıklanabilir? sorularına cevap aranmıştır. Sonuç olarak TAPI'nin; bölge devletlerin enerji gelişmelerine dolayısıyla enerji güvenliğine etkisinin çok açık bir örnek olduğu görülmüştür. Diğer taraftan bölgedeki mevcut stratejileri değiştirmekle beraber diğer entegrasyon projelerine de ivme kazandırma potansiyeli vardır. Ancak boru hattının büyük kısmının Afganistan topraklarından geçtiği göz önüne alındığında proje içerisinde kilit devlet konumunda olduğu görülmektedir. ABD'nin 2020 itibariyle Afganistan'dan çekilmeye başlaması ve Taliban'ın devlet yönetimini ele geçirmesiyle Taliban'ın projeye vereceği güven önem arz etmektedir. TAPI Projesi söz konusu bölgenin Güney Asya olması nedeniyle proje paydaşları çerçevesinde bölgedeki işbirliğini geliştirip, istikrara katkı sağlamasından dolayı bölge güvenliği ile doğrudan bağlantılı olduğu değerlendirilmiştir.

The Binding Power of Multifaceted Threats: The Impact of the TAPI Project on Afghanistan's Weak State and Regional Energy Security

Abstract

Although the TAPI Natural Gas Pipeline Project was brought to the agenda in the 1990s, it was delayed due to the instability in the South Asian region. The insecurity and instability in Afghanistan, which is on the transit route of the project, had significant effects on the project remaining in the background. In this study, an analysis was made that the project should not be evaluated solely within the scope of energy cooperation, but could also be effective in security issues in the South Asian region by providing interdependence to stakeholder countries. Apart from the benefits it will bring to the project states, Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, and its contribution to regional stability and security, it is obvious that global actors in Asia also have benefits from this. In addition, the impact of

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Afghanistan, which constituted an example of a 'weak state' after the Taliban took over after the US withdrew from the region, on the security of surrounding countries was explained by adapting Helman and Rathner's (1992) weak states hypothesis to energy security. According to this hypothesis, instability in a weak state whose national security is threatened by internal pressures and political instability is likely to spread to other states in the region and may cause serious security problems in the region. The TAPI project, which could contribute to the energy security of neighboring countries, could not be realized for years due to the instability of Afghanistan, which is a weak state.

In this context, why did the project come to the agenda in the 1990s, but why did it remain in the background? What kind of an obstacle did the insecurity and instability in Afghanistan, which is on the project's transit route, pose? What kind of interdependence can the TAPI Project provide among partner countries? How can the TAPI Project be effective in security issues in the South Asian region? Why is this project important for global actors in Asia? What kind of an example of a "weak state" has Afghanistan's instability created? How can the impact of instability in Afghanistan on the security of surrounding countries be explained? Answers to these questions were sought. As a result, TAPI; It has been seen that it is a very clear example of its impact on the energy developments and therefore the energy security of the states in the region. On the other hand, it has the potential to change existing strategies in the region and accelerate other integration projects. However, considering that most of the pipeline passes through Afghanistan, it appears to be a key state in the project. As the USA begins to withdraw from Afghanistan as of 2020 and the Taliban takes over the state government, the trust that the Taliban will give to the project is important. Since the region in question is South Asia, the TAPI Project has been evaluated to be directly linked to regional security as it improves cooperation in the region and contributes to stability within the framework of the project stakeholders.

GİRİŞ

Türkmenistan-Afganistan-Pakistan-Hindistan (TAPI) doğalgaz boru hattı, dört ülkenin katılımıyla oluşturulan ve 1.814 kilometrelik bir uzunluğa sahip uluslararası bir doğal gaz iletim projesidir. Bu boru hattı, Barış Boru Hattı ve Trans-Afganistan Boru Hattı adlarıyla da anılmaktadır. Proje, Türkmenistan kaynaklı doğal gazı Afganistan'ı geçerek Pakistan ve Hindistan'a iletmeyi amaçlamaktadır. TAPI Boru Hattı Şirketi (TPCL), Türkmengaz'ın (%85 hissesiyle çoğunluk paya sahip olduğu), Afghan Gas Enterprise (%5), Inter State Gas Systems (%5) ve Hindistan'da doğal gaz araştırma, üretim ve dağıtımından sorumlu devlete ait kuruluş olan GAIL'in (%5 hissesiyle) katılımıyla Kasım 2014'te kurulmuştur. Türkmenistan-Afganistan güzergahındaki boru hattının inşaatı Aralık 2015'te başlamış ve projenin geliştirilmesi için dört ülke arasında yatırım anlaşması Şubat 2016'da imzalanmıştır. Boru hattının Afganistan-Pakistan bölümünün inşaatına dair çalışmalar ise Şubat 2018'de başlatılmıştır. İlk aşamada 30 yıl boyunca hizmet verecek olan bu proje, yılda 33 milyar metreküp doğal gaz taşıma kapasitesine sahiptir¹⁴

TAPI projesinin hayata geçirilmesi, proje ülkeleri arasındaki çıkar farklılıkları, sınırlarla ilgili anlaşmazlıklar, aşırılık yanlısı grupların etkisi ve özellikle Afganistan'daki istikrarsızlık gibi faktörler nedeniyle zorluklarla karşılaşmaktadır. Bu çalışma, TAPI boru hattının

¹⁴<https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/turkmenistan-afghanistan-pakistan-india-tapi-gas-pipeline-project/>.

gerçekleştirilmesiyle birlikte paydaş ülkeler arasındaki işbirliğinin artarak karşılıklı bağımlılığın güçleneceği öngörüsünde bulunmaktadır. Bu durumun Güney Asya bölgesindeki istikrarın tesisi üzerinde olumlu bir etkisi olacağı düşünülmektedir. Özellikle stratejik konumu nedeniyle TAPI projesinde bir köprü ülke olarak işlev gören Afganistan'ın istikrarı ve refahı açısından bu proje büyük önem taşımaktadır. Afganistan'ın istikrarı, bölgedeki tüm paydaşların çıkarları ve bölgesel istikrar için kritik bir unsurdur.

Literatürde sadece TAPI özelinde yazılmış çalışmaların nadir oluşu, ayrıca paydaş ülkelerin çıkarlarıyla beraber Afganistan devletindeki güvenlik problemlerinin bir teoriyle birleştirilerek projeye ve enerji güvenliğine etkisi anlamında açıklanmasının ardından küresel aktörlerin amaçlarının da bölgeyle çakışmasının proje özelinde analiz edilmesiyle literatürdeki boşluğa katkı sağlayacağı değerlendirilmiştir. İlk olarak projenin teknik bilgileri ve paydaş ülkelerle alakalı bilgilendirme yapılmıştır. Ardından proje geçmişinde tarihsel olarak yaşanan aksaklıklar ve ilerleyişten bahsedilmiştir. Devamında ise paydaş ülkelerin kazançları analiz edilmiş, zayıf devlet olarak Afganistan'ın güvenliği söz konusu hipoteze göre yorumlanarak TAPI'nin sürüncemede kalmasının hem kendisinin hem de bölge devletlerinin enerji güvenliğine olan etkileri ortaya konulması amaçlanmıştır. Son tahlilde ise hem paydaş devletlerin hem de küresel aktörlerin TAPI projesindeki politikaları birlikte değerlendirilmiştir. Bununla beraber bu projenin Güney Asya bölge güvenliği için önemi açıklanarak gerçekleşmesi halinde meydana gelebilecek stratejik katkılar vurgulanmıştır. Çalışmada nitel araştırma desenlerinden biri olan durum çalışması yaklaşımıyla analiz yapılmıştır.

Proje Geçmişi

TAPI projesi ilk olarak, Amerikan enerji şirketi Unocal liderliğindeki bir konsorsiyumun ve Arjantinli şirket Bridas'ın, o dönemdeki Taliban rejimi ile Kabil'de bir anlaşma imzalamak için rekabet ettiği 1990'ların ortalarında ortaya çıkmıştır¹⁵. TAPI projesinin ilk tasarımı ise, 1990'ların başında Türkmenistan'ın gaz rezervlerinden gelir elde etmek amacıyla Afganistan üzerinden Pakistan ve Hindistan'a doğal gaz ihraç etme hedefiyle oluşturulmuştur. Harita 1'de görüldüğü üzere, Türkmenistan'ın Merv bölgesindeki Galkınış'tan çıkarılan doğalgaz, Herat-Kandahar-Kuetta-Multan rotasıyla Fazilka'ya iletmeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu proje, Asya Kalkınma Bankası'nın da desteklediği bir girişim olup Aralık 2015'te başlayan inşaat süreci büyük ölçüde tamamlanmış durumdadır. Türkmen ve Kazak gaz şirketlerinin, bölgedeki enerji bağımlılığını azaltmak ve gaz ihraç etmek amacıyla 1990'lı yılların sonunda başlattığı çeşitlendirme girişimiyle ortaya çıkan proje, öncelikle Türkmenistan ve Pakistan arasında Mart

¹⁵ D'Souza, S. (2011). The TAPI Pipeline: A Recipe for Peace or Instability?. *ISAS Brief*, (194), s.2.

1995'te imzalanan bir protokolle temellerini atmıştır. Ancak 1996'da Afganistan'da Taliban'ın iktidara gelmesi, projeye Taliban'ın dahil olmasını beraberinde getirmiştir. Fakat projenin erken dönemlerinde ABD ve Rusya'nın engellemeleriyle karşılaşmıştır. Özellikle 1998'de ABD ile Taliban arasındaki gerginliklerin ardından proje askıya alınmıştır¹⁶.

Diğer taraftan, güvenlik endişeleri ve uluslararası toplumun Taliban rejiminin insan hakları ve özellikle kadın hakları konularındaki tutumunu kınaması, her iki şirketin de projeden çekilmesine ve projenin zor durumda kalmasına sebep olmuştur. Proje, Taliban'ın Kabil'den ayrılmasının ardından tekrar canlanmıştır. 2002 yılının sonlarında ise Afganistan, Pakistan ve Türkmenistan, proje çalışmalarını yeniden başlatarak bu fikri canlandırmışlardır¹⁷. ABD'nin değişen politika ve stratejileriyle birlikte, TAPI projesine yönelik desteğinin artması, bölgede enerji güvenliği ve istikrarına verdiği önemi göstermektedir.

Route of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) natural gas pipeline



Harita1: TAPI Doğalgaz Boru Hattı Projesi (intellinews.com).

İlerleyen yıllarda ABD, projeye destek vererek bölgedeki Rus etkisini azaltma amacıyla adımlar atmıştır. Ancak, Pakistan, Afganistan ve Hindistan arasındaki anlaşmazlıklar, inşa sürecini 2015'e kadar ertelemiştir¹⁸. Bununla birlikte, katılımcı ülkeler projeden vazgeçmemiş, 23 Şubat 2018'de Türkmenistan'ın Mary eyaletinde Serhetabad ilçesinde ve Afganistan'ın Herat

¹⁶ <https://www.mepanews.com/afganistandan-gecen-stratejik-tapi-projesi-nedir-47678h.htm>. Erişim Tarihi: 20.11. 2021.

¹⁷ D'Souza, S. (2011). The TAPI Pipeline: A Recipe for Peace or Instability?. *ISAS Brief*, (194), s.2.

¹⁸ <https://www.mepanews.com/afganistandan-gecen-stratejik-tapi-projesi-nedir-47678h.htm>. Erişim Tarihi: 20.11. 2021.

kentinde liderler ve bakanların katılımıyla projenin 800 km'lik Afgan bölümünün inşaatına başlamıştır. Afganistan'da Taliban'ın etkinliğindeki artışla birlikte, özellikle 2019 ve sonrasında Türkmenistan, Taliban ile proje konusunda temaslar kurmuştur. Bu temaslar 2021'de artmış ve Taliban'ın 15 Ağustos 2021'de yönetimi ele geçirmesinden sonra resmiyet kazanmıştır. Taliban ise, TAPI projesini destekleyeceğini ve katılım sağlayacağını ifade etmiştir¹⁹. Bu durum, projeye ilişkin umutları artırmış, “Hayal Boru Hattı” olarak adlandırılan bu proje için olumlu bir ivme sağlamıştır. Begjanov'un TAPI projesini paydaş ülkeler açısından değerlendirdiği gibi, projeye daha fazla ülkenin katılmasının uluslararası alanda büyük destek gören bir proje haline gelmesini sağlamıştır²⁰. TAPI projesinin artan destek ve katılımı birlikte, bölgesel iş birliği ve enerji alanındaki potansiyelini en üst düzeye çıkarma yolunda önemli bir aşama kaydedildiği açıkça görülmektedir.

TAPI'nın Proje Ülkeleri ve Diğerleri İçin Anlamı

Orta Asya'daki jeopolitik dinamikler, ABD, Rusya ve bazı bölge ülkelerinin siyasi ve askeri müdahaleleri üzerinde şekillenmektedir. ABD'nin bölgedeki etkisinin devam ettiği, özellikle Hazar bölgesindeki varlığıyla anlaşılabilir. ABD yönetiminin ve askeri düzenin Orta Asya'daki temel politikaları, bu bölgenin kaynakları üzerinde kontrol sağlamak isteyen herhangi bir rakip gücün küresel hegemonyasına tehdit oluşturabileceği endişesiyle şekillenmiştir. ABD stratejisi, potansiyel bir küresel rakibin ortaya çıkmasını engellemeye odaklanarak, bu bölgelerdeki kaynakların kontrolünü ve güç dengesini korumayı amaçlamaktadır²¹. Bu durum, bölgenin enerji kaynakları üzerindeki jeopolitik rekabetin sürmesine ve bölgedeki güç dengelerinin dikkatle izlenmesine neden olmaktadır.

Afganistan, stratejik öneme sahip bir konumda bulunmaktadır. Önemli enerji kaynaklarına yakınlığı, stratejik ulaşım ve iletişim hatları üzerindeki konumu, Rusya ve Çin gibi önemli aktörler arasında yer alması ve komşu konumunda bulunan İran ile ilişkisi dikkate alındığında stratejik bir öneme sahiptir. Ayrıca, gerektiğinde Müslüman bir nükleer güç olan Pakistan gibi ülkelerle temas halinde olması, jeopolitik açıdan dikkate değerdir. Bununla birlikte, ülkenin terör eğitim merkezi haline gelmiş istikrarsız yapısı, ABD'nin müdahale konusunda uygun bir konuşlanma bölgesi olarak algılanmasına neden olmaktadır²². Afganistan'ın, büyük güçlerin

¹⁹ Agm.

²⁰ Begjanov, A. (2021). Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline. *Central Asian Journal Of Theoretical & Applied Sciences*, 2(1), 8-12, s.3.

²¹ Rajpoot, A. R., ve Naeem, S. (2020). Geopolitics of Energy Pipelines: Case Study of TAPI and IP gas Pipelines. *International Journal on Integrated Education*, 3(8), 15-22, s.17.

²² Gökirmak, M. (2011). Afganistan: Bölgesel Rekabet ve Yeni Açılımlar. *Güvenlik Stratejileri Dergisi*, 7(13),s.12.

kesişim noktasında bulunması, ABD'nin bu bölgedeki gelişmelere karşı duyarsız kalmamasına yol açmaktadır. Bu bölgedeki kontrolün kaybı, Güney Asya'dan Çin'e kadar uzanan geniş bir coğrafyanın etkilenmesi anlamına gelmektedir²³. Afganistan'ın stratejik konumu, bölgedeki istikrarın sağlanması ve bölgesel dengelerin korunması açısından uluslararası aktörlerin dikkatini çeken kritik bir unsurdur.

ABD, TAPI projesini, bölgedeki çatışan grupları ve onların bölgesel müttefiklerini bir araya getirebilecek 'sihirli bir yapıstırıcı' olarak görmektedir. TAPI'nin, olası bir alternatif olarak Hindistan'ı İran-Pakistan-Hindistan (IPI) doğalgaz boru hattından, yani İran'ın Basra Körfezi'ndeki Güney Pars gaz kompleksinden uzaklaştırabileceği öngörülmektedir. Bu durum, ABD'nin İran'ı daha fazla izole etmeyi ve bölgedeki dengeyi şekillendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Diğer yandan, ortaya çıkacak karşılıklı bağımlılık ve işbirliğinin faydaları, Hindistan ve Pakistan arasında barışın teşvik edilmesinde bir katalizör olabilir niteliktedir²⁴. Bu perspektif, bölgedeki enerji politikalarının sadece kaynakların temini üzerine değil, aynı zamanda bölgesel ilişkilerin ve dengelerin şekillenmesindeki etkileri üzerine odaklanarak, projenin stratejik önemini vurgulamaktadır.

Pakistan, Hindistan'dan gelen olası tehditleri göz önünde bulundurarak Afganistan'ı stratejik derinlik açısından önemli bir coğrafya olarak görmektedir. Bu, resmi belgelerde geçerse de politik ve askeri analizlerde sıkça rastlanan bir kavramdır. Stratejik derinlik, olası çatışma durumlarında geri çekilme ve toparlanma imkânı sunan bir coğrafyayı ifade ederken, aynı zamanda Pakistan'a kaynak ve destek sağlayacak bir devlet algısı da içermektedir. Bu yaklaşım, Hindistan ve Keşmir politikalarında kullanılacak terör gruplarına güvenli alanlar oluşturmayı da içermektedir. Bununla birlikte, Pakistan ve Afganistan komşu ülkeler olmaları nedeniyle birbirlerine bağımlıdır ve iş birliği alanları bulunmaktadır. Özellikle Orta Doğu devletlerinde sınırların yapay olarak belirlenmesi, etnik, dil, din ve kültürel ortaklıkların yanı sıra ekonomik ve güvenlik algılamalarını da içeren iş birliği alanlarını karşılıklı ilişkileri şekillendirmektedir²⁵. Bu durum, bölgedeki jeopolitik karmaşıklığı ve Pakistan'ın stratejik politikalarını şekillendirirken hem Afganistan'la olan ilişkilerin karmaşıklığını vurgulamakta hem de bölgesel denge ve iş birliği açısından kritik bir rol oynamaktadır.

Pakistan'ın Afganistan üzerinden Hindistan politikalarını uygulama girişimleri, bölgedeki gerilimlerin derinleşmesine katkıda bulunmaktadır. Hindistan ile süregelen rekabetçi ilişkileri

²³ Nogayeva, A. (2009). Yeni Dünya Düzeninde Orta Asya Bölgesinde Rusya, Abd ve Çin Arasında Stratejik Denge Arayışları, Doktora Tezi, Ankara Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Ankara, s.169.

²⁴ D'Souza, S. (2011). The TAPI Pipeline: A Recipe for Peace or Instability?. *ISAS Brief*, (194), s.3.

²⁵ Çamkerten, İ. (2020). İnşacı Perspektiften Pakistan Dış Politikasında Afganistan Meselesi. *The Turkish Yearbook of International Relations*, 51, 1-26, s.9-10.

olan Pakistan, istikrarsız bir Afganistan yerine Hindistan ile yakın ilişkiler içinde olan bir Afganistan'ı tercih etme eğilimindedir. Bu durum, Pakistan'ın Hindistan'a duyduğu endişelerden kaynaklanmaktadır ve Pakistan, bölgesel etkinliğini sürdürmek ve Afganistan'ı kendi etki alanı içinde tutmak amacıyla çaba harcamaktadır. Çünkü Pakistan'ın yanında yer alan güçlü bir Afganistan, Hindistan ile rekabet edebilecek bir potansiyel güç oluşturabilir. Dolayısıyla, mevcut durumda yeniden yapılanmaya çalışan Afganistan, Pakistan ve Hindistan arasındaki güç mücadelesi ve çekişme alanı haline gelmiştir²⁶. Bu dinamikler, bölgesel denge üzerinde ciddi etkilere sahip olurken, Afganistan'ın stratejik konumu nedeniyle üç ülke arasında çatışmaların odak noktası haline gelmesine neden olmaktadır.

Afganistan'ın istikrarı, Güney Asya bölgesinde, özellikle de Hindistan açısından bölgesel güvenliğin sağlanması açısından büyük önem taşımaktadır. Hindistan, enerji güvenliği perspektifinden bakıldığında, TAPI veya benzeri bir doğal gaz boru hattı olasılığına odaklanmakta ve bu potansiyelin değerlendirilmesi önem taşımaktadır. Ayrıca, Hindistan'ın bölgedeki ekonomik çıkarları da söz konusudur. Taliban rejiminin çöküşünden sonra, Hindistan, Afganistan'daki hükümeti kalkınma amaçlı desteklemeye yönelmiş ve Afgan hükümetiyle Stratejik Ortaklık Anlaşması gibi bir iş birliği anlaşmaları dahi imzalamıştır. Hindistan'ın Afganistan ile olan ilişkilerindeki temel sorun, Pakistan'ın Afganistan'daki varlığına duyduğu endişelerdir. Özellikle Kandahar ve Celalabad'daki konsoloslukların açılması ve Hint ajanlarının faaliyet gösterdiği yönündeki yanlış anlamalar, bu durumu zorlaştırmaktadır. Ancak Hindistan'ın Afganistan'da sınırlı istihbarat faaliyetleri bulunmakta olup, Pakistan'a karşı Afganistan üzerinden herhangi bir iş birliği talebi bulunmamaktadır. İstikrarsız bir Pakistan ve Afganistan, Hindistan'ın içinde aşırı İslamcı hareketlerin yükselmesi endişesini artırmaktadır²⁷. Bu durum, Hindistan'ın bölgede istikrarın korunması, ekonomik ve enerji çıkarlarının gözetilmesi ve Pakistan'ın Afganistan'daki varlığına yönelik endişeleri arasında karmaşık ve hassas bir denge oluşturmasını gerektirir.

Başlangıçta, Çin ve Rusya'nın çıkarları, TAPI boru hattı projesiyle uyumlu görünmüyordu. Çin, ekonomik büyümeyi hızlandıracak kaynakları sağlamak amacıyla Hindistan'la küresel düzeyde bir rekabet içindedir. Bu bağlamda, Hindistan ile Çin arasında Hint Okyanusu bölgesinde artan etki ve Pakistan ile güçlenen askeri güvenlik bağları konusunda bir dikkat ve tedbir söz konusu olmuştur²⁸. Bu durum, bölgedeki enerji projelerinin dinamiklerinin, Çin'in küresel rekabeti ve

²⁶ Agm, s.17-18.

²⁷ Rawan, N., ve Grishin, O. E. (2020). Importance of Afghanistan for Regional Security in South and East Asia. *Sovyet Sonrası Bölge Sorunları*, 7(1), 94-103, s.96-99.

²⁸ Huda, M. S., ve Ali, S. H. (2017). Energy diplomacy in South Asia: Beyond the security paradigm in accessing the TAPI pipeline project. *Energy research & social science*, 34, 202-213, s.206.

bölgedeki askeri ve stratejik bağlar üzerindeki etkisini dikkate alarak sürekli bir değişim içinde olduğunu göstermektedir.

Çin'in Afganistan'daki politikaları, iç güvenlik kaygılarından kaynaklanan endişeler ve Sincan bölgesindeki El Kaide ve Sincan İslami terör örgütleri arasında potansiyel bağlantı iddiaları üzerine şekillenmektedir. Çin'in ana hedefi, batı bölgelerinde istikrarın sağlanması, Orta Doğu'nun enerji kaynaklarına güvenli bir erişim koridorunun oluşturulması, geniş çapta ticaret ve yatırım fırsatlarının geliştirilmesi ve genel stratejik etkisinin artırılması için Çin'in yumuşak gücünün kullanılmasıdır. Bu bağlamda, Çin'in Afganistan'daki politikaları, daha geniş bir stratejik planın parçası olarak değerlendirilebilir. Pakistan, Hindistan, Orta Asya ülkeleri, Suudi Arabistan ve İran gibi aktörler, Afganistan'a altyapı ve inşaat alanlarında destek sağlamaktadır. Ancak bu yardımların, Afganistan'ın kalkınma ihtiyaçlarından ziyade kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda yapıldığı değerlendirilmektedir²⁹. Bu durum, Afganistan'ın bölgesel ve küresel aktörler arasında jeopolitik bir oyun alanı haline gelmesine neden olarak, ülkenin istikrarı ve kalkınması için yapılan yardımların gerçek amacının sorgulanmasına yol açmaktadır. Bu karmaşık etkileşimler, Afganistan'ın gelecekteki kalkınma ve siyasi istikrarı üzerinde belirleyici bir faktör olabilir.

Rusya'dan yapılan gaz ithalatındaki büyük düşüşle birlikte Çin, aslında Türkmenistan'dan gelen gazın ana ihracat pazarı haline gelmiştir. İran, Rusya ve Çin'in ardından Türkmenistan için üçüncü bir ihracat pazarı oluştururken, İran'a uygulanan yaptırımların kaldırılması, bu iki ülkenin enerji ihracatı konusunda rekabetçi hale gelmelerine neden olabileceği durumu vardır. Bu durum, Çin'in Türkmenistan için pazar olma konumunu daha da güçlendirmesiyle Türkmenistan'ın Çin'e olan ekonomik bağımlılığını artıracaktır. TAPI boru hattı sayesinde Türkmenistan, Hindistan ve Pakistan'a gaz ihracatını gerçekleştirerek gaz satışını çeşitlendirme yolunda adımlar atacak ve bu da Çin'e olan bağımlılığını azaltacaktır³⁰. Ayrıca proje, Türkmenistan'ın enerji piyasalarında çeşitliliği artırma ve bölgesel enerji ihracatındaki bağımlılığını azaltma çabalarını vurgulayarak, ülkenin enerji politikalarının önümüzdeki dönemdeki yönelimlerini belirleyebilir.

Hindistan, Moskova'nın TAPI projesine katılımına herhangi bir itirazda bulunmazken, Türkmenistan ise Rusya'nın projeye dahil olmasına isteksizdir. Türkmenistan ile Rusya arasındaki tarihsel anlaşmazlıklar, 2009'da iki ülke arasındaki gaz ticaretinde geçici bir

²⁹ Rawan, N., ve Grishin, O. E. (2020). Importance of Afghanistan for Regional Security in South and East Asia. *Sovyet Sonrası Bölge Sorunları*, 7(1), 94-103, s.97-100.

³⁰ Osmani, R. (2016). TAPI gas pipeline: are Sino-US relations a zero-sum game?. *The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*.

duraksamaya neden olmuş ve bu durum Rusya'nın TAPI projesine dahil olmasına karşı Türkmenistan'ın isteksizliğini tetiklemiştir. Türkmenistan, ulusal enerji güvenliği bağlamında Rus etkisine karşı bir önlem olarak TAPI'yı değerlendirerek haklılığını savunmaktadır. Rusya'nın Orta Asya'da kendi topraklarını dışlayan boru hatlarına karşı genellikle düşmanca bir tavır sergilemesi ve TAPI projesine yardım teklifinin reddedilmesi bu durumu daha da pekiştirmiştir. Ancak, Orta Asya-Çin boru hattının Türkmenistan kısmının inşasında Rus enerji şirketi Sroytransgaz'ın rol alması dikkate değerdir³¹.

Rusya, sadece Orta Asya ülkeleriyle hidrokarbon ihracatında rekabet etmekle kalmamış, aynı zamanda kendi coğrafi etki alanı içinde dış güdümlü enerji projelerine karşı sert bir tutum sergilemiştir. Öte yandan, Çin, Güneydoğu ve Orta Asya'da boru hatları inşa etme konusunda önemli atılımlar yapmış olup, dünya çapında altyapı inşa etme kapasitesine sahip deneyimli bir ülke konumundadır³². Asya Kalkınma Bankası'nın, Çin'in zengin deneyimlerinden dolayı TAPI projesinin inşaat aşamasına katılmasını sağlamak için Çin'e yaklaşması önemli olmuştur. Çin'in Tek Kuşak Tek Yol Girişimi'nin hızlı gelişimi, TAPI'ye olan Çin katılımını daha da güçlendirmektedir. Çin, bu proje kapsamında Orta Asya ülkelerinde altyapının geliştirilmesine yönelik TAPI konsorsiyumuyla işbirliği fırsatları yaratmak için milyarlarca dolarlık yatırım yapmıştır. Ek olarak, Çin-Pakistan Ekonomik Koridoru'nun bir parçası olarak düşünülen Tek Kuşak Tek Yol, Gwadar ve Kaşgar arasında bir boru hattı ağı, karayolu ve demiryolu ağları inşasını içermektedir. Bu ekonomik koridorun önemli bir kısmı, TAPI'nin geçmesi beklenen güneybatı Pakistan eyaleti Belucistan'da planlanan Gwadar limanının geliştirilmesini de içermekte ve genel istikrarın sağlanmasında Çin'in çıkarlarını artırmaktadır³³. Bu durum, Çin'in bölgedeki geniş altyapı projeleri aracılığıyla bölgesel etkisini artırmayı ve enerji ticaretindeki konumunu daha da güçlendirmeyi hedeflediğini göstererek, Çin'in bölgedeki jeopolitik rolünün giderek önem kazandığını ortaya koymaktadır.

Bu bağlamda Afganistan'ın coğrafi konumu düşünüldüğünde, Güney Asya, Orta Doğu ve Çin pazarlarını birbirine bağlama potansiyeliyle stratejik bir öneme sahiptir. Ancak, TAPI boru hattı özellikle Afganistan'ın genel güvenlik ve emniyet durumunda endişeler yaratmaktadır. Projenin

³¹ Huda, M. S., ve Ali, S. H. (2017). Energy diplomacy in South Asia: Beyond the security paradigm in accessing the TAPI pipeline project. *Energy research & social science*, 34, 202-213, s.207.

³² 2013'te Çin, Myanmar'daki Swe gaz sahasından Kunming'e gaz ve petrol taşıyan iki paralel boru hattı inşa etti; bu proje, önemli teknik zorlukların yanı sıra siyasi ve güvenlik riskleri de barındıran bir arazide yapılmıştır. Ayrıca Çin, Türkmən ve Kazak gazını Özbekistan üzerinden Çin'in Sincan eyaletine ulaştırarak 1833 km'lik Orta Asya-Çin Doğalgaz Boru Hattı'nı inşa etme tecrübesine de sahiptir (Huda, M. S. (2020). De-securitising the TAPI pipeline: Converging interests of countries, companies and communities through collaborative planning. In *Energy Cooperation in South Asia*, Routledge, pp. 98-124).

³³ Huda, M. S., ve Ali, S. H. (2017). Energy diplomacy in South Asia: Beyond the security paradigm in accessing the TAPI pipeline project. *Energy research & social science*, 34, 202-213, s.206.

rotası, Afganistan'ın çeşitli bölgelerindeki militan ve milliyetçi sorunlar nedeniyle güvenlik açısından ciddi zorluklarla karşı karşıya olduğunu göstermektedir³⁴. Bu proje, Afganistan'ı istikrara kavuşturmanın yanı sıra Orta Asya'nın enerji kaynaklarına ve diğer pazarlara uzanmak için erişim sağlayacak en etkili yollardan biri olarak görülmelidir. Dolayısıyla, proje hem Pakistan'ın hem de Hindistan'ın uzun vadeli ekonomik ve stratejik çıkarları içinde değerlendirilmelidir³⁵. TAPI projesinin tamamlanması, bölgesel iş birliği ve enerji güvenliği açısından kritik bir dönemeç olabilir, ancak Afganistan'ın içsel güvenlik zorlukları bu süreci etkileme potansiyeline sahiptir.

Birleşik Arap Emirlikleri Ekonomi Bakanı Sultan Bin Said Al Mansuri, bölgede istikrarın sağlanması adına boru hattının önemine vurgu yaparak, gelecekteki refahın temelinde bu hatın rolünü vurgulamaktadır. “Afganistan'da siyasi istikrarın tesisi için ekonomik istikrara olan ihtiyaca dikkat çekmektedir. Bölgedeki insanların gelir, endüstri ve iş olanaklarına erişimini desteklemek önemlidir. Boru hattı, bu ihtiyaçları karşılamada Afganistan'a önemli katkılar sağlayacaktır. Dört ülkenin bağlantısı, uluslararası teknik uzmanlık ve bilgi alışverişi ile yeni yatırımların bölgeye girmesine olanak tanıyarak bu alanda önemli bir rol oynayacaktır”³⁶.

TAPI projesi aracılığıyla üretilen enerji, Pakistan devletinin enerji açığını kapatmakla kalmayacak, aynı zamanda mevcut yüksek yakıt maliyetlerini azaltacak ve Pakistan'ın ödemeler dengesi ile döviz üzerindeki baskısına katkıda bulunacaktır. Aynı şekilde, TAPI'nin güvenilir rezervlere dayalı alternatif bir gaz tedarik kaynağı sunması, Hindistan için de gelişmiş enerji güvenliği anlamına gelecektir. Hindistan, net bir gaz ithalatçısı olarak, uzun vadede enerji ihtiyaçlarını karşılamak için gaz ithalatına devam etmeyi öngörmektedir. Bu proje, Hindistan ekonomisinin yakıt portföyünü çeşitlendirerek ve büyüme sürecinin sürdürülebilirliğine katkıda bulunarak Hindistan'ın enerji ihtiyaçlarını karşılamada önemli bir rol oynayacaktır. Ayrıca, doğal gazın TAPI üzerinden ithal edilmesi, sıvılaştırılmış doğal gaz (LNG) rotasına kıyasla daha ekonomik olabilme durumu vardır, çünkü sıvılaştırma, taşıma ve ilgili diğer maliyetleri azaltabilecektir³⁷. Buradan bakıldığında TAPI projesi, bölgedeki ekonomik entegrasyonu teşvik ederek, enerji kaynaklarının verimli ve sürdürülebilir bir şekilde kullanılmasına olanak tanıyarak bölgesel kalkınma ve iş birliği için temel bir adım olabilme potansiyelini göstermektedir.

³⁴ Ali, Y., Ahmad, M., Sabir, M., ve Shah, S. A. (2021). Regional development through energy infrastructure: A comparison and optimization of Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) & Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipelines. *Operational Research in Engineering Sciences: Theory and Applications*, 4(3), 82-106, s.83.

³⁵ Lodhi, M. (2001). Security Challenges in South Asia. *The Nonproliferation Review*, 8(2), 118-124, s.120.

³⁶ <https://tr.euronews.com/next/2018/02/28/afghanistan-tapi-projesi-ile-kalkinacak>.

³⁷ Osmani, R. (2016). TAPI gas pipeline: are Sino-US relations a zero-sum game?. *The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*.

Orta Asya bölgesinin gaz ve petrol rezervlerinden faydalanan devletler için, TAPI projesinin büyük jeo-stratejik etkilere sahip olacağı aşikardır. Bölgesel istikrarın ve yaşam standartlarının iyileştirilmesi için kilit bir araç olması beklenmektedir. Aynı şekilde TAPI, Pakistan ve Hindistan'a ucuz gaz sağlarken, geçiş ücreti geliri sağlayarak Afganistan ve Pakistan'a, enerji piyasası oluşturarak Türkmenistan'a katkıda bulunacak ve bu durum tüm ülkelerin ekonomik gelişimine katkı sağlayacaktır. Ekonomik refahı artıracak, yüksek enflasyon oranlarını azaltacak ve temiz enerji kaynaklarıyla tüketicilere erişimi artıracaktır. Bu proje aynı zamanda gelirlerin eğitim, sağlık, su temini ve konut gibi sosyal sektörlerin geliştirilmesinde kullanılmasını mümkün kılacaktır³⁸. Projenin başarılı olması durumunda sadece Güney ve Orta Asya'yı ekonomik açıdan birbirine bağlamakla kalmayacak, aynı zamanda bölgedeki istikrarsızlığı azaltma konusunda katkısı olacaktır³⁹.

Afganistan tarihsel olarak iç çatışmalar ve siyasi istikrarsızlıkla mücadele eden bir ülke olmuştur. Bu iç dinamikler ve güvenlik zayıflıkları, ülkenin dış müdahalelere karşı savunmasız hale gelmesine ve egemenlik yeteneğinin sınırlı kalmasına yol açmıştır. TAPI doğalgaz boru hattı gibi büyük ölçekli altyapı projeleri, Afganistan'ın zayıf devlet yapısını uzun vadede aşması ve içsel istikrarsızlığına çözüm bulması için bir fırsat sunabilir. Ancak, ülkenin bu tür projelerdeki rolü, içsel zayıflıkları ve güvenlik tehditleriyle şekillenmektedir. Bu durum, Afganistan'ın hem iç politikaları hem de bölgesel etkileşimleri göz önünde bulundurularak değerlendirilmelidir.

Afganistan Zayıf Devleti

Zayıf devletlerin ciddi bir güvenlik tehdidi oluşturabileceği hipotezine göre; hayatta kalmaları iç baskılar tarafından tehdit edilen ve siyasi istikrarsızlığı ile çatışma yaratma potansiyeli diğer devletlere sıçrayabilecek devletlerin bu zayıflıkları ciddi güvenlik tehditlerine neden olmaktadır. Zayıf devletlerin hayatta kalma yetenekleri konusunda oldukça düşük bir seviye izlemesi onları dış müdahalelere karşı daha savunmasız hale getirirken egemenlik kavramının da var olmalarına yetecek kadar yani asgari düzeyde kalmasına neden olmaktadır⁴⁰. Buna göre zayıf devletlerin zayıflığı çevresindeki devletleri de zayıflatmaktadır.

Zayıf devletler teorisi, zayıf bir devletin, çevresindeki diğer devletlerin de güvenliğini etkileyebileceğini savunmaktadır. Afganistan gibi bir zayıf devletin iç istikrarsızlığı,

³⁸ Rajpoot, A. R., ve Naeem, S. (2020). Geopolitics of Energy Pipelines: Case Study of TAPI and IP gas Pipelines. *International Journal on Integrated Education*, 3(8), 15-22, s.19.

³⁹Osmani, R. (2016). TAPI gas pipeline: are Sino-US relations a zero-sum game?. *The Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst*.

⁴⁰ Helman, G. B., & Ratner, S. R. (1992). Saving failed states. *Foreign policy*, (89), 3-20.

sınırlarında yaşanan çatışmalar veya siyasi belirsizlikler, bölgesel istikrara ve komşu ülkelerin güvenliğine zarar verebilmektedir. TAPI doğalgaz boru hattı projesindeki ülkelerden biri olan Afganistan'ın içsel zayıflıkları, sınır güvenliği ve istikrarı zedeyerek, ülkenin kontrolü dışındaki bölgelerinde var olan çatışmalar veya güvenlik zaafiyetleri, komşu ülkelerle olan ilişkilerini etkileyebilmektedir. Bu durum, sınırlarda kaçakçılık, terör faaliyetleri veya silahlı grupların hareketliliği gibi sorunların yayılmasına ve bölgesel istikrarı tehdit etmesine yol açabilmektedir.

Nitekim Afganistan, enerji kaynaklarına erişimde kısıtlamalar yaşayan bir ülkedir ve bu nedenle enerji güvenliği büyük bir sorundur. Afganistan'daki enerji güvenliğini tehdit eden faktörler arasında iç istikrarsızlık ve güvensizlik önemli bir yer tutmaktadır. Terör örgütlerinin faaliyetleri ve iç savaşlar, enerji altyapısına zarar verebilir ve enerji tedarikini kesintiye uğratabilmektedir. Kesintiler ve gecikmeler, Afganistan'daki istikrarsızlık nedeniyle TAPI doğalgaz boru hattı projesinin hayata geçirilememesi, bölgesel enerji güvenliğini olumsuz etkileyebilmektedir. Bu durum sadece Afganistan'ın enerji güvenliğini değil, aynı zamanda Türkmenistan, Pakistan ve Hindistan gibi diğer proje ortaklarının da güvenliğini etkileyebilmektedir.

Türkmenistan, TAPI projesinin kaynak ülkesidir ve doğalgaz rezervlerine sahiptir. Bu proje aracılığıyla doğal gazını uluslararası pazarlara taşıyarak ekonomisini çeşitlendirmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Ancak Afganistan'daki güvensizlik ve terör tehditleri, bu gazın güvenli bir şekilde taşınmasını tehlikeye atabilmektedir. Pakistan, TAPI projesiyle doğalgaz tedarikini artırmayı ve enerji güvenliğini iyileştirmeyi hedeflemektedir. Ancak yine Afganistan'daki istikrarsızlık, enerji arzını kesintiye uğratma ve Pakistan'ın enerji güvenliğini tehdit etme potansiyeline sahiptir. Hindistan, enerji talebinin sürekli arttığı bir ülke olarak TAPI projesini enerji güvenliğini artırmak için bir fırsat olarak görmektedir. Ancak yine Afganistan kaynaklı güvenlik tehditleri, Hindistan'ın doğalgaz tedarikini kesintiye uğratma riskini taşımaktadır.

Güney Asya enerji projelerinin genel algılaması gibi, TAPI projesine de enerji işbirliği yerine savunma ve güvenlik perspektifinden bakılmaktadır⁴¹. Bölge, toprak iddialarının karmaşık doğası ve dini aşırılık yanlısı faaliyetler gibi birbirini güçlendiren güvenlik, ekonomik ve diplomatik faktörlerin dinamik etkileşimiyle karakterize edilmiştir⁴².

⁴¹ Huda, M. S., ve Ali, S. H. (2017). Energy diplomacy in South Asia: Beyond the security paradigm in accessing the TAPI pipeline project. *Energy research & social science*, 34, 202-213, s.99.

⁴² Rawan, N., ve Grishin, O. E. (2020). Importance of Afghanistan for Regional Security in South and East Asia. *Sovyet Sonrası Bölge Sorunları*, 7(1), 94-103, s.95.

Sonuç olarak, Afganistan'daki enerji güvenliği tehdidi, TAPI projesinin tüm paydaş ülkeleri üzerinde olumsuz etkilere neden olabilecek ciddi bir endişe kaynağıdır. Bu nedenle, bu proje sadece enerji güvenliğini artırmakla kalmayacak, aynı zamanda bölgesel istikrara katkıda bulunarak bu tehditleri azaltmaya yönelik bir adım olarak önem taşımaktadır.

TAPI Doğal Gaz Boru Hattı Projesinin Güney Asya Bölge Güvenliği İçin Önemi

TAPI doğalgaz boru hattı, bölge devletlerinin artan enerji taleplerini karşılamak ve yeni enerji bölgeleri oluşturmak için ikili ilişkileri güçlendirmek ve ekonomik işbirliğini teşvik etmek için bir fırsat sunmaktadır. Sürdürülebilir enerji temini, bir ülkenin kalkınması ve ekonomik büyümesi için kritik öneme sahip bir faktördür. Proje tamamlandığında, bu boru hattı Güney Asya pazarlarına ulaşan ilk Orta Asya enerji nakil hattı olacaktır.

Enerji kaynakları politikası, bölgesel ve uluslararası güçler arasında stratejik bir öneme sahiptir. ABD'nin TAPI'yi desteklemesinin altında Orta Asya'daki Rus etkisini azaltma çabası olduğu sıkça ifade edilmiştir. Bununla birlikte, ABD'nin boru hattını Afganistan'da istikrar ve barışın sağlanması için bir araç olarak görmesi, Pakistan ile Hindistan arasında işbirliği mekanizması oluşturma çabası da gerçekçi bir nedendir. ABD, TAPI'yı Yeni İpek Yolu vizyonunun bir parçası olarak değerlendirmekte; bu vizyon, Orta Asya ülkeleri arasında ticaret, hidroelektrik projeleri ve sınır ötesi taşımacılık anlaşmalarını kolaylaştıran bir entegrasyon projesidir. Eğer Yeni İpek Yolu ve Tek Kuşak Tek Yol projelerinin sinerjisi sağlanabilirse, TAPI, bölgesel entegrasyon gündemine bütüncül bir yaklaşım getirebilir ve güvenlik sorunlarına ortak bir çözüm sunabilir. Bu durumda, TAPI, küresel süper güç ile dünyanın en büyük ikinci ekonomisi arasındaki jeopolitik rekabeti hafifletebilecek benzersiz bir fırsat sunabilir⁴³. Ancak Washington ve Pekin, Orta Asya'daki büyük güç rekabetinden sadece Güney Asya güvenliğinin yumuşamasıyla vazgeçmeleri kolay bir seçenek değildir.

Pekin'in alt kıtaya katılımı genellikle Yeni Delhi'de şüpheyle karşılanmaktadır. Çin, Hindistan'ın en büyük ticaret ortağı konumundadır ve TAPI'nin yarattığı ekonomik ve politik sinerjiler, iyi bir ticari ilişkiye katkıda bulunabilir. Ancak Hindistan'ın, Mayıs 2017'deki Tek Kuşak Tek Yol Zirvesi'ni boykot etme kararı, Asya'da ekonomik ve enerji alanındaki karşılıklı bağımlılık beklentilerini zedelemiştir. Bununla birlikte, bu gerilemeye rağmen, bir sonraki ay Hindistan ve Pakistan, Rusya ve Çin tarafından yönetilen Şanghay İşbirliği Örgütü'nün tam üyesi olmuşlardır⁴⁴. Buradan bakıldığında Çin ve Hindistan arasındaki dengeli bir ekonomik

⁴³ Huda, M. S., ve Ali, S. H. (2017). Energy diplomacy in South Asia: Beyond the security paradigm in accessing the TAPI pipeline project. *Energy research & social science*, 34, 202-213, s.207.

⁴⁴ Agm,s.206.

işbirliği ve karşılıklı yarara dayalı ilişkiler, bölgede geniş bir enerji ağı oluşturulması açısından kritik bir öneme sahiptir.

ABD-Hindistan stratejik ortaklığı, bölgedeki enerji anlaşmalarının belirlenmesinde temel bir unsur olarak kabul edilebilir. Hem ABD hem de Hindistan'ın, Basra Körfezi'ndeki ekonomik ve stratejik çıkarları paralellik göstermektedir. ABD, Orta Asya'daki etkisini sürdürmek arzusundadır ve bu bağlamda TAPI doğalgaz boru hattının başarılı bir şekilde tamamlanması önem arz etmektedir. Bu proje, iki rakip devlet olan Pakistan ve Hindistan arasında daha yakın ve samimi ilişkilerin gelişmesine ve bölgesel entegrasyon için enerji transferi kaynağı olabilecek bir temel oluşturma potansiyeline sahiptir⁴⁵. TAPI projesinin başarılı bir şekilde hayata geçirilmesi, Hindistan ve Pakistan arasındaki ilişkilerin gelişimi için bir köprü oluşturup ve böylece bölgesel iş birliğini güçlendirirken, ABD'nin de Orta Asya'daki etkisini artırarak bölgedeki stratejik konumunu daha da pekiştirebilir.

Rusya, enerji kaynakları açısından zengin olan eski Sovyetler Birliği devletlerinin kontrolünü elinde tutmaya çabalamaktadır, ancak yeni devletler bu kontrolü azaltmaya çalışmaktadır. Özellikle Türkmenistan, Rusya'ya olan gaz ihracatına olan bağımlılığını azaltmak ve alternatif bir boru hattı ağı oluşturmak için adımlar atmaktadır. Rusya, Gazprom gibi dev bir gaz şirketinin TAPI boru hattına Türkmenistan'ın katılmasına izin verme teklifini Ekim 2010'da sunmuş ancak Aşkabat tarafından reddedilmişti⁴⁶.

TAPI projesi, Pakistan için ise, bu projeden sağlanacak olan gaz, elektrik üretimi için kullanılacak potansiyele sahiptir. TAPI boru hattından geçecek olan gaz, 6.000 megavatlık bir elektrik üretimine olanak sağlayarak Pakistan'ın mevcut en büyük baraj olan Tarbela Barajı'nın üretiminden daha fazla elektrik üretebilme potansiyeline sahip olduğu anlamına gelir. Pakistan, son zamanlarda Orta Asya ülkelerinden LNG tedariki konusunda adımlar atmış olsa da, yerel doğal gaz ihtiyacını karşılamak için kaynakları artırmaya ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Ayrıca, proje, Hindistan'a yapılan ödemelerde ömrü boyunca sürekli bir döviz arzı sağlayabilir. Bu proje, inşaat ve işletme süreciyle birlikte kamu ve özel yatırımları artırabilir ve istihdam oluşturabilir⁴⁷. Aynı zamanda, Pakistan'ın enerji talebindeki artışı karşılamak için TAPI projesi, ülkenin enerji bağımlılığını azaltarak ekonomik büyümeyi destekleyebilir.

⁴⁵ Rajpoot, A. R., ve Naeem, S. (2020). Geopolitics of Energy Pipelines: Case Study of TAPI and IP gas Pipelines. *International Journal on Integrated Education*, 3(8), 15-22, s.21.

⁴⁶ D'Souza, S. (2011). The TAPI Pipeline: A Recipe for Peace or Instability?. *ISAS Brief*, (194), s.3.

⁴⁷ Ali, Y., Ahmad, M., Sabir, M., ve Shah, S. A. (2021). Regional development through energy infrastructure: A comparison and optimization of Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) & Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipelines. *Operational Research in Engineering Sciences: Theory and Applications*, 4(3), 82-106, s.87.

Afganistan'ın önemi, karada önemli bir ticaret ve ticaret yolu olan eski İpek Yolu'nda bulunmasıyla yeniden vurgulanmalıdır. Afganistan kendisi enerji zengini olmasa da, İran ve Türkmenistan ile birlikte konumu onu daha da önemli kılmaktadır⁴⁸. TAPI doğalgaz boru hattından beklenen, tüm bölgedeki siyasi ve sosyal istikrarın desteklenmesini ve güçlendirilmesini teşvik etmesi ve Afganistan'ın ekonomisini canlandırmasıdır⁴⁹. Afganistan'ın projeden kazanacağı açık nedenler bulunmaktadır. Dış yardıma bağımlı bir 'kiracı devlet' için boru hattı, ekonomik büyümeyi ateşlemek, gelir ve istihdam yaratmak için fırsatlar sağlayabilir - uzun vadeli istikrar için bir reçete olabilir. Kabil'deki hükümetin yıllık geçiş ücretlerinden 1,4 milyar ABD dolarından fazla kazanabileceği tahmin edilmektedir. Ayrıca, bu proje Afganistan'ın kara yolunu kullanarak günde yaklaşık 2.400 ton benzin tedarik ettiği İran'a olan bağımlılığını azaltmasına olanak tanımaktadır. Bu tür bir bağımlılığın, en azından yakın geçmişte, baskın tedarikçiye Afganistan'ın satın alınan ürünü kullanma yeteneğini kontrol etmek için bile bir araç sağlayan bir bedeli olmuştur⁵⁰. Uzun vadede bu proje aynı zamanda Afganistan'ın enerji bağımsızlığını artırarak bölgesel ilişkilerde daha dengeleyici bir rol oynamasına da olanak tanıyabilir.

Aralık 2015'teki TAPI boru hattı temel atma töreninde Afganistan'ın eski Devlet Başkanı Eşref Ghani'nin ifadeleri şöyleydi: “TAPI, altyapıya yönelik işbirliği anlayışının bir başlangıcıdır. İlk aşamada doğalgaz boru hattı geliyor, ancak dört ülke arasında yürütülen müzakereler sonucunda TAPI'nin yanı sıra fiber optik şebekenin de bu projeye eşlik edeceğine dair bir anlaşma yapıldı. Bu, Hindistan'dan Pakistan'a, Afganistan'dan Türkmenistan'a ve Avrupa'ya kadar olan yolculukların en hızlı ve en güvenilir şekilde gerçekleşeceği bir altyapıdır. Ayrıca TAPI hattı boyunca Türkmenistan'dan Afganistan üzerinden Pakistan'a elektrik iletimi gerçekleştirilecek tarihi bir adım olacaktır. Afganistan, demiryolları, otoyollar, su kanalları ve su yönetimi gibi alt yapıları birleştirmeye kararlıdır. Bu nedenle TAPI sadece bir boru hattı projesi değil, aynı zamanda Güney Asya ve Orta Asya'yı tekrar birbirine bağlayacak büyük bir işbirliği ve koordinasyon girişimidir”⁵¹. Ghani'nin ifadeleri, TAPI'nin sadece enerji transferi değil, aynı zamanda bölgesel ilişkileri güçlendirecek ve kapsamlı bir altyapı ağı oluşturacak geniş kapsamlı bir proje olduğunu vurgulamaktadır.

⁴⁸ Rawan, N., ve Grishin, O. E. (2020). Importance of Afghanistan for Regional Security in South and East Asia. *Sovyet Sonrası Bölge Sorunları*, 7(1), 94-103, s.97.

⁴⁹ Begjanov, A. (2021). Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline. *Central Asian Journal Of Theoretical & Applied Sciences*, 2(1), 8-12, s.3.

⁵⁰ D'Souza, S. (2011). The TAPI Pipeline: A Recipe for Peace or Instability?. *ISAS Brief*, (194), s.3.

⁵¹ Rajpoot, A. R., ve Naeem, S. (2020). Geopolitics of Energy Pipelines: Case Study of TAPI and IP gas Pipelines. *International Journal on Integrated Education*, 3(8), 15-22, s.18.

Afganistan, karayla çevrili olması nedeniyle ticaretin çeşitli alanlarında komşularına bağımlıdır. Bu durum, ülkeyi Doğu ve Batı Asya ile Orta Doğu arasında bağlayan Güney Asya'da stratejik bir konuma getirir. TAPI projesi, sadece boru hatlarının geçtiği ülkelerde ekonomik büyümeyi teşvik etmekle kalmayıp, aynı zamanda insanlara enerji sağlayarak, üretim ve sosyal altyapıyı geliştirerek, istihdam imkanları yaratarak bir dizi sorunun çözümüne katkıda bulunabilir. Bu etkiler, genel siyasi durumu olumlu yönde etkileyerek bölgedeki istikrarı artırabilir⁵². Bu anlamda bölgesel iş birliği ve enerji paylaşımı yoluyla Afganistan'ın ve diğer ülkelerin kalkınma ve bağımsızlığını artırarak genel olarak bölgedeki güvenliği ve refahı desteklemeyi amaçlamaktadır.

Diğer taraftan bu durum, yoksulluğun azalması ve refahın yükselmesiyle, istihdam olanaklarının artması ve gençlerin aşırılık yanlısı gruplara katılma şartlarının azalmasıyla sonuçlanabilir. Ayrıca, ekonomik çıkarlarını etkileyen güvenlik endişelerini ele almak için komşularıyla ortak stratejiler geliştirme konusunda yönlendirici olabilir. Bu nedenle, TAPI projesi Güney Asya'da Güven Arttırıcı Önlem (CBM) olma potansiyeline sahiptir. Eğer faydalar adil bir şekilde dağıtılırsa, bu durum yerel halkın daha fazla katılımını teşvik ederek yerel sahipliği artırabilir. Hükümetler, özellikle istikrarsız bölgelerde, yerel halkın desteğini kazanmanın ve halkın gelecekteki desteklerini sağlamanın önemli olduğu bilinciyle güvenlik yönetişimini ve hizmet sunumunu geliştirmede bu projenin yardımcı olabileceğini görebilirler⁵³.

Diğer taraftan bu proje, bölge devletlerinden olan İran'ı yeni bir enerji ihracat ekonomisi oluşturma ve dışlanma endişesiyle karşı karşıya bırakmıştır. İran, kış ısıtması ve yakıt ihtiyaçları için giderek artan bir şekilde Türkmen doğal gazına bağımlı durumdadır ve petrol sahalarını verimli bir şekilde tutabilmek için bu gazın pompalanmasına ihtiyaç duymaktadır. Eğer TAPI projesi gerçekleşirse, Türkmenistan'ın İran'a olan enerji ihracatına bağımlılığı önemli ölçüde azalabilir. Bu durumda İran, Türkmenistan'a enerji anlaşmalarında kendi şartlarını dayatma konusunda baskı yapma konumunda olmayabilir⁵⁴. Bu durum, bölgedeki enerji dengelerinin değişmesine ve İran'ın kendi enerji politikalarını revize etme ihtimaline işaret etmektedir.

Nihayetinde boru hattının genel olarak bölgede ticaret ve işbirliğini artırarak, aynı zamanda dört ülke arasında barış ve güvenliği desteklemesi beklenmektedir. Projenin uzun vadeli enerji

⁵²Begjanov, A. (2021). Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline. *Central Asian Journal Of Theoretical & Applied Sciences*, 2(1), 8-12, s.2.

⁵³ Rajpoot, A. R., ve Naeem, S. (2020). Geopolitics of Energy Pipelines: Case Study of TAPI and IP gas Pipelines. *International Journal on Integrated Education*, 3(8), 15-22, s.20.

⁵⁴ D'Souza, S. (2011). The TAPI Pipeline: A Recipe for Peace or Instability?. *ISAS Brief*, (194), s.4.

güvenliği sağlayarak Afganistan, Pakistan ve Hindistan'da 1,5 milyardan fazla insanın faydalanması öngörülmektedir. Ayrıca, projenin Türkmenistan'ın gelirlerini gaz satışları yoluyla artırma hedefi de bulunmaktadır⁵⁵.

Sonuç olarak, bu proje diğer projelerin başlatılmasında ve ikili ve bölgesel bağlantıların geliştirilmesinde büyük bir etki yaratabilir. Boru hattı, insanlar ve hükümetler arasında güven oluşturarak, sıfır toplamlı rekabet yerine karşılıklı yarar sağlayan işbirliği çerçevesine geçmelerini teşvik edebilir. Karşılıklı güvenlik algısını geliştirmek, barışın inşasına yardımcı olabilir ve aşırılık yanlısı grupların gelişmesi için koşulları zorlaştırabilir. Böylece bölgedeki iş birliği ve ilişkilerin güçlenmesinde katalizör rolü oynayarak, uzun vadede bölgesel istikrarın ve refahın sağlanmasına önemli katkılarda bulunabilir.

TAPI boru hattının gerçekleştirilmesindeki önemli zorluklardan biri, enerji söyleminin güvenleştirilmesi olarak öne çıkmaktadır. Bu perspektife göre, TAPI projesinin güvenlik unsurlarından arındırılması, dört üye ülkenin ötesinde daha geniş bir paydaş grubuna erişim sağlayabilir. TAPI'nin üye ülkelerinin yanı sıra bölge ülkelerinin ve dış güçlerin çıkarlarının anlaşılması, boru hattının güvenliğini sağlama açısından çıkarların yakınlaştırılmasının değerlendirilmesini gerektirir. Ayrıca, toplum düzeyindeki paydaşların çıkarlarını ele almak için sosyo-ekonomik programlar aracılığıyla yol haritalarının belirlenmesi, insan güvenliği endişelerini projenin planına entegre ederek boru hattının fiziksel güvenliğine yönelik açık vurguyu azaltabilir. Bu daha geniş paydaş grubuna erişimin kümülatif etkisi, TAPI'nin savunma ve güvenlik alanından kapsayıcı işbirliğine doğru algısında bir değişiklik yaratabilir. Bu tür bir yaklaşım, enerji konularını barış inşası için araçsal bir mekanizma olarak yükseltme potansiyeline sahip olduğunu göstermektedir⁵⁶.

Bu bağlamda TAPI projesi, üye ülkeler arasında karşılıklı fayda sağlayacak bir kazan-kazan durumu yaratacaktır. Hindistan, artan enerji talebine daha uygun fiyatlı gaz sağlarken, Afganistan ülkede şu anda neredeyse olmayan iş ve istihdam olanakları yaratarak fayda elde edecektir. Bu yakalanan istikrar, bölge güvenliği açısından son derece önemlidir. Ayrıca, Türkmenistan'ın enerji pazarını genişletmesi ve bölgedeki müşterileriyle daha stratejik bir ilişki kurması için bir fırsat sunacaktır. TAPI, bu ülkelerin ekonomilerini iyileştirerek enerji ihtiyaçlarını karşılayacak ve nihayetinde Güney ve Orta Asya'daki insanların yaşam standartlarını artırmak için ana kaynak olacaktır. Ancak Afganistan'ın, şu anda Taliban

⁵⁵<https://www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/turkmenistan-afghanistan-pakistan-india-tapi-gas-pipeline-project/>.

⁵⁶ Huda, M. S., ve Ali, S. H. (2017). Energy diplomacy in South Asia: Beyond the security paradigm in accessing the TAPI pipeline project. *Energy research & social science*, 34, 202-213, s.99.

yönetimi altında ele alınması (2021 itibariyle), projenin beklentileri için büyük bir zorluk oluşturmaktadır. Bu durum, TAPI projesinin başarılı bir şekilde yürütülmesini büyük ölçüde etkileyebilir. Gelecekteki çalışmalar, bu projelerin Afganistan'daki yönetim durumuna bağlı olacaktır⁵⁷. Bu nedenle TAPI'nin başarısı, bölgedeki politik ve güvenlik dinamiklerindeki değişimlere duyarlı bir şekilde yönetilmesine bağlıdır.

Afganistan'ın Maden ve Petrol Bakanlığı sözcüsü İsmatullah Burhan, TOLO News'e verdiği demeçte, çevre ülkelerin istikrarlı bir Afganistan'a yönelik çağrılarına yanıt verdiklerini ve TAPI projesi inşaatındaki engelleri aşmak için çaba sarf ettiklerini ifade etmiştir. Aynı zamanda, Taliban'ın Maliye Bakanlığı sözcüsü Ahmad Wali Haqmal, ilerlemeyi engelleyen yalnızca teknik zorluklar olduğunu belirterek işlerin finansal yönünün "çözüldüğünü" de ifade etmiştir. Haqmal, teknik ekiplerinin Türkmenistan ekibiyle iş birliği içinde olduğunu ve arazi edinimi çalışmalarını tamamlamak için çalıştıklarını belirtmiştir⁵⁸. Projenin finansal güvencesi ve teknik zorlukların üstesinden gelinmesi, TAPI'nin Afganistan'daki uygulanabilirliğini ve bölgesel etkilerini belirlemede kritik bir rol oynamaktadır.

Afganistan'daki içsel zayıflıklar, komşu ülkelerin güvenlik endişelerini artırabilir ve bölgede bir dizi olumsuz etki yaratabilir. Bu, sınır güvenliği ve istikrarın zayıflamasına, terörizm veya kaçakçılık gibi sorunların yayılmasına ve bölgesel güvenliği tehlikeye atabilecek durumların ortaya çıkmasına neden olabilir. Dolayısıyla, 1990'larda ortaya çıkmış olan TAPI'nin henüz gerçekleştirilememiş olmasında Afganistan zayıf devletindeki istikrarsızlığın önemli bir etken oluşu, komşu ülkelerin enerji politikalarını etkileyebilmiş ve bölgesel istikrara zarar verme durumu ortaya çıkmıştır. Ancak gerçekleşmesi durumunda sağlanabilecek kazançların önemiyle birlikte hem paydaş devletlere hem de daha genel anlamda bölgeye olan geniş çaplı katkıları nedeniyle projeden vazgeçilmemiştir.

SONUÇ

TAPI projesi tamamlandığı takdirde Güney Asya'daki ilişkilere ve bu bölgenin istikrarı ve güvenliği için önemli katkıları olacağı aşikardır. Bölgedeki mevcut stratejileri değiştirmekle beraber diğer entegrasyon projelerine de ivme kazandırabilecektir. Son durumda 2022 Mart ayında Hindistan devlet başkanı Türkmenistan başbakanını ziyaret ederek TAPI inşaatının devam etmesine dair görüşme yapmışlardır. Ancak boru hattının büyük kısmının

⁵⁷ Ali, Y., Ahmad, M., Sabir, M., ve Shah, S. A. (2021). Regional development through energy infrastructure: A comparison and optimization of Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) & Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipelines. *Operational Research in Engineering Sciences: Theory and Applications*, 4(3), 82-106, s.88.

⁵⁸ <https://thediplomat.com/2022/04/indias-plan-to-realize-tapi/> Erişim Tarihi:20.11.2021.

Afganistan'dan geçileceği göz önüne alındığında Afganistan projenin içerisinde kilit konumdadır. ABD'nin 2020 itibariyle Afganistan'dan çekilmeye başlaması ve Taliban'ın devlet yönetimini ele geçirmesiyle Taliban'ın proje için vereceği güven önem arz etmektedir. Afganistan'daki istikrarsızlık ve güvenlik endişeleri, projenin tüm ortaklarının enerji güvenliğini etkileyebilir ve bölgesel enerji dengesini bozabilir. Bu nedenle, projenin hayata geçirilememesi veya aksamaları, sadece Afganistan'ın değil, bölgedeki diğer ülkelerin de enerji güvenliğini olumsuz yönde etkileyebilmektedir.

Paydaş ülkelerin bahsedilen önemli çıkar alanları 1990'lardan beri sürüncemede kalan bu boru hattından vazgeçilememesini sağlamıştır. TAPI Projesi söz konusu bölgenin Güney Asya olması nedeniyle proje paydaşları çerçevesinde bölgedeki işbirliğini geliştirip, istikrara katkı sağlamasından dolayı bölge güvenliği ile doğrudan bağlantılıdır. Karşılıklı bağımlılık unsurunun sağlanması ve bölgedeki istikrarla beraber entegrasyonun artması devletler arasındaki, anlaşmazlık konularında da yumuşatıcı etkisi itibariyle bölge güvenliği için oldukça önem arz eden bir projedir.

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Ali, Y., Ahmad, M., Sabir, M., ve Shah, S. A. (2021). Regional development through energy infrastructure: A comparison and optimization of Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) & Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipelines. *Operational Research in Engineering Sciences: Theory and Applications*, 4(3), 82-106.

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Green Theory In The Realm Of International Security, Peace, And Development

Ayşegül Ün⁵⁹

Introduction

A new purpose for the new age of international relations discipline has emerged concomitant with the advent of the Green Theory. As the global community grapples with the complexities of the present epoch, encompassing endeavours to comprehend the prevailing state of affairs and devise strategies to navigate or mitigate the tumult of conflicts, disparities, and environmental upheavals, the avant-garde theories in international relations stand in stark contrast to their classical counterparts.

Within this context, the Green Theory assumes prominence in the discourse surrounding the nascent world order. Diverging from a singular focus on environmental concerns and conservation, this theoretical framework manifests a multifaceted and pragmatic orientation, addressing a spectrum of challenges confronted by the purported power-actors within international systems. This paper aims to explicate the methodological framework of the Green Theory, undertaking a comparative analysis vis-à-vis classical international relations theories, with the aspiration of proffering insightful recommendations for ameliorative measures.

Green Theory of International Relations

Fundamentally, this normative, critical, and interdisciplinary paradigm of contemporary provenance of Green Politics scrutinize economic and technological advancements that engender deleterious effects on the natural milieu. In its critique, this new age theory not only underscores the need for systemic alterations but also advocates for a paradigm shift aimed at safeguarding the well-being of all living creatures within the environment. Furthermore, the classification of the Green Theory within the ambit of post-positivism is plausible. Positivism, with its contention that humanity is distinct from the broader natural world and espouses dominion over nature through the embrace of scientific principles and economic rationality, stands in contrast to the post-positivist tenets embraced by the Green Theory. This post-positivist stance underscores a departure from the positivist premise, positing a more nuanced and interconnected relationship between humanity and the environment.

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The advent of industrialization and capitalism catalysed a paradigmatic shift, redirecting the focal point of scientific and political discourses toward realms characterized by perpetual competition. Subsequent to the aftermath of World War II, the deleterious ramifications of industrialization became palpable, notably in the form of escalating pollution and environmental predicaments. Concurrently, a heightened awareness of these issues burgeoned in tandem with the global reordering that ensued during the post-war economic upswing, giving rise to challenges such as burgeoning population, substantial energy demands, and escalating resource consumption. Consequently, the Green Theory emerges as a distinct sub-branch within the broader framework of international political economy, aligned with the precepts of the international relations school.

International Framework

The 1972 Stockholm Conference convened by the United Nations marked a pivotal moment in addressing the interplay between human activities and the environment. Two decades later, the 1992 Rio Earth Summit played a crucial role in setting the global environmental agenda. Subsequently, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol represented a landmark commitment by industrialized nations and transitioning economies to curtail and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions in alignment with specified individual targets. The culmination of these efforts materialized in the 2016 Paris Agreement, a comprehensive accord wherein nations pledged to collectively reduce emissions and collaborate on adaptive strategies in response to the multifaceted challenges posed by climate change.

It is imperative to underscore that international environmental conferences convene in response to the exigencies and requisites of the international community, eschewing the inclination to institute sanctioning mechanisms or devise novel punitive strategies. The primary objective of these gatherings is to formulate policy recommendations conducive to fostering equitable transformations. For instance, within the framework of United Nations assemblies, there is a recurrent reference to sustainable development goals. The Green Theory, in this context, engages in a discourse aimed at elucidating pathways for the actualization of such transformative objectives. Noteworthy is the disconcerting statistic revealing that between 2013 and 2020, less than 1% of the aggregate global financial allocations for renewable energy initiatives were directed towards low-income countries.⁶⁰ In 2019, high-income countries (16% of the world's population) were responsible for 40% of global consumption-based CO₂

⁶⁰ Irena and CPI, "Global Landscape Of Renewable Energy Finance, 2023", International Renewable Energy Agency, (Abu Dhabi, 2023)

emissions, while low-income countries' contribution was a negligible 0.4%. Africa's current consumption-based emissions are less than 4%, despite the continent being home to 17% of the world's population.⁶¹

Green Politics and Environmentalism

Green Politics and Environmentalism, while seemingly akin, manifest distinct trajectories toward shared objectives. Primarily, environmentalism acknowledges the prevailing political, social, and economic framework of global politics. The environmentalist perspective posits that the existing international system possesses the capacity to address prevailing challenges, consequently advocating, and encouraging for collaborative efforts facilitated by international cooperation and organizations. This ideology espouses an anthropocentric worldview, characterizing nature through the lens of human values.

Conversely, Green Politics posits that the primary causes of environmental degradation lie within the overarching social, political, and economic global structures, necessitating their transformation and confrontation. The Green ideological standpoint rejects the involvement of states or other authoritative actors in addressing environmental issues, contending that these entities exacerbate the situation by being intrinsic contributors to the problem. Green Theory embraces an eco-centric perspective, asserting an inseparable bond between nature and humanity, wherein harm inflicted upon one is tantamount to harm inflicted upon the other. This paradigm rejects anthropocentrism and adopts an eco-centric, nature based ethical viewpoint, positing that no entity holds supremacy over other living beings.

Green Ideology, as endorsed by environmentalism, confronts two pivotal concepts in its pursuit, namely sustainable development, and ecological modernization. Sustainability in development contends that simultaneous economic growth and environmental protection are achievable. In contrast, ecological modernization advocates for collaborative efforts between the state and the market to safeguard the environment. Consequently, the Green Perspective critiques the existing world order, grounded in capitalism, industrialization, and consumer culture, positing the imperative for radical transformations, and challenging both aforementioned perspectives. The Green Perspective does not outright reject growth but asserts that the boundaries of growth have already been reached. The proposition that infinite growth is unattainable within a finite system is rooted in the fundamental reality that the world possesses finite resources. In 1972,

⁶¹ "Climate Equality: A planet for the 99%", Oxfam, 2023. <https://policy-practice.oxfam.org/resources/climate-equality-a-planet-for-the-99-621551/> (10.10.2023)

as it was mentioned in the “Report for The Club Of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind”, there are limits to growth.

Concepts of Green Theory

According to Green Theory, foundational concepts within the realm of global regulations remain contentious, lacking a definitive approach to the role of the State. This perspective significantly influences security considerations by extending beyond a human-centric framework, prioritizing the security of the entire natural world. Unlike mainstream international relations theories that predominantly adopt an anthropocentric interpretation of security, Green Theory challenges this perspective, asserting that environmental damage is anthropogenic and attributing responsibility to sovereign states. In parallel to the power struggles and anarchy emphasized in the realist concept, the Green Perspective contends that cooperation among states is improbable, given their role as the source of the environmental predicament, preventing collective action to address the issue.

As Green Theory redefines our understanding of security, the associated threats also undergo a transformation. Rejecting the conventional notions of power struggles and interstate anarchy, the Green Ideology identifies threats arising from uncontrollable agents. Within this framework, the depletion of the ozone layer or climate change are perceived as threats affecting all living beings and the environment. Methodologically, the actors in this paradigm exhibit auto-responsiveness to the altered nature of these threats. The absence of a hierarchical structure among creatures on the planet is emphasized, highlighting their interconnectedness. Consequently, it becomes more apt to characterize these concepts as global rather than international, allowing for the inclusion of local communities and every living entity on Earth in the discourse.

In the ongoing exploration of the Green Structure, an examination of both dependent and independent variables is crucial. Within this framework, wars are construed as environmental issues, yet the prevailing power politics hinder collective efforts by States to address these concerns. The Green Structure, in contrast to power politics, advocates for a departure from anarchy and competition in the system to attain pragmatic results. The pressing reality of threats to essential human needs, particularly the spectre of famine, directly contributes to conflicts and tensions between States. Recognizing this interplay is essential in comprehending the intricate dynamics of environmental issues within the broader context of international relations. A significant proponent of Green Theory, economist E.F. Schumacher, has articulated a foundational framework by identifying six primary anti-nature factors contributing to

environmental degradation. These factors encompass evolutionary processes, competitive dynamics, the principles of natural selection, the survival of the fittest paradigm, the mass production concepts derived from a Marxist interpretation of historical development, and the philosophical underpinnings of Descartes and Newton pertaining to relativity and empirical scientific thinking. Schumacher posits these elements as critical contributors to unbridled industrialization, which he contends is the principal issue exacerbating ecological concerns. In essence, Schumacher's delineation of these factors serves to underscore the multifaceted and interconnected nature of challenges posed by human activities to the natural world within the context of Green Theory.⁶²

Critiques of Green Theory

How will mainstream International Relations Theories elucidate and proffer solutions amidst severe environmental crises? Is the potential consequence of environmental crises a diminution of state authority, or do these crises necessitate global interventions, given the large scale of issues such as climate change? In the context of classical international relations paradigms, the role of state authority in emergency situations may be explicated through the theoretical concept of Securitization. Coined by Ole Wæver in 1993, Securitization represents a synthesis between constructivist and realist approaches. This conceptual framework posits that officials (authority), can declare an existential or potential threat to the audience (target population) in order to justify their acts (restrictive measures). Consequently, those measures such as the imposition of restrictions on liberties and freedoms are implemented in response to perceived threats in emergency situations as long as it was accepted by the audience. The COVID-19 pandemic serves as a notable illustration of the application of the securitization theory and its efficacy in justifying measures that curtail significant liberties and freedoms within the targeted population. However, it is crucial to highlight that both states and other authoritative actors, including the World Health Organization, faced substantial criticism for their perceived lack of preparedness to address the consequences of a global pandemic and the delayed implementation of necessary measures.

Nevertheless, Green Politics unequivocally dismisses the legitimacy of authorities and power structures, attributing them as primary contributors to environmental crises, including pandemics and epidemics. Instead, it advocates for a novel perspective to comprehend and develop a redefined model of sovereignty. A pertinent example is evident in the recent

⁶² Altuğ Günar, "Green Theory in IR", in *Critical Approaches to International Relations: Philosophical Foundations and Current Debates*, ed.M. Kürşad Özekin & Engin Sune (Brill, Leiden, 2022), 242.

campaigns of the United Nations, introducing the term 'Global Citizenship,' although the concept is not entirely novel, emphasizing our shared responsibilities. While acknowledging the significance of incorporating ecological responsibilities in calculating a country's GDP through ecological footprint analysis, it is imperative to recognize the stark reality that the death toll from environmental disasters is approximately seven times higher in the least developed countries compared to their more developed counterparts. In light of this disparity, asserting that we all share equal responsibilities becomes a challenging proposition.

Aligned with the discourse on authority, the Green Ideology underscores the nature of conflict and violence as intricately linked to the basic needs of the population, thereby escalating tensions between States. Notably, the Green Ideology posits that the foundation for peace cannot be established through military means and the self-interest-driven leadership of States. The acknowledgment is made that in times of necessity, states possess the capability to potentially misuse technology, including the deployment of chemical or biological weapons, resulting in catastrophic and irreversible consequences. This stems from the rejection of power, whether hard or soft, and challenges the traditional concept of authority within the framework of Green Theory.

Paradoxically, environmental damages, such as famine or emerging pandemics, which may be overlooked, can instigate shifts in social structures, potentially giving rise to new social classes and exacerbating social conflicts and divisions. This, in turn, could herald the advent of a novel global order. Famine or natural disasters may prompt population movements towards areas with more abundant resources, rendering democratic mechanisms ineffective and culminating in substantial migration flows and population displacement.

The matters of inequality and injustice, inherent in the power dynamics of international relations, find interpretation within the Green Ideology through a direct linkage with both poverty and the quality of life, alongside environmental degradation, forming a comprehensive concept. To dissect this expansive spectrum for a nuanced analysis, Green Theory emphasizes the crucial role of direct democracy achieved through decentralization, with a focus on empowering local organizations over central ones. Consequently, the theory advocates for the establishment of an ecologically sustainable society, prioritizing this over the conventional notion of sustainable development. In this context, sustainability is not geared towards regulating the consequences of industrialization but is perceived as a means to enhance environmental conditions.

In an interconnected manner, the roles of communities and even identities are emphasized, stemming from the principles of eco-centrism. In addressing communities, the scope extends to

encompass all creatures on planet Earth. Recognizing the limitations to growth and the evident unsustainability of our current lifestyle in meeting environmental demands, the primary cause is identified as carbon-based capitalism, characterized by overconsumption and an unsustainable production system. Consequently, there is an imperative to transition towards the establishment of an economically and socially post-carbon society, marked by a pronounced inclination towards low carbon practices, deemed essential for environmental sustainability.

Conclusion

In comprehending the intricacies of international relations, the succession of generational theories serves as a valuable tool to navigate and understand the ongoing dynamics and formulate appropriate responses. Inevitable elements within this complex arena, such as wars, inequalities, and periodic economic or environmental crises, have perennially been integral facets of history and continue to shape our lives. The persisting question revolves around why, despite the repetitive nature of these events, humanity struggles to effectively cope with them. The nature of human behaviour, encapsulated within these theories, spans from realism 'All is in war within a war', to postmodernism, which overthrow the concepts of rationality, objectivity, and universal truth. As events unfold, the multifaceted nature of human responses to the complexities of international relations becomes increasingly apparent.

First-generation theories of international relations, such as classical realism and liberalism conceptualize the intricate relationships among actors and non-actors (dependent and independent variables) in the global arena as systems. In this framework, the interconnectedness of dependent and independent variables implies that any insertion of a disruptive element, can be represented as bugs, to these systems can lead to their collapse. While the reconstruction of empires akin to historical epochs is deemed implausible today, the persistence of ongoing wars underscores the complexity of the international landscape. Transitioning to second-generation theories, can be referred to as "the Neos", efforts to protect the system involve severing interconnections between variables, defining this intricate environment as the international order. When a disruptive element is detected, the affected variable triggers protective measures across the system, ordering other variables to take necessary measures to prevent the collapse. For instance, if the international arena faces an economic crisis, strategies involve engaging private sectors to stimulate the economy, regulating fiscal policies, and leveraging international law and order for beneficial outcomes.

The third wave of international relations theories characterizes the global arena as the international structure or commonly referred the new global structure. In this paradigm, both

the international order and system collectively construct the framework to safeguard against potential disruptions. However, the very entities within this structure are now contributing to its destabilization. This predicament results in a sense of confinement for humans who find themselves unable to adapt to the constraints they have constructed. The Green Theory, as a representative of third-generation international relations theories, encapsulates this impetus while pushing the boundaries of established structures within the intention to rebuild a new one. The behavioural dimension of this theory becomes evident through its assertiveness and extremism across a wide spectrum of issues, ranging from climate change to global injustice and inequality. In its proactive stance, Green Theory proposes solutions to mitigate or slow down the impending disasters caused by irreversible human-made damage. Key tenets for a green future include advocating for a new societal model, emphasizing self-sufficiency, promoting the appropriate use of technology, endorsing decentralization and a balanced population.

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Modern Mob: Cyber-Communication's Impact on Social Change & its Threat to International Security

Heba Anwar Enajah⁶³

Introduction

For centuries, humans have been looking for new methods to facilitate communication; the most recent stage arrived at in this search is cyber-communication⁶⁴. Cyber-communication can briefly be defined as communications facilitated by the internet⁶⁵, that can encompass interpersonal, corporation, and public service communication, as three levels of the human experience of personal, industry, and state⁶⁶, where cyber-communication operates within spheres such as online banking, online shopping, news, social networking, and government interactions. As the focus of this paper is how cyber-communication can relate to social and political mobilisation, state and privatised censorship, and group polarisation in relation to international security, cyber-communication is only taken as a topic of discussion in regards to internet-situated media platforms that facilitate user-interactivity.

This paper first explores the contemporary age of media and the characteristics of social media platforms, including a discussion on whether social media denotes a paradigm shift in communication or if it is reflexive of real-life communities, and the implication of either scenario. Next, this paper discusses the problems that arise due to social media, such as the rapid spread of misinformation, social media's role in increasing polarisation and anti-social behaviour, algorithmic control including the formation of echo-chambers and filter bubbles etc., and the commercialisation of the user. Finally, this paper ends on a discussion on how the optimistic idealisation of a global public sphere, that social media would have enabled, is prevented by the mechanisms that govern platforms and the colonisation of social media platform through agenda-driven political and economic actors.

⁶³ ORCID: 0009-0003-8709-0634

⁶⁴ O'Brien, Pamela C. "Introduction: Social Media History and Use." In *Social Media: Pedagogy and Practice*, by Kehbama Langmia, Tia C. M. Tyree, Pamela O'Brien and Ingrid Sturgis. (Maryland: University Press of America. 2014).

⁶⁵ Ruud, Ryan. *Cyber Communication and Mass Media Theory*. <https://ryanruud.com/resources/cyber-communication-mass-media-theory/>. (02/09/2023).

⁶⁶ Fuchs, Christian. "Social Media and the Public Sphere." (*TripleC Journal for a Global Sustainable Information Society* 57-101. 2014)

The Age of Media

As of July 2023, 64.6% of the world population, equating to 5.19 billion people, was active on the internet⁶⁷. Of these internet users, 94% were active on social media, a total of 60.6% of the world population, with a growth of 3.7% per annum⁶⁸ where a consistent rise in social media usage can be seen across multiple platforms. In many countries, social media and cyber-communication has become an integral part of communication and day-to-day functioning, with a new phenomenon emerging of “living online”⁶⁹, thus, suggesting that humans have entered a new paradigm in their means of communication as it has been retrospectively transformed. Before embarking on the impact of these new forms of communication on social developments and interactions, it is important to first understand the nuances of the term social media. The typical understanding of this concept usually generates the name of specific and current social media platforms, such as Facebook, X (previously Twitter), or Instagram, however, the rise and fall of media platforms necessitates a definition that outlives specific platforms and can be applicable to future innovations⁷⁰, particularly when considering that these platforms are essentially tools that facilitate a wider form of communication⁷¹. For the purposes of integrating a holistic understanding of social media, this paper takes the definition developed by Carr and Hayes (2015):

“Social media are Internet-based channels that allow users to opportunistically interact and selectively self-present, either in real-time or asynchronously, with both broad and narrow audiences who derive value from user-generated content and the perception of interaction with others.”⁷²

This definition is favoured for two dominant reasons; the first being the specified mass-personal communication, where the reality of the varied audience on social media is taken into account, which is comparatively a novel experience for communication in human history⁷³, thus, the explicit reality of conflating interpersonal and organisation communication is adequately considered; the second reason is the inclusion of the term “perception of interaction” which

⁶⁷ Petrosyan, Ani. Number of internet and social media users worldwide as of July 2023 (in billions). <https://www.statista.com/statistics/617136/digital-population-worldwide/#:~:text=Worldwide%20digital%20population%202023&text=As%20of%20July%202023%2C%20there.percent%20of%20the%20global%20population>. (22/09/2023).

⁶⁸ Kemp, Simon. 2023. Global Social Media Statistics. <https://datareportal.com/social-media-users>. (01/09/2023).

⁶⁹ Greenwood, Shannon, Andrew Perrin, and Maeve Duggan. Social Media Update 2016. www.pewresearch.org: Pew Research Centre. 2016. (30/08/2023).

⁷⁰ Carr, Caleb T., and Rebecca A. Hayes. “Social Media: Defining, Developing, and Divining.” *Atlantic Journal of Communication* 23. 1-43. 2015.

⁷¹ Miller, Daniel, et al. *How the World Changed Social Media*. London: UCL Press. 2016.

⁷² Carr, Caleb T., and Rebecca A. Hayes. *Social Media: Defining, Developing, and Divining*. 8

⁷³ O'Brien, Pamela C. *Introduction: Social Media History and Use*.

addresses a root problem within the paper, which is that social media platforms do not necessarily facilitate interaction with different social actors, rather, although the value of social media is tied with its user generated capacity, peer interactions are orchestrated by data-collecting algorithms, meaning that it is a digital manipulation rather than a cross-user generated interaction, although users can perceive it to be an organic interaction. It is for this reason that this form of communication can be equated to a paradigm shift, as communication is no longer about intentional interactivity, but a fabricated, computer and algorithm facilitated, version of interactivity⁷⁴.

As for the context or nature of cyber-communication, it is generally taken for granted that cyber-communities are reflexive of real-life communities, wherein society and culture are perceived to be undergoing “computerisation”, yet, the essence of social media is that it is a reflection of society and not an innovative sphere⁷⁵. The theory of attainment proposes that such technological advancements are not a paradigm shift as they do not correlate to drastic change in humanity, rather they are a stage of what humans have the capacity to do and can neither be afforded a positive nor a negative value in terms of their impact on society, as it is how they are utilised which impacts their moral and ethical standard⁷⁶. Furthermore, regarding the discussion of social media platforms as the start of a global public sphere due to the lack of intermediation, where users at the forefront of communicating with each other regardless of their geographical situation can establish such a connection⁷⁷, this conceptualisation becomes less likely when the behaviour of user’s is considered, where people prefer and are more likely to engage with like-minded people only⁷⁸. Accordingly, social media platforms can be understood as culturally dependent and not as global public spheres⁷⁹, as diverse content can transform the media platform according to its user’s, meaning that the cultural alignment of social media platforms is a consequence of user-interaction, rather than a cause of user-interaction, which abides by the definition that these platforms are realised by user-generated content. Therefore, this perspective sees social media as a tabula-rasa and promotes the idea that social media and society operate within a level of circulatory interactions, where social media becomes diversified as a result of its users, and is thus, a networked public space⁸⁰.

⁷⁴ Carr, Caleb T., and Rebecca A. Hayes. *Social Media: Defining, Developing, and Divining*.

⁷⁵ Ruud, Ryan. “Cyber Communication and Mass Media Theory”

⁷⁶ Miller, Daniel, et al. *How the World Changed Social Media*.

⁷⁷ Zimmer, Franziska et al. “Fake News in Social Media: Bad Algorithms or Biased Users?” *Journal of Information Science Theory and Practice* 40-53. 2019.

⁷⁸ Sunstein, Cass R. “The Law of Group Polarization.” *John M. Olin Program in L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 91 1-30*. 1999.

⁷⁹ Fuchs, Christian. “Social Media and the Public Sphere.”

⁸⁰ Miller, Daniel, et al. *How the World Changed Social Media*.

However, this notion of a networked public space contradicts the reflected-community understanding of social media, as the boundaries of public space are blurred and conflated on social media. Within society exists social differentiation that occurs within different spheres that can be mutually exclusive or inclusive but are all recognised as independent spheres of social life and can be divided into a Private or Public sphere, such as, culture at a Micro level, the Civil Sphere at a Meso level, and the State and Economy at a Meso level. However, social media blurs the lines of these boundaries, making the distinction between the private and public realm less defined, where social media facilitates the convergence of different social spheres, for example, a personal profile with photographs of family members can be accessed by both family and employers, therefore, the idea that media reflects existing social structures loses its validity under the light of this innovation that is exclusively enabled by social media platforms and profiles⁸¹. Thus, although it can be true that social media is a reflection of communities wherein community actors are generating the content as the supposed primary actors on social media, social media alters interactions by conflating social spheres and reducing boundaries. Furthermore, if social media acts as a reflection of social communities, then it would be correct to assume that online platforms would also suffer from similar issues in society, for example, studies show that social media can reinforce existing political tensions and social censorship, reflect inequalities in societies, and impose social structures⁸². More concerning examples include extremism and radicalisation⁸³. However, whereas in societies such unrest is regulated by governments and state actors through laws and policies, social media entities are not subject to such regulation and instead operate as private companies⁸⁴, which are subject to their own policies⁸⁵. It is important to understand that social media platforms are not objective parties, therefore, the question that arises is what the narrative and political inclinations with which social media platforms are operating on is⁸⁶. This idea of social media as a colonised space “of group sociality between the private and the public”⁸⁷ can be extended to questioning who is colonising it, a possible answer being the corporate and state control being exercised onto social media⁸⁸, which will be discussed in more detail in the following section. Finally, the idea of

⁸¹ Fuchs, Christian. “Social Media and the Public Sphere.”

⁸² Miller, Daniel, et al. *How the World Changed Social Media*.

⁸³ Lane, Justin E. et al. “Is radicalization reinforced by social media censorship?” (Cornell University Social and Information Networks. 2021) 1-16.

⁸⁴ Fuchs, Christian. “Social Media and the Public Sphere.”

⁸⁵ Chemaly, Soraya. 2016. Fake news and online harassment are more than social media byproducts — they're powerful profit drivers. 17 December. <https://www.salon.com/2016/12/17/fake-news-and-online-harassment-are-more-than-social-media-byproducts-theyre-powerful-profit-drivers/>. (30/09/2023)

⁸⁶ Fuchs, Christian. “Social Media and the Public Sphere.”

⁸⁷ Miller, Daniel, et al. *How the World Changed Social Media*. x

⁸⁸ Fuchs, Christian. “Social Media and the Public Sphere.”

cyber-communication and social media as reflexive of real-life communities is also challenged by the reality that the development of technology is not linear to the development of society⁸⁹, wherein society is struggling to keep up with technological advancements on the social, economic, and legal level.

To summarise, this article presupposes that social media platforms have ushered in an innovative form of communication where social interactions have taken on a new light in a cyber-society structure with the new forms of interactions between individuals. Having outlined what is denoted by the terms cyber-communication and social media and explored the context of these terms as both a computerised community within the next stage of development in humanity and a new online society that is signifying a paradigm shift in how people understand communication, the next part of this paper will look at how social media can escalate, instigate, and eliminate social change within society.

The Proliferation of Information

Between the years of 2015 to 2017, 90% of the data of the world was produced, with an average of 2.5 quintillion bytes being produced a day⁹⁰. Additionally, a Pew Research study found that 86% of Americans get their news from a form of cyber-communication, with 53% relying on social media for news, which was more prevalent amongst young people⁹¹. This indicates that the role of media has become more significant in the modern world as people are able to access information at an unprecedented rate, which is contrary to how the output of information was historically much more controlled⁹²; this points to the emergence of an age of information, and thus, a subsequent need for a conversation regarding information superiority, information dominance, and information effectiveness⁹³, especially considering that certain mass communication theories are applicable to cyber-communication, for example, agenda setting theory, selective exposure, and polarisation theory⁹⁴, thus, the colonisation of the cyber-communication sphere by political or economic actors who wish to control certain narratives or tendencies is possible, especially as social media sites become more prominent as news

⁸⁹ Ruud, Ryan. "Cyber Communication and Mass Media Theory."

⁹⁰ Hale, Tom. "How Much Data Does The World Generate Every Minute?" IFL Science. 2017 https://www.iflscience.com/how-much-data-does-the-world-generate-every-minute-42939?utm_source=42939&utm_medium=pdf&utm_campaign=pdf_lead_conversion. (25/09/2023)

⁹¹ Shearer, Elisa. Pew Research Centre. 12. 2021. <https://www.pewresearch.org/short-reads/2021/01/12/more-than-eight-in-ten-americans-get-news-from-digital-devices/>. (25/09/2023)

⁹² Kaplan, Andreas, and Michael Haenlein. "Users of the World, Unite! The Challenges and Opportunities of Social Media." Business Horizons. 2010. 59-68.

⁹³ Mayfield, Thomas. "A Commander's Strategy for Social Media." Joint Forces Quarterly Issue 60, 1st Quarter. 2011. 79-83.

⁹⁴ Ruud, Ryan. "Cyber Communication and Mass Media Theory"

distribution sites⁹⁵. An article written for the National Defence University regarding how the US can curate influence online claims the importance of 1) international information, 2) greater focus on the nature of audiences, in other words, creating population demographics, 3) engaging with social and psychological experts who can improve marketing strategies, and 4) strategic communications and influence efforts, where the internet is a direct tool for exerting influence⁹⁶. This article will demonstrate how these points were accomplished to shape an online sphere, that contrary to idealistic notions of a combined public sphere, is rigidly controlled by State actors and Stakeholders⁹⁷. Another study also found that social media can be used to accurately predict trends, such as consumer behaviour and stock market prices⁹⁸. Modern media has also had a very powerful role within the changing political discourse as political and social activists are able to reach larger audiences, thus, are able to mobilise people to their movements by using tools such as propaganda and ally conversion efforts⁹⁹. Furthermore, a more debilitating issue that has arisen from cyber-communication is the extreme prevalence of misinformation.

Misinformation

According to the World Economic Forum, digital misinformation represents a massive risk ranging from technological to geopolitical, including cyber-terrorism and governmental instability on a global scale¹⁰⁰. A study conducted on Twitter found that misinformation, including “fake news”, which refers to false stories shared as legitimate news sources which contain untrue propositions¹⁰¹, rumours, hoaxes, and conspiracy theories¹⁰², spreads 6 times more quickly than the truth, with a much more significant spread than all other types of information, and an estimated 70% of being more likely to be shared than the truth. Additionally, fake political news was also shown to be the most viral form of misinformation that was being shared. This spread was linked directly to user engagement with the news rather than bot activity, where the reason identified for this behaviour was the novelty factor of the

⁹⁵ Greenwood, Shannon, Andrew Perrin, and Maeve Duggan. “Social Media Update 2016.”

⁹⁶ Kramer, Franklin D., and Larry Wentz. “Cyber Influence and International Security.” NDU Press: Center for Technology and National Security Policy National Defense University Number 61. 2008. 1-12.

⁹⁷ Fuchs, Christian. “Social Media and the Public Sphere.”

⁹⁸ Carr, Caleb T., and Rebecca A. Hayes. *Social Media: Defining, Developing, and Divining*.

⁹⁹ Mayfield, Thomas. “A Commander's Strategy for Social Media.”

¹⁰⁰ Howell, Lee. *Global Risks 2013 Eight Edition*. Insight Report, World Economic Forum. 2013.

¹⁰¹ Zimmer, Franziska et al. “Fake News in Social Media: Bad Algorithms or Biased Users?”

¹⁰² Fernandez, Miriam, and Harith Alani. “Online Misinformation: Challenges and Future Directions.” *WWW2018 Proceedings* © 2018 International World Wide Web Conference Committee. 2018. 1-8.

information as having a higher level of “information uniqueness”¹⁰³. In some cases, the spread of misinformation was deliberately orchestrated in order to derive some benefit, for example, a smear campaign on an opposing political candidate or to damage a company’s public image¹⁰⁴. The lack of intermediation on news sharing on social media platforms means false news and misinformation is much more likely to proliferate in society¹⁰⁵. Such a spread can be problematic because of the following reasons: 1. The formation and spread of misconceptions, 2. The internalisation of false information, 3. Increase in polarisation, 4. Decline of the public sphere, and 5. The exertion of social influence from other social actors. Misconceptions are false narrative that can affect politics, foreign policy, economy, health, and climate change¹⁰⁶, as well as healthy discourse and communications in society¹⁰⁷. Efforts to correct these misconceptions include online misinformation detector systems, which are currently utilised by some social media platforms, however, these in themselves are problematic as they operate by claiming certain narratives as misinformation without providing any rationale and disregarding the user role in creating and detecting misinformation¹⁰⁸. Additionally, bots are not equipped to detect misinformation as the evidence of the truth and falsity can be refuted, where truth is taken to be 1. Empirical through evidence theory, 2. The accepted customs of a society as the theory of reflection, 3. The community acceptance as the consensus theory, and 4. The logical acceptance through the coherence theory¹⁰⁹. Such a criteria for truth can be difficult to prove on social media, thus, what can be flagged as misinformation may not be accurate and is dependent on the coding, which is not neutral but based on the values and orientations of the programmer¹¹⁰. Effective misinformation correction strategies include relevant evidence and explanations and engaging with the opposing opinion; however, such tactics are not well enabled online¹¹¹, and studies show that most users do not interact with debunking posts (in other words, post that provide the correct information and debunk the misinformation), where dissenting information tends to be ignored¹¹².

¹⁰³Vosoughi, Soroush, Deb Roy, and Sinan Aral. The spread of true and false news online. DOI:10.1126/science.aap9559: Science 359. 2018.

¹⁰⁴ Howell, Lee. Global Risks. 2013.

¹⁰⁵ Zimmer, Franziska et al. “Fake News in Social Media: Bad Algorithms or Biased Users?”

¹⁰⁶ Fernandez, Miriam, and Harith Alani. “Online Misinformation: Challenges and Future Directions.”

¹⁰⁷ Yardi, Sarita. “Dynamic Debates: An Analysis of Group Polarization Over Time on Twitter.” Sage Journals Volume 30 Issue 5. 2010. 316-327.

¹⁰⁸ Fernandez, Miriam, and Harith Alani. “Online Misinformation: Challenges and Future Directions.”

¹⁰⁹ Zimmer, Franziska et al. “Fake News in Social Media: Bad Algorithms or Biased Users?”

¹¹⁰ Agosti, Claudio, and Fabio Chiusi. “The Influence Industry Personal Data and Political Influence in Italy.” Technical Tech: Our Data Our Selves. 2018. <https://ourdataourselves.tacticaltech.org/posts/overview-italy/>. (25/09/2023).

¹¹¹ Yardi, Sarita. “Dynamic Debates: An Analysis of Group Polarization Over Time on Twitter.”

¹¹² Zollo, Fabiana et al. “Debunking in a world of tribes.” PLOS ONE 12(7). 2017. 1-27.

Misinformation effect

Even more problematic is that after communities accept misinformation as fact, these information become internalised, and even if proven incorrect, people will continue to believe in them, which psychologists refer to as the misinformation effect, where false information will impair memory, generate false memories, and affect people's behaviour¹¹³; this is especially true for repeated information, although some studies show that fake news can be combatted by raising immediate awareness against it¹¹⁴. This indicates that misinformation can cause debilitating effects for society as falsehoods are being spread with strong social reinforcements where individuals internalise the information irrefutably due to factors such as confirmation bias, which highlights the significant role of the production and consumption of media that social media has directly escalated. Additionally, this internalisation and acceptance of misinformation is also related to the ideological alignment of the individual accessing the misinformation¹¹⁵, which can be explained by the law of polarisation.

Polarisation & Anti-Social Behaviour

Group polarisation is a phenomenon wherein people are inclined to undergo a dramatic ideological or political shift to an already preferred pole. This can occur due to two reasons; the first is interpersonal comparison, where a person perceives a likeness with another's opinion and consequently feels more empowered to share their own opinion; the second is informational influences, where increased information on a topic that someone is already inclined towards will polarise their opinion as it increases cognitive learning towards one perspective, where they will feel that their perspective is justified and validated. Repeated exposure to a certain narrative also escalates polarisation¹¹⁶. Group polarisation is critical for this discussion due to, firstly, its interplay with fake news in how it validates and makes fake news credible, where people with an ideological alignment to a certain topic behave in a biased way, and are very likely to accept falsities, illegal, or immoral information¹¹⁷ and how polarisation results in the production and diffusion of fake news, where polarised individuals tend to circulate fake news

¹¹³ Cherry, Kendra. The Misinformation Effect and False Memories. 2022. <https://www.verywellmind.com/what-is-the-misinformation-effect-2795353>. (14/10/2023).

¹¹⁴ Cherry, Kendra. "The Misinformation Effect and False Memories."

¹¹⁵ Leona, Candela S., et al. "Fake news and false memory formation in the psychology debate." *IBRO Neuroscience Reports* 15. 2023. 24–30.

¹¹⁶ Myers, David G., and Helmut Lamm. "The Group Polarization Phenomenon." *Psychological Bulletin* Vol. 83 No. 4. 1976. 602-627.

¹¹⁷ Sunstein, Cass R. "The Law of Group Polarization."

within their platforms¹¹⁸. Secondly, group polarisation has negative repercussions on the behaviour of people, where it leads to a rise in mob culture, hate speech and verbal violence, and in severe cases, radicalisation, and extremism, where internet circles are being weaponised by extremists and terrorists¹¹⁹. Online polarisation is also linked with the rise of fragmentation and violence, and an increased lack of stability¹²⁰. Regarding this increase in online hate culture, Vint Cerf, Internet Hall of Fame member, Google vice president and co-inventor of the Internet Protocol says:

“The internet is threatened with fragmentation... People feel free to make unsupported claims, assertions, and accusations in online media. ... As things now stand, people are attracted to forums that align with their thinking, leading to an echo effect. This self-reinforcement has some of the elements of mob (flash-crowd) behaviour. Bad behaviour is somehow condoned because ‘everyone’ is doing it.”¹²¹

Thus, polarisation can lead to anti-social behaviour online. While it is true that humans are capable of and are responsible for group polarisation which pre-exists the internet, not all group interactions result in polarisation in social settings, where heterogeneity and group deliberation which includes a plurality of perspectives can lead to depolarisation, where opposing opinions become more balanced¹²². However, depolarisation is less likely to occur on social media because mediums contribute to systematising and thus accelerating the effects of group polarisation, which this paper narrows down to three mechanisms; first is the lack of regulations on online spheres, where actions that are illegal or socially unacceptable face no accountability or social repercussions when performed online¹²³. Additionally, online spheres are not subject to “legally binding transparency requirements”, meaning political actors can spread false propaganda or messages without repercussions¹²⁴. Second is how polarisation is exacerbated with a higher chance of becoming more extreme when individuals adopt anonymity, which magnifies biases and misguided judgements¹²⁵; anonymity is also shown to increase anti-

¹¹⁸ Cerf, Moran, and Adam Waytz. “If you worry about humanity, you should be more scared of humans than of AI.” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* Vol 79 No 5. 2023 289-292.

¹¹⁹ Rainie, Lee, Janna Anderson, and Jonathan Albright. *The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake News Online*. Survey, 2017. www.pewresearch.org: Pew Research Centre. (30.09.2023).

¹²⁰ Sunstein, Cass R. “The Law of Group Polarization.”

¹²¹ Rainie, Lee, Janna Anderson, and Jonathan Albright. “The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake News Online.”

¹²² Sunstein, Cass R. “The Law of Group Polarization.”

¹²³ Miller, Daniel, et al. *How the World Changed Social Media*.

¹²⁴ Agosti, Claudio, and Fabio Chiusi. “The Influence Industry Personal Data and Political Influence in Italy.”

¹²⁵ Sunstein, Cass R. “The Law of Group Polarization.”

social behaviour¹²⁶. Third is the contribution of algorithms. Unlike polarisation in social settings, online polarisation and the spread of misinformation are not only organic changes that involve human production and interaction, but ones that are manoeuvred by technological factors.

Algorithms

The previously given definition of social media included “the perception of interaction with others” which is chiefly appropriate due to the functioning of algorithms which alter and shape the social media platform according to the analysed and collected data of the individual operating the platform in order to be compatible to the user’s perception of reality¹²⁷, rather than a true reflection of a public space. While users perceive that they are interacting with others, they are in fact interacting with a computerised system curating to their interests and generating appropriate content, thus, the perceived interactivity is a digital manipulation rather than a cross user-generated interaction, where computers behave as social actors¹²⁸. However, there is a lack of transparency regarding how these algorithms function on social media, as what platforms have declared regarding operations of their algorithms is not what independent investigations have shown¹²⁹. Algorithms curate user experiences according to preferences, meaning that the user-generated content on the platforms is organised according to what the algorithm shows will receive the most engagement and user-interactivity¹³⁰. Accordingly, algorithms will continue to promote posts that generate harassment, hate speech, trolling, and arguments as they increase engagement¹³¹, which generates more revenue to the platforms; such a system is unlikely to change because there is no incentive for platforms to be socially responsible as they are profit-oriented economically driven systems, which will be discussed in more detail below¹³².

¹²⁶ Rainie, Lee, Janna Anderson, and Jonathan Albright. “The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake News Online.”

¹²⁷ Agosti, Claudio, and Fabio Chiusi. “The Influence Industry Personal Data and Political Influence in Italy.”

¹²⁸ Carr, Caleb T., and Rebecca A. Hayes. *Social Media: Defining, Developing, and Divining*.

¹²⁹ Romano, Salvatore, et al. Shadow-promotion: TikTok’s algorithmic recommendation of banned content in Russia. 2022. <https://tracking.exposed/press/releases/shadow-promotion-tiktoks-algorithmic-recommendation-of-banned-content-in-russia/> (01/09/2023).

¹³⁰ Agosti, Claudio, and Fabio Chiusi. “The Influence Industry Personal Data and Political Influence in Italy.”

¹³¹ Rainie, Lee, Janna Anderson, and Jonathan Albright. “The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake News Online.”

¹³² Chemaly, Soraya. “Fake news and online harassment are more than social media byproducts — they're powerful profit drivers.”

Echo Chambers & Filter Bubbles

Additionally, two new concepts that have arisen from social media platforms are echo-chambers and filter bubbles. Echo chambers refer to a circulatory process of sharing information within homogenous groups online. This includes following family, friends, and certain pages with similar ideological leanings¹³³, meaning that the individual is only exposed to content that confirms their opinions and political perspective¹³⁴. This contributes to people indoctrinating and radicalising themselves using their own chosen propaganda, in what is known as an ideological isolation¹³⁵, where polarisation is exacerbated by echo-chambers that echo the same opinions and ideological affinities of the group¹³⁶. Filter bubbles are algorithmically structured spheres that alter the information that the user has access to, where they can limit, increase, or block exposure to certain topics¹³⁷. Preliminarily, this is based on the user information and their online activity, however, what it leads to is selective exposure and confirmation bias to the user, as it limits users from accessing information outside of their immediate interests or perspective, which can lead to an increase in deceptive information and fragmentation online, which is reflected on society¹³⁸. While most people have an inclination for creating social echo chambers and filter bubbles in order to be surrounded by compatible opinion, social media platforms systematise and (exaggerate) this existing inclination, for the purpose of maximising user engagement¹³⁹.

Censorship, Shadow-Banning, & Shadow-Promoting

On the other hand, studies also show that algorithms are ideologically corrupt as posts receive coverage and repetition depending on the political leanings, where centre left political messages had the most coverage¹⁴⁰. Therefore, in addition to personalising user-experience, algorithms are also involved in manipulating user-content through three main methods. The first is through censorship, which can be carried out privately by the social media platforms or by government bodies, where governments can implement government removal requests onto social media

¹³³ Agosti, Claudio, and Fabio Chiusi. "The Influence Industry Personal Data and Political Influence in Italy."

¹³⁴ Fernandez, Miriam, and Harith Alani. "Online Misinformation: Challenges and Future Directions."

¹³⁵ Zimmer, Franziska et al. "Fake News in Social Media: Bad Algorithms or Biased Users?"

¹³⁶ Lane, Justin E., Kevin McCaffree, and F. LeRon Shults. "Is radicalization reinforced by social media censorship?"

¹³⁷ Sanna, Leonardo. "YTTREX: crowdsourced analysis of YouTube's recommender system during COVID-19 pandemic." Information Management and Big Data, 7th International Conference, SIMBig. 2020. 1-15.

¹³⁸ Zimmer, Franziska et al. "Fake News in Social Media: Bad Algorithms or Biased Users?"

¹³⁹ Carr, Caleb T., and Rebecca A. Hayes. Social Media: Defining, Developing, and Divining.

¹⁴⁰ Agosti, Claudio, and Fabio Chiusi. "The Influence Industry Personal Data and Political Influence in Italy."

platforms to remove activities or individuals who oppose them¹⁴¹. However, this strategy is detrimental because censored individuals can become more motivated and more ideologically tied to their position, which can eventually lead to extremism, due to reasons such as identity uncertainty, shared negative effect, and identity fusion etc.¹⁴². Recently, platforms are inclined to carry out shadow-banning, which refers to the algorithmic phenomenon where certain content receives limited exposure on platforms in order to demote the content that platforms do not wish to circulate. Platforms, such as TikTok, have also been discovered of shadow-promoting, where content that is governmentally banned in a region may still be promoted¹⁴³. What this indicates is that social media platforms have no transparency in how they operate their sites and no accountability.

Commercialisation of the User

The above section has demonstrated how social media platforms can manipulate content according to their own undisclosed agenda through algorithmic mechanisms which are ideologically corrupt. In addition to this, social media platforms also have an economic stake, where they generate significant profit from their users; 98% of the most popular social media platforms are for-profit organisations. Whilst social media platforms are free for users, billions of dollars are generated worldwide in profit; this is because the user, as the producer and consumer of the content, is the product on which these platforms operate on. An analysis of the top Social Media platforms found 88% used targeted advertisement¹⁴⁴, which are created and distributed according to psychometric profiling. The mechanisms which social media operate through mean that historically private information is now freely publicised by the user, due to interactivity and social capital purposes. Psychometric profiling refers to the process where user data and digital footprint data are analysed in order to infer the user's personality, which is then used to generate curated marketing, advertisements, social groupings, and political strategies. This leads to widespread profiling, which is then used to influence the consumer through advertisements and can also be used to sway the outcome of voting and the popularity of political candidates by sending micro-targeted to individuals or groups. In other words, through psychometric profiling, social media platforms can sell user data, which is then used by

¹⁴¹ Thomas, Poel. "Social Media Activism and State Censorship." In *Social Media, Politics and the State: Protests, Revolutions, Riots, Crime and Policing in an Age of Facebook, Twitter and YouTube.*, by D. Trottier & C. Fuchs. 2014. 189-206.

¹⁴² Lane, Justin E., Kevin McCaffree, and F. LeRon Shults. "Is radicalization reinforced by social media censorship?"

¹⁴³ Romano, Salvatore, et al. "Shadow-promotion: TikTok's algorithmic recommendation of banned content in Russia."

¹⁴⁴ Fuchs, Christian. "Social Media and the Public Sphere."

marketing campaigns to manipulate people into a preferred direction¹⁴⁵, where platforms act as large advertising agencies and influence users globally¹⁴⁶. This brings into question concepts such as platform imperialism and cyber-space sovereignty, as the social media platforms exercise global control, whilst being agenda driven and commercialising their user's data, which is actively affecting geopolitical stability¹⁴⁷.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article was to explore the nature of cyber-communication spaces, as spaces that have the capacity of creating a global public sphere, which is a vision that has unfortunately not been realised due to 1. The fragmentation that is facilitated and expediated by the mechanisms with which social media operate on, 2. The colonisation of social media by economic and political actors.

Instead of the idealised notion of cyber-communication as a computerised community that is reflective of real-life interactions, the mechanisms with which social media operate on have created a platform that facilitates fragmentation and polarisation in society. Contrary to previous polarisation within society, rather than creating one homogenous community through social interactions, social media creates fragmentation by isolating people into online sub-communities which do not interact with each other. Thus, this goes against the creation of a global public sphere as it systematically creates division in each society by creating multiple polarised groups. However, polarisation can be combatted by a general public sphere where all perspectives and voices are represented and people are exposed to competing opinions, yet, this is prevented by social media; issues such as misinformation, polarisation, extremism etc. already existed in society prior to social media, however, social media platforms escalate the scope of these problems through having mechanisms that reproduce and enable them, such as the creation of echo-chambers and filter bubbles which systematise homogeneity, thus damaging deliberation and discussion in society. Therefore, algorithms prevent the global public sphere and damage societies and communities when ideally, social media should combat media plurality and allow for better dialogue, but instead of bringing diverse people and opinions together, social media creates more separation and an overall reduced social diversity.

¹⁴⁵Bashyakarla, Varoon. Psychometric Profiling: Persuasion by Personality in Elections. 2018. <https://ourdataourselves.tacticaltech.org/posts/psychometric-profiling/> (5.10.2023).

¹⁴⁶Fuchs, Christian. "Social Media and the Public Sphere."

¹⁴⁷Rainie, Lee, Janna Anderson, and Jonathan Albright. "The Future of Free Speech, Trolls, Anonymity and Fake News Online"

Secondly, social media platforms have been colonised by economic and political actors; the economic beneficiaries of social media commercialise user data and violate privacy for the purpose of making a profit. It is important to note that social media is only free because the users are the product. The political actors benefit from the user data as a means to manipulate users into certain ideologies or agendas. They also exercise power through surveillance and policing of people, and through censorship practices. Instead of a global public sphere, social media is instead rigidly controlled by overarching powers who dictate the direction of discourse. To conclude, social media plays an important role in shaping social discourse, as well as in instigating, escalating, and eliminating social change, as social media platforms are information producing centres that are being manipulated by actors to certain gains, which highlights their capacity to indoctrinate, manipulate, and suppress individuals. Additionally, another point that should not be overlooked is the implicit ideological bias and preferences of social media platforms, who steer users according to certain agendas, using data collected from the users, as the commercialisation of personal data by tech companies. The global use and reach of social media means that this is an issue that effects the entire world, and must be addressed and combatted, or it will remain a problem that threatens social stability and international security.

Disclaimer:

This paper gave a very brief overview of the context and culture being facilitated by social media. More comprehensive research should ethnographically investigate the real-life ramifications of such digital manipulations.

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Discussing Diplomacy in the Context of the Global Climate Crisis: Climate Diplomacy, Historical Developments, Actors and Practices

İlke TAŞDEMİR¹⁴⁸

Abstract

With the developments in the international conjuncture, new topics have been included in the field of study of diplomacy and migration, epidemic diseases and environmental problems have begun to be examined within modern types of diplomacy. In this context, environmental problems have been examined under different types of diplomacy in the literature and climate change has been the main field of study of “climate diplomacy”. Climate diplomacy, in its most general definition, refers to the process of establishing an international climate change regime to combat climate change, ensuring the functioning of the established regime and its implementation. In this context, the stages of negotiating a global treaty, creating international political conditions, its implementation and integration process are important factors for climate diplomacy. Therefore, the development of climate diplomacy plays a key role in the construction of the climate regime and shapes it. Furthermore, climate diplomacy emphasizes the process by which states, non-governmental and other actors set their goals and work to achieve them. In this framework, besides the states, international organizations, diplomats, delegates, non-governmental organizations, local governments, academia and the business world are among the actors of climate diplomacy. By examining the emergence process of climate diplomacy in the historical context, as a result of the literature review, some studies show that diplomacy practices under the United Nations (UN) are the beginning of climate diplomacy in the 1980s. Also, it has been claimed that 1988 was the turning point of climate negotiations and that the emergence of climate diplomacy began with the evaluation report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) in 1990s. In addition, in some academic studies, the years 1991 and 1992 have been described as the infancy period of climate diplomacy. In this framework, it is assumed that the evolution of climate diplomacy takes place in three stages. The first of these is negotiating a global treaty, the second stage is the construction of international political conditions, and the last is the implementation and integration stage. Although climate diplomacy is classified and limited to certain stages in the literature, climate diplomacy emphasizes a continuous process that brings to the fore values and norms.

While dialogue is important in this process, climate diplomacy has mainly focused on supporting and shaping formal negotiations in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). However, climate diplomacy has expanded and deepened with diplomatic practices such as responding to the increasing effects of climate change and ensuring the growth of a low carbon economy. In the context of enlargement and deepening, implementation of the Paris Agreement, commitment to multilateralism, addressing the effects of climate change on peace and security, accelerating national actions, developing international climate cooperation, climate advocacy and social assistance are the main topics in climate diplomacy. However the success of climate diplomacy depends on the participation of the actors, such as ministers and government officials, of diplomacy. In addition, the fact that the fight against climate change has become a national interest in political and diplomatic channels plays an important role in this process. Therefore, an effective climate diplomacy requires the inclusion of all state and non-state actors in the diplomatic process by entailing inclusive and holistic approach.

In this study which deals with climate diplomacy as an object of analysis, the emergence, purpose, actors and practices of climate diplomacy will be analyzed retrospectively. In this context, the study aims to contribute to the literature on diplomacy.

Keywords: *Diplomacy, Environment, Climate, Climate Change, Climate Diplomacy.*

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Küresel İklim Krizi Bağlamında Diplomasiyi Tartışmak: İklim Diplomasisi, Tarihsel Gelişimi, Aktörleri Ve Pratikleri

Özet

Uluslararası konjonktürde yaşanan gelişmelerle birlikte yeni konular diplomasi alanına dâhil olmuş ve modern diplomasi türleri içinde göç, salgın hastalıklar, çevre konuları irdelenmeye başlamıştır. Bu bağlamda çevre problemleri literatürde farklı diplomasi türleri altında incelenmiş, iklim değişikliği ise "iklim diplomasisi"nin temel inceleme alanını oluşturmuştur. En genel tanımı ile iklim diplomasisi, iklim değişikliği ile mücadelede uluslararası iklim değişikliği rejiminin oluşturulması, oluşturulan rejimin işleyişinin sağlanması ve uygulanması sürecini ifade etmektedir. Bu bağlamda iklim diplomasisinde küresel bir antlaşmayı müzakere etme, uluslararası politik şartlar oluşturma, uygulama ve entegrasyon aşamaları önem taşımaktadır. Bu nedenle iklim diplomasisinin gelişimi, iklim rejiminin inşası için kilit rol oynamakta ve onu şekillendirmektedir. Ayrıca iklim diplomasisi devletlerin, hükümet dışı aktörlerin ve diğer aktörlerin hedeflerini belirlediği ve söz konusu hedefleri gerçekleştirmek için çalıştığı sürece vurgu yapmaktadır. Bu çerçevede iklim diplomasisinin aktörleri arasında devletlerin yanı sıra, uluslararası örgütler, diplomatlar, delegeler, sivil toplum örgütleri, yerel yönetimler, akademi ve iş dünyası yer almaktadır.

Tarihsel bağlamda iklim diplomasisinin ortaya çıkış sürecini incelediğimizde yapılan literatür taraması sonucunda, iklim diplomasisi adı altında yer verilen girişimlere istinaden, 1980'li yıllarda Birleşmiş Milletler (BM) altındaki diplomasi pratiklerinin iklim diplomasisinin başlangıcı olduğuna yer veren, 1988 yılını iklim müzakerelerinin miladı olarak değerlendiren ve iklim diplomasisinin ortaya çıkışını 1990 yılındaki Hükümetlerarası İklim Değişikliği Paneli (HİDP)'nin değerlendirme raporu ile başladığını ileri süren çalışmalar mevcuttur. Ayrıca bazı akademik çalışmalarda 1991 ve 1992 yılları iklim diplomasisinin emekleme dönemi olarak da nitelendirilmiştir. Bu bağlamda iklim diplomasisinin evrimini farklı aşamalarda gerçekleştirdiği varsayılmıştır. Bunlardan ilki küresel bir antlaşmayı müzakere etme aşaması olup, ikinci aşama uluslararası politik şartlar inşa etme, sonucusu ise uygulama ve entegrasyon aşamasıdır. Zira iklim diplomasisi literatürde belirli aşamalarla sınıflandırılıp sınırlandırılrsa da süreklilik arz eden bir süreci ifade etmektedir. Bu bağlamda iklim diplomasisinin gelişimi ile birlikte tartışılan değerler ve normlar da farklılık göstermiştir.

Bu süreçte diyalog önemli olmakla birlikte iklim diplomasisi esas olarak Birleşmiş Milletler İklim Değişikliği Çerçeve Sözleşmesi (BMİDÇS)'ndeki resmi müzakereleri desteklemeye ve şekillendirmeye odaklanmıştır. Bununla birlikte, iklim değişikliğinin artan etkilerine yanıt verme, düşük karbon ekonomisinin büyümesini sağlama gibi faaliyetler ile iklim diplomasisi genişlemiş ve derinleşmiştir. Genişleme ve derinleşme bağlamında Paris Antlaşması'nın uygulanması, çok taraflılık taahhüdü, iklim değişikliğinin barış ve güvenlik üzerindeki etkilerinin ele alınması, ulusal eylemlerin hızlandırılması, iklim savunuculuğu, sosyal yardım, uluslararası iklim işbirliğinin geliştirilmesi iklim diplomasisinde ele alınan konular arasında yer almıştır. Zira iklim diplomasisinin başarılı olabilmesi, iklim değişikliğinin diplomasi alanına aktörleri arasında yer alan üst düzey bakanların ve hükümet yetkililerinin katılımı ile mümkündür. Ayrıca iklim değişikliğiyle mücadelenin siyasi ve diplomatik kanallarda ulusal çıkar haline gelmesi bu süreçte önemli rol oynamaktadır. Dolayısıyla etkili bir iklim diplomasisi, kapsayıcı ve bütüncül bir yaklaşımla birlikte diplomatik sürece tüm devlet ve devlet dışı aktörlerin dâhil edilmesini gerektirmektedir.

İklim diplomasisini analiz nesnesi olarak ele alan bu çalışmada ise iklim diplomasisinin ortaya çıkışı, amacı, aktörleri ve pratikleri retrospektif bir şekilde analiz edilmeye çalışılmıştır. Bu bağlamda çalışma diplomasiye ilişkin literatüre katkı sağlamayı amaçlamıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Diplomasi, Çevre, İklim, İklim Değişikliği, İklim Diplomasisi.

1. Introduction

Recent developments in environmental problems have heightened the need for diplomacy. The field of diplomacy has expanded with the developments in global politics¹⁴⁹ and it was thought that environmental issues would bring diversity to diplomacy.¹⁵⁰ One of the most significant current discussions in environmental problems is climate change, and diplomacy which is among the foreign policy instruments,¹⁵¹ has played a key role in the search for solutions to global warming. In this framework, different types of diplomacy have emerged in the discussion of environmental problems. In the specific case of climate change, climate diplomacy which developed under Environmental Diplomacy has come to the fore.¹⁵²

Recently, in the most studies have shown that the international community has to confront the inevitable effects of global warming. In this context, global warming and climate change have cause a series of problems such as conflict, migration and terrorism,¹⁵³ and in addition to international organizations, states have started to participate in the process of making decisions. In this respect, international organizations are important component in the climate change by taking part an essential role. The function of institutions, legally enforceable agreements and diplomacy in resolving unexpected effects of climate change have all been explored. Climate change has brought economic and security concerns to the fore, as well as environmental protection, and has therefore played an important role in the functionalization of climate diplomacy, as a phenomenon in which actors feel insecure.

In this context, the main research question adressed in this paper is: What is the role of climate diplomacy in international relations? In addition, the study seeks to answer what are the challenges faced by climate diplomacy and what are the necessary strategies to maintain it effectively. The aim of this study which deals with climate diplomacy as an object of analysis, the emergence, purpose, actors and practices of climate diplomacy will be analyzed retrospectively. The fact that climate diplomacy is a long, transforming and progressive process constitutes the limitations of the study. In the history of climate diplomacy, protocols, agreements or treaties have been thought of as a key factor in its implementation. This paper

¹⁴⁹ Ali Engin Oba, *Diplomasi ve Tarih Osmanlı'dan Cumhuriyet'e Türk Diplomasi Tarihi Araştırmaları*, 1st ed. (İstanbul: Kitabevi Yayınları, 2021), x.

¹⁵⁰ Kemal Girgin, *Çağdaş Politika ve Diplomasi El Kitabı*, 1st edition (Ankara: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 1975), 120.

¹⁵¹ Barış Özdal, "Diplomasi". In *Diplomasi Tarihi I*, edited Barış Özdal, R. Kutay Karaca, 4. ed. (Bursa: Dora Yayınevi, 2020), 34.

¹⁵² Levent Kurnaz, *Son Buzul Erimededen: İklim Değişikliği Konusunda Merak Ettiğimiz Herşey*, (İstanbul: Doğan Kitap, 2019).

¹⁵³ Barış Özdal and Esra Vardar Tutan, "Temel Kavramlar, Olgular ve Kuramlar". In *Uluslararası Göç ve Nüfus Hareketleri Bağlamında TÜRKİYE*. Editor: Barış Özdal. 2nd ed. (Bursa: Dora Yayınevi, 2021), 10-11.

first gives a brief overview of the recent history of climate diplomacy, and then explains the challenges and requirements for diplomacy. Therefore, the study focuses on the facts such as turning points, that are essential to explain climate diplomacy. Also, the study, which is based on content analysis as a research method, aimed to contribute to the literature on climate diplomacy.

2. Global Climate Crisis and Climate Diplomacy

The origin of the word climate comes from the Greek word “klima”, which means slope, tilt of the earth, region. In the 15th and 16th centuries, climate was discussed in terms of the sun, the earth and the angle.¹⁵⁴ In this context, climate change, which is often referred to as the global climate crisis in the literature, has been used as natural and human-induced changes in the climate¹⁵⁵ and, is also defined as the effect of the temperature increase on the climate as a result of greenhouse gases reflected from the atmosphere.¹⁵⁶ While greenhouse gases enable the sustainability of life, on the other hand, they affect the economy, energy, agriculture. From this point of view, it is possible to say that the policies implemented by states disrupt the ecological balance and lead to global catastrophe.¹⁵⁷

However, the situation that we discuss today, which is now described as global boiling by the United Nations, is not a new phenomenon.¹⁵⁸ Climate change caused by human activities was also observed by Aristotle’s student Theophrastus in the 3rd century. He tried to establish a correlation between deforestation and global warming.¹⁵⁹ A relatively recent period, the “Medieval Warm Period” took place in the 14th century and in the 17th century, there was a climate crisis known as the “Little Ice Age” in the Northern Hemisphere, which caused famine and plague with the change in climate.¹⁶⁰ The fact that the earth started to warm up again after

¹⁵⁴ Mike Hulme, *İklim Değişikliği Konusunda Neden Anlaşmıyoruz?*, translated by Merve Özenç, 1st ed. (İstanbul: Alfa Basım, 2016), 31-32; Roger G. Barry, “Short Communication A Brief History of the Terms Climate and Climatology”, *International Journal of Climatology* 33: 1317; C. R. Longwell, “Origin of the Word Climate”, *Science* 120, no. 3113 (27 August 1954): 355, <https://www.science.org/doi/10.1126/science.120.3113.355.a>, (10.06.2023).

¹⁵⁵ Nuran Talu, *Türkiye’de İklim Değişikliği Siyaseti*, (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2015), 25.

¹⁵⁶ Matt McDonald, “Avustralya ve Küresel İklim Değişikliği”, translated by Nasuh Uslu, *Dış Politika Teoriler, Aktörler, Örnek Olaylar*, ed. Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield, Tim Dunne, 2nd ed. (Ankara: Röle Akademik Yayıncılık, 2016), 384-396.

¹⁵⁷ Talu, “Türkiye’de İklim Değişikliği”, 5.

¹⁵⁸ United Nations, “Hottest July ever signals ‘era of global boiling has arrived’ says UN chief”, 27 July 2023, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2023/07/1139162> (08.09.2023).

¹⁵⁹ Hulme, “İklim Değişikliği Konusunda”, 62.

¹⁶⁰ Ayşe Zarakol, *Before the West: The Rise and Fall of Western World Orders*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023), 87-88; Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century*, (London: Yale University Press, 2013); Brian Fagan, *The Little Ice Age: How Climate Made History 1300-1850*, 1st ed. (New York: Basic Books, 2000).

different climatic periods, which accelerated with the Industrial Revolution, has resulted climate crisis we encounter today.¹⁶¹

When the main causes of the climate change are examined, it was seen that two reasons, natural and human (anthropogenic), caused climate change. One of the leading factors causing the increase in greenhouse gas emissions as a result of human activities is fossil fuels used as energy sources.¹⁶² While the effects of climate change resulting from human activities are investigated, it has been seen that the increasing in global temperature causes climate disasters such as drought, floods, storms and forest fires.¹⁶³ In addition to these factors, change in climate also triggers events such as famine, migration, increase in nationalism and inter-sectarian conflict.¹⁶⁴ In addition to all these, it has also been discussed that the neoliberal policies implemented by states have accelerated the change in climate.¹⁶⁵ Therefore, this transformation in climate is expected to have the greatest impact on the poorest countries in this context.¹⁶⁶

In this respect, discussions and initiatives for solution have started with awareness of the climate and acceptance of this change as a problem.¹⁶⁷ The growing body of scientific evidence of human influence on the atmosphere has necessitated an international response.¹⁶⁸ Considering all these reasons, which we have stated in the general lines above, it has been observed that the differentiation in the climate affects the domestic and foreign policy of the actors. In this context, a series of diplomatic initiatives were carried out within the framework of combating global warming and climate change, international meetings were organized and actors signed binding treaties. In search of a solution climate diplomacy plays a central role in this period.

Climate diplomacy refers to the process of establishing the international climate change regime, ensuring and implementing the functioning of this regime.¹⁶⁹ Moreover, by taking part in

¹⁶¹ Geoffrey Parker, *Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth Century*, (Yale University Press, 2013).

¹⁶² Anthony Giddens, *İklim Değişikliği Siyaseti*, translated by Erhan Baltacı, (Ankara: Phoenix Yayınevi, 2013), 55-61.

¹⁶³ William Nordhaus, *İklim Kumarı: Isınan Dünyada Risk, Belirsizlik ve İktisat*, translated by Cesi Mizrahi, 1st ed. (İstanbul: Doğan Egmont Yayıncılık, 2020).

¹⁶⁴ Köni and Özdal, “İklim Değişikliği, Göç”, 1-4.

¹⁶⁵ Noam Chomsky, Robert Pollin, *İklim Krizi ve Küresel Yeşil Yeni Düzen*, translated by Onur Orhangazi, 1st ed. (Ankara: Ütopya Yayınları, 2021), 40.

¹⁶⁶ Murat Türkeş, “İklim Diplomasisi ve İklim Değişikliğinin Ekonomi Politikası”, *Bilim ve Ütopya* 332, (Şubat 2022): 31.

¹⁶⁷ Jeremy Brecher, *İklim Direnişi*, translated by Dilara Kılıç, ed. Ömer Madra, 1st ed. (İstanbul: Yeni İnsan Yayınevi, 2020), 32-33.

¹⁶⁸ Loren R. Cass, *The Failures Of American And European Climate Policy: International Norms, Domestic Politics, and Unachievable Commitments*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2006), 19.

¹⁶⁹ Nick Mabey, Liz Gallagher, Camilla Born, “Understanding Climate Diplomacy: Building Diplomatic Capacity and Systems to Avoid Dangerous Climate Change”, Report, (1 October 2013), 23, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep17706?searchText=climate%20diplomacy&searchUri=%2Faction%2FdoBasi>

discussions of national interest and international cooperation, climate diplomacy contributes to the process in which states, civil society and other actors endeavor to achieve their goals.¹⁷⁰ In terms of the scope of the International Relations discipline, climate diplomacy involves the use of diplomatic channels and strategies to address global climate change and its impact on international relations.¹⁷¹

Primary objective of climate diplomacy is to deal with climate change. In this context, to carry out the construction of the international climate regime, to ensure the sustainability of the regime and the viability of the treaties provided with the regime are among the aims of climate diplomacy.¹⁷² However, with the development of the diplomatic process, the objectives of the climate diplomacy have been differentiated, and issues such as the expansion of its scope and the prevention and adaptation of conflicts have been included in diplomacy.¹⁷³

Based on the aim of diplomacy to maintain relations between actors in a peaceful manner¹⁷⁴, it is possible to say that climate diplomacy aims at the sustainability of peace, reconciliation between national interests and international interests and the establishment of ethical principles. More broadly, the fact that international regimes consist of norms, principles, rules and procedures¹⁷⁵ imposes on climate diplomacy the task of building norms. Furthermore, diplomacy is also based on norms that enable coexistence.¹⁷⁶ This aspect of diplomacy has led to the emergence and detailed discussion of climate norms. Therefore, climate diplomacy has taken a prospective approach by including future-oriented measures.

In this context, the tools of climate diplomacy are constituted by elements such as negotiations, conferences, treaties, protocols organised by diplomats and delegates on climate change. Thus elements such as the UNFCCC, the United Nations Conferences of the Parties (COPs), the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement appear as tools in the continuation of diplomacy. The actors of climate diplomacy include states, international organisations, diplomats, delegates,

cSearch%3FQuery%3Dclimate%2Bdiplomacy&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&refreqid=fastly-default%3A59f231b86a4d42193765d77b2347c02f; Murat Türkeş, “Küresel İklim Değişikliği: Nedenleri, Sonuçları ve İklim Diplomasisi”, In Çevre Diplomasisi ve Türkiye, ed. Adem Bilgin, Betül Gökür, Günay Erpul, 1st ed. (İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi Yayınları, 2023), 323.

¹⁷⁰ Mabey et al., “Understanding Climate Diplomacy”, 14.

¹⁷¹ “Climate Diplomacy”, DIPLO, <https://www.diplomacy.edu/topics/climate-diplomacy/>, (11.06.2023).

¹⁷² Türkeş, “Küresel İklim Değişikliği”, 323.

¹⁷³ Dennis Tänzler, Alexander Carius, “Beyond International Climate Negotiations: Climate Diplomacy from a Foreign Policy Perspective”, In Climate Change: International Law and Global Governance, ed. Oliver C. Ruppel, Christian Roschmann and Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting, 1st ed. (Baden: Nomos Publishers, 2013), 259.

¹⁷⁴ Özdal, “Diplomasi”, 34.

¹⁷⁵ Nicholas Onuf, “Constructivism: A User’s Manuel”, International Relations in a Constructed World, ed. Vendulka Kubalkova, Nicholas Onuf, and Paul Kowert, (London: Routledge, 2015), 70.

¹⁷⁶ Christer Jönsson, Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy, 1. ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 28.

civil society organisations, local governments, academia and the business world.¹⁷⁷ For example, between 1979 and 1991, the first phase of climate diplomacy, the primary actors were scientists, environmental groups and international organisations such as the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Ministers of Environment and Foreign Affairs have also been among the actors of climate diplomacy.¹⁷⁸

Furthermore, with the increasing role of the UN in the negotiations and establishment of the IPCC, responsibility has shifted from experts to political organisations, from scientists to diplomats.¹⁷⁹ As the diplomatic process developed, actors such as the UN and the European Union (EU) have played a key role in the fight against global climate change. Therefore, climate diplomacy, which developed with the initiatives of scientists, the UN and the WTO has deepened with the EU's climate targets and diplomatic efforts and brought the Union to the fore in the diplomatic process.

By considering this deepening, the evolution of climate diplomacy takes place in three phases: negotiating a global agreement, building international political conditions, and the implementation and integration phase. Negotiating a global treaty requires effective representation in the UNFCCC. The second stage, which is building international political conditions, comprises the process by which the negotiations under the UNFCCC are strengthened by diplomatic efforts. This process, which also aims to influence governments, is coordinated by experts in the Ministries of Environment and Foreign Affairs. The final phase entails supporting and shaping formal negotiations at the UNFCCC. Furthermore, at this stage, it is aimed to harmonize climate strategies with national interests by a holistic approach. Therefore, climate diplomacy has tried to maintain the balance between national interests of actors by focusing on legal and technical issues¹⁸⁰ and played substantial role in reconciling politically conflicting interests¹⁸¹ and ensuring harmony between developing and developed countries.¹⁸²

¹⁷⁷ Türkeş, "Küresel İklim Değişikliği", 318.

¹⁷⁸ Sura and Schweimler, "Climate Diplomacy: Seeing", 2-3,

¹⁷⁹ Elizabeth Dowdeswell and Richard f. Kinley, "Constructive Damage to the Status Quo", In *Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention*, ed. Irving M. Mintzer, J. Amber Leonard, 1st ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 118.

¹⁸⁰ Mabey et al., "Understanding Climate Diplomacy", *passim*.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹⁸² Bubu Pateh Jallow and Brianna Craft, "Engaging Effectively in Climate Diplomacy: Policy Pointers from the Gambia", International Institute for Environment and Development, 2014, 1-4. <https://www.iied.org/17246iied> (05.07.2023).

3. Historical Development and Practices of Climate Diplomacy

In the historical context, several studies have tried to attempt to explain the beginning of the climate diplomacy. One of them that evaluate the year 1988 as the turning point of climate negotiations.¹⁸³ Moreover, there are studies that associate the emergence of climate diplomacy with the first assessment report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and argue that it started after the Second World Climate Conference.¹⁸⁴ Also Loren R. Cass, in his study on climate norms and negotiations on climate change, has treated the period from the Villach Conference to the Geneva Conference as a separate period. Cass also stated that the second period of negotiations has begun with the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Climate Change (INC) initiative by highlighting the year 1991. As of this period, diplomacy has focused on negotiations rather than defining the problem of climate change.¹⁸⁵

However, there is no clear consensus in the literature for when climate diplomacy started. In this study, climate diplomacy has been examined under diverse periods by considering its practices from 1979 to the present. In this process, the year 1988, the adoption of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement constitute the pivot points of the climate diplomacy. In this context, it is possible to divide negotiations into four periods within the framework of the developments since 1979: the period from the First World Climate Conference in 1979 to the adoption of the UNFCCC in 1992, from the UNFCCC to the Kyoto Climate Change Conference, from Kyoto to Paris, and post-Paris period.

3.1. From the First World Climate Conference to the UNFCCC

Although debated centuries ago, climate change has been a major international issue since 1979. One of the most important events of the 1970s was the First World Climate Conference. In 1979 the Conference has led to a consensus that climate change is an environmental problem, and delegates have reflected it in the diplomatic process. A series of conferences on climate change were held with the subsequently established World Climate Programme. The first was the Villach Conference in 1980, the second in 1985, in Austria. As a result of these conferences held in 1980 and 1985, scientists agreed on human-induced climate change and pointed out that climate change is an international issue rather than a scientific phenomenon, which is significant for diplomatic initiatives.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸³ Talu, "Türkiye'de İklim Değişikliği", 196-197.

¹⁸⁴ Türkeş, "Küresel İklim Değişikliği", 318.

¹⁸⁵ Cass, "The Failures of American", 53.

¹⁸⁶ Cass, "The Failures of American", 20-22.

Following the 1985 Villach Conference, the UNEP executive director Mostafa Kamal Tolba sent a letter to United States Secretary of State, George Schultz, proposing a global response to the threat of climate change. In view of this situation, the United States of America proposed to the WMO in 1987 to organize a panel to discuss climate change, and in July of the same year the WMO called for an intergovernmental panel on climate changes against global warming.¹⁸⁷ In addition to these examples we mentioned above, the developments in 1988 seem to be crucial for diplomacy. In 1988, in the United States of America, the occurrence of extreme heat events led to social awareness for climate change and Canadian government took the initiative by organizing The World Conference on the Changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security in Toronto. The Conference focused on the need to reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 20% until 2005 and to negotiate a global agreement. It was also important for creating a normative debate on how to respond to the threat of climate change.¹⁸⁸

Other important developments in 1988 were the resolution 43/53 “Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind”, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its 43rd session,¹⁸⁹ and the establishment of the IPCC.¹⁹⁰ The significance of the resolution was that climate change has been described as “a common heritage and a common problem”.¹⁹¹ The aim of IPCC was to provide governments with scientific information to improve their climate policies.¹⁹² In this context of these developments, the year 1988 has been recognized as a turning point for climate change.¹⁹³

In 1990, the Second World Climate Conference was held, which highlighted the need to start negotiations on a climate change treaty.¹⁹⁴ Also in 1990, the UN resolution 45/212, “Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind”, stressed the urgency of a framework agreement and emphasized the need for intergovernmental negotiations to be

¹⁸⁷ Ibid., 21.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 22.

¹⁸⁹ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, “History of the IPCC”, <https://www.ipcc.ch/about/history/> (5.5.2023). The decision included the effects of climate change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and international institutions.

¹⁹⁰ Talu, “Türkiye’de İklim Değişikliği”, 196-198.

¹⁹¹ Murat Türkeş, “Küresel İklimin Korunması, İklim Değişikliği Çerçeve Sözleşmesi ve Türkiye”, Tesisat Mühendisliği, TMMOB Makina Mühendisleri Odası, Süreli Teknik Yayın 61, (2001): 2.

¹⁹² United Nations Climate Change, “About the IPCC”, <https://www.ipcc.ch/about/>, (e.t. 07.05.2023); Tora Skodvin, Structure And Agent in The Scientific Diplomacy of Climate Changes: An Empirical Case Study of Science-Policy Interaction in the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 106.

¹⁹³ Talu, “Türkiye’de İklim Değişikliği”, 196-198.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, 196-198.

supported by the WMO and the UNEP.¹⁹⁵ Thus, the roots of climate diplomacy date back to 1990 in an immature form.

3.2. Climate Diplomacy from the UNFCCC to Kyoto Climate Change Conference

In this period, until the signing of the UNFCCC, international negotiations were dominated by the problematic issues of which greenhouse gases would be regulated in the agreement to be created, the reduction, the rules that the agreement would bring, and the flexibility issues.¹⁹⁶ In 1992, the UNFCCC, “the first document for the protection of the climate regime on a global scale”¹⁹⁷ was opened for signature, and governments established the “Rio Conventions” at the “United Nations Conference on Environment and Development”, also known as the “1992 Earth Summit”, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.¹⁹⁸

The main objective of the Convention, which entered into force in 1994, is to prevent greenhouse gas concentrations caused by human activities from reaching dangerous level to the global climate system. Furthermore, preserving the climate system for present and future generations, supporting sustainable development, integrating this mission into national development programs, and providing cooperation are principles that guide the Parties to the Convention.¹⁹⁹ In addition, the responsibilities of the Parties are established on the basis of the principles of common but differentiated responsibility and sustainable development included in the Convention.²⁰⁰ In terms of diplomacy, the importance of the UNFCCC is that it forms the foundation for the international climate regime and the Conference of the Parties, which has been held every year since 1995.²⁰¹

In this context, the First Conference of the Parties, held in Berlin in 1995, focused on the fight against climate change as well as the sustainability of negotiations. The Second Conference of the Parties was held in Geneva in 1996.²⁰² During the diplomatic negotiations, from the 1st

¹⁹⁵“Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind”, <https://daccess-ods.un.org/access.nsf/Get?OpenAgent&DS=A/RES/45/212&Lang=E> (07.05.2023).

¹⁹⁶Cass, “The Failures of American”, 54.

¹⁹⁷Yasemin Kaya, Paris Anlaşmasını İklim Adaleti Perspektifinden Değerlendirmek”, Uluslararası İlişkiler 14, no. 54 (2017): 92.

¹⁹⁸ United Nations Climate Change, “The Rio Conventions”, <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-rio-conventions#What-is-a-UN-Convention>, (06.05.2023).

¹⁹⁹United Nations, “United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, 1992, <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>, (06.05.2023).

²⁰⁰Kaya, “Paris Anlaşmasını İklim”, 91.

²⁰¹United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change”, 1992, <https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf>, (06.05.2023).

²⁰²United Nations Climate Change, “Conference of the Parties (COP)”, <https://unfccc.int/process/bodies/supreme-bodies/conference-of-the-parties-cop> (01.07.2023); Uğur Sadioğlu, Erkan Ağıralan, “İklim Değişikliği Çerçevesinde 25. Taraflar Konferansı (COP25)”, Kafkas Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi 11, no. 1 (2020).

Conference of the Parties to the 3rd Conference, from Berlin to Kyoto, measures, which gases should be reduced, or flexibility and national reductions were often discussed.²⁰³

3.3. Negotiation period from Kyoto to Paris

The other important episode of climate diplomacy is the negotiation period from Kyoto to Paris. With respect to the Kyoto Protocol, which is based on the UNFCCC and to which 192 states are parties, it was adopted on 11 December 1997, but entered into force on 16 February 2005 due to the delay in the ratification process. The protocol aims to enable the UNFCCC to function in terms of limiting and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The protocol is binding only on developed countries, it imposes responsibilities on the developed countries within the framework of the principles of common but differentiated responsibility and capabilities. For the first commitment period of the Protocol, 2008-2012, the objective was to reduce emissions 5 percent by 1990 for the Parties.²⁰⁴

On 8 December 2012, at the 18th Conference of the Parties held in Doha, a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol was adopted, starting in 2013 and lasting until 2020. With the second period, the parties committed to reduce their greenhouse gas emission rates below 18 per cent compared to 1990. Additionally, the Protocol emphasises three elements, also called Kyoto mechanisms, which include international emissions trading, clean development mechanism and joint implementation.²⁰⁵ Furthermore, the emphasis on common but differentiated responsibilities and sustainable development in the Protocol indicates that these principles are decisive in diplomacy.

From Kyoto to Paris, 18 conferences of the parties took place between 1997 and 2015. In general terms, these conferences focused on the effects of climate change, adaptation measures, reduction policies, technology issues, loss and damage. Although climate diplomacy focuses on reconciliation and solution, it was also seen that diplomatic negotiations ended in disagreement. For instance, decisions on how to implement the targets were debated at the Conference of the Parties in The Hague in 2000, but the conference was suspended due to political disagreements.²⁰⁶ Or, although the Copenhagen Accord was put forward at the end of the negotiations organised in 2009 in Copenhagen, a compromise has not been reached, the

²⁰³ Ibid.

²⁰⁴“What is the Kyoto Protokol?”, United Nations Climate Change, https://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol, (01.08.2023).

²⁰⁵ Ibid.

²⁰⁶United Nations Climate Change, “[The Hague Climate Change Conference - November 2000](https://unfccc.int/event/the-hague-climate-change-conference-november-2000)”, <https://unfccc.int/event/the-hague-climate-change-conference-november-2000>, (1.07.2023).

expectations of the parties have not been met, and the failure of the negotiations has begun to be debated.²⁰⁷

Nevertheless, most of the negotiations focussed on finding a solution. For instance Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, Durban Platform, Green Climate Fund were discussed during the negotiations in Warsaw. In Durban in 2011, it was emphasised that a universal legal treaty should be adopted and this should be achieved by 2015 at the latest. In 2014, at the Conference of the Parties in Lima, the Parties agreed to advance and share commitments on reducing greenhouse gas emissions.²⁰⁸

Concerning the diplomatic process of Paris Agreement, the treaty is also seen as a turning point in the multilateral climate change process, as it brings all nations together in the fight against climate change and adapting to its effects. The Paris Agreement, which is legally binding, was adopted at the 21st Conference of the Parties in 2015 and entered into force in 2016. The main objective of the treaty is to keep the global average temperature rise below 2°C of pre-industrial levels and, if possible, limit it to 1.5°C. In this context, to limit global warming, greenhouse gas emissions need to be reduced by 43% by 2030.

Under the Paris Agreement, financial, technical, and capacity-building support is provided to the parties. More importantly, the process of implementing the treaty requires economic and social transformation.²⁰⁹ From 2020 onwards, Parties have been preparing nationally determined contributions. Hence at the heart of the Paris Agreement is the national declaration of Parties, which explains the rates of emission reduction that the states are obliged to specify. In this context, the Parties are obliged to specify and explain the declaration of national determined contribution they intend to pursuant to article 4 of the Treaty.²¹⁰ The Paris Agreement, which is the outcome of the COP21 in Climate Diplomacy, has emphasised the reduction, adaptation and financing of greenhouse gas emissions, and the concepts of “common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities” are brought to the forefront in the Treaty.

3.4. Post-Paris Period

The 22nd Conference of the Parties, held after the Paris Climate Change Conference, focused on the implementation of the Paris Agreement and the constructive aspect of multilateral

²⁰⁷ Talu, “Türkiye’de İklim Değişikliği”, 221-259.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., 221-259.

²⁰⁹United Nations Climate Change, “The Paris Agreement”, <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement>, (01.09.2023).

²¹⁰ Ibid.

cooperation.²¹¹ UN Climate Change Conference, the 23rd Conference of the Parties, aimed to advance the objectives of the Paris Agreement and ensure progress in its implementation by focusing on cooperation.²¹² After the 21st Conference of the Parties, the Paris Agreement was discussed in diplomatic negotiations. The theme of sustainability came to the fore in the report adopted at the end of the 24th Conference of the Parties, and financial and technology issues were discussed at the Conference.²¹³

At the UN Climate Change Conference in 2019, COP 25, diplomatic conversations have been dominated by issues of the global carbon market and commitments. The most important aspect of the conference is that the Parties agreed on the need for support regarding loss and damage.²¹⁴ As a result of the negotiations, the parties accepted the Glasgow Climate Pact, which includes adaptation, emissions, regional and international cooperation, and emphasizes the concepts of loss and damage and sustainable development.²¹⁵ Finally, at the Sharm-El Sheikh Climate Change Conference in 2022, a consensus was reached to provide “loss and damage” financing for fragile countries and to mobilize more financial support for developing countries.

In this regard, the UN Conferences of the Parties indicate a process that enables the discussion and dissemination of values on climate change. On the one hand, these Conferences provide a discussion of norms in the pursuit of solutions to climate change, which is a global crisis, and meanwhile, they reveal the role of the UN as an actor in climate diplomacy.

4. Challenges and the Effective Factors for Climate Diplomacy

With the developments in Climate Diplomacy, several problems have come to the fore, and the fact that diplomacy is an evolving, developing and dynamic process has brought about discussions on how to combat climate change more effectively. In this context, the first step of

²¹¹United Nations Climate Change, “Marrakech Climate Change Conference- November 2016”, <https://unfccc.int/conference/marrakech-climate-change-conference-november-2016> (08.07.2023).

²¹²United Nations Climate Change, “UN Climate Change Conference-November 2017”, <https://unfccc.int/conference/un-climate-change-conference-november-2017> (08.07.2023).

²¹³ United Nations Climate Change, “Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-Fourth Session, Held in Katowice from 2 to 15 December 2018: Addendum Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Twenty-Fourth Session”, <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/10a1.pdf?download> (08.07.2023); United Nations Climate Change, “Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Twenty-Fourth Session, Held in Katowice from 2 to 15 December 2018: Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at its Twenty-Fourth Session”, <https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/10a2e.pdf?download> (08.07.2023).

²¹⁴Sadioğlu and Ağralan, “İklim Değişikliği Çerçevesinde”, 376-378.

²¹⁵United Nations Climate Change, “The Glasgow Climate Pact”, https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2021_10_add1_adv.pdf (08. 07. 2023); United Nations Climate Change, “The Glasgow Climate Pact – Key Outcomes from COP26”, <https://unfccc.int/process-and-meetings/the-paris-agreement/the-glasgow-climate-pact-key-outcomes-from-cop26> (08.07.2023).

Climate Diplomacy should be discussing the national interests of the actors, climate risks and the positive aspects of the international climate regime.²¹⁶

In this context, the inability to meet the political conditions, the failure to establish a fair agreement, the lack of ambition in the actors and the failures in implementation in the fight against global climate change has emerged as the difficulties that climate diplomacy must overcome.²¹⁷ Additionally, actors' limited resources or institutional structures may also affect diplomacy. For instance, diplomats in underdeveloped countries may lack the technical expertise or negotiation skills to influence the diplomatic agenda due to their limited resources. Or, the sharing of responsibility for climate diplomacy between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs or Environment may affect the priority for policies.²¹⁸ Therefore, while developed countries are active in climate diplomacy, developing or underdeveloped countries are less effective.²¹⁹ More accurately, different attitudes of the great powers that manage to the world economy make reconciliation difficult.²²⁰ To illustrate, in the United States of America the perspectives and behaviours of the Democratic Party and the Republican Party on climate change have differed.²²¹

In this context, climate diplomacy has played an important role in establishing a connection between national and international climate policies for an effective diplomacy process. Correspondingly, in order to develop a national position and take action to solve the problems encountered, it is necessary to have knowledge about how actors perceive their own and other actors' interests and actions. Moreover, in order to integrate national priorities with diplomacy, skills such as the ability to influence are needed.²²² Effective climate diplomacy requires identifying climate change as a national policy priority, developing the skills of climate diplomats, learning and changing norms on climate change, and linking international climate policies with domestic policy practices.²²³ Besides, informing the public on climate change by scientists and politicians and using mass media will ensure that climate diplomacy is carried out effectively.²²⁴ The success of climate diplomacy is possible with the participation of senior ministers and government officials, who are among the actors of diplomacy. In this regards,

²¹⁶Mabey et al., "Understanding Climate Diplomacy", 38.

²¹⁷Ibid., 21-22.

²¹⁸Sura and Schweimler, "Climate Diplomacy: Seeing", 2-3.

²¹⁹Jallow and Craft, "Engaging Effectively in", passim.

²²⁰Özdal and Köni, "İklim Değişikliği, Göç", 15.

²²¹İlke Taşdemir and Barış Özdal, "Amerika Birleşik Devletleri Başkanları'nın Söylemlerinde Öne Çıkan Kavramlar Bağlamında Çevre Sorunları: Rol Algıları ve Çatışan Rollerin Analizi", *Journal of Diplomatic Research* 4, no. 1, 49-50.

²²²Mabey et al., "Understanding Climate Diplomacy", 35.

²²³Sura and Schweimler, "Climate Diplomacy: Seeing", 2-3.

²²⁴Jallow and Craft, "Engaging Effectively in", 4-5.

discussions of the national interests of the actors, climate risks and the positive aspects of the international climate regime will be instructive.²²⁵

5. Conclusion

Diplomacy is a tool to discuss normative questions. In this context, the actors of climate diplomacy have developed adaptation strategies and organised conferences and treaties to combat climate change. Climate change has affected the domestic and foreign policy behaviors of the actors in the international system and enabled the development of diplomacy. With the conferences organised, states in the process of socialisation have tried to adopt certain behavioural patterns. In this regards, the rapid increase in climate change requires deep cooperation and the change for solution. So, it is possible to evaluate objectives of the UNFCCC and the Conferences of Parties, which form the basis of Climate Diplomacy, among the objectives of climate diplomacy.

Historically, from a diplomatic point of view, the Villach Conferences have contributed to the development of inter-institutional diplomatic relations and the diversification of actors of climate diplomacy. Most importantly, at the beginning of the negotiations, the initiatives of Tolba, the USA, the WMO and the UN, examples of climate diplomacy practices, have been the basis for establishment of intergovernmental panel on climate change. From the establishment of the UNFCCC to Kyoto Climate Change Conference, measures, flexibility, national mitigation have often been discussed in diplomatic negotiations. Until Paris Agreement, Parties have discussed the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, necessity of a legally binding agreement, responsibility of Parties. Subsequent to the signing of the Paris Agreement, global carbon market, commitments, loss and damage came to the fore.

It is possible to say that different principles, norms and rules are discussed in each period of Climate Diplomacy. However, in general, the concepts of reducing emission rates, common but differentiated responsibility, loss and damage, and sustainable development have come to the fore in the negotiations from the beginning. In this framework, roadmaps, action plans, protocols, agreements and treaties put forward by the UNFCCC and the Conferences of the Parties constitute the basis for diplomacy. As a matter of fact, Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement have also demonstrated that the different interests of the actors produce different results.

²²⁵ Mabey et al., "Understanding Climate Diplomacy", 38.

The fact that the Paris Agreement is binding on the parties is important for the sustainability of climate diplomacy and for the spread of ethical, and normative values in this process. Furthermore, there is a significant positive correlation between constructive side of diplomacy and norms. In this context, while global agreements / treaties provide a road map for actors on what to do, diplomacy aims to reach consensus and ensure compliance with the commitments made, and any agreement or treaty to combat climate change will need to comply with climate norms such as sustainable development or common but differentiated responsibilities. Interestingly, in each period of climate diplomacy different norms have been discussed. For example, while the emission reduction norm was frequently discussed in the early periods of climate diplomacy, in recent years the norms of loss and damage have emerged as the norms encountered by the actors. As a result, construction of the negotiations within the framework of UNFCCC norms, and negotiation of the potential impacts of climate change has revealed both retrospective and prospective sides of climate diplomacy.

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The Global Digital Order and the Opportunities for Asia to Bring Balance between the East and the West

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Abstract

Global order is a focal point for explaining, analyzing and predicting global trends. Ian Bremmer, the American political scientist and the founder and head of the Eurasia group recently depicted the world through different orders, two of which is the multi-polar economic order and the digital order that incase China and the United states continue their forceful assertion will lead to a bipolar digital order. The research question of this paper is whether the new emerging orders is capable of harmonizing and unifying the East as a key player in the virtual and digital world under one umbrella. To reach an answer the constructivist theory is applied since the constructivists believe in the presence of various structures in the world system, a material and a normative one. To be more precise the world orders comprise units, structure, process and external rules. Therefore it is hypothesized now that China is a determining power in Asia both economically and digitally, there rest opportunities for bringing harmony to Asia regarding identity in order to level the playing field between the East and the West. This research is qualitative and it involves non- numerical data such as texts, podcasts, web casts therefore a secondary research.

Keywords: *global order, digital order, economic order, Asia, the East and the West*

1. Introduction

The world is witnessing dramatic shifts in many aspects such as geopolitics, economy and digital which has led to emerging orders crucial to be considered. The economic shift as a key one has been accelerated by the end of the Cold War. The smooth move from globalization to regionalization or as some experts of the IR field put it, a regional globalization is being shaped. The driving force of the new economic order is the rapid growth of the GDP beyond the Atlantic zone, creating an alternative economic pole. There has appeared an orchestra of powers. Asia is now the most dynamic global region. There is the Belt & Road initiative, the emergence and convergence of sub-regions, new trade pacts, agreements, institutions all together resonating a systemic shift. The economic order is multipolar since the global power is more widely shared. Therefore the global economic order will remain a multi-polar one. (Ehteshami Anoushirvan, Niv Horesh, *How China's Rise is Changing the Middle East*, Routledge, 2021 p. 17)

An unprecedented, vague and controversial order that might be a game changer in world affairs is the digital order where the dominant actors are not yet the governments or states but the technology companies. The digital order is of great importance because it is a key factor that shapes our vision, life style, desires and understating. Ian Bremmer, the founder and president of Eurasia Group, a political risk research and consulting firm, recently depicted three possible digital order scenarios:

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1. A technology cold war between the United States and China in which countries will have to choose sides, if tech companies get along with their home countries.
2. A globalized order resulted from the tech companies' decision to adhere to global growth strategies.
3. A power competition between the governments and tech companies in the digital space.

He adds that the way things turn in the end depends on the way the governments react to the change driven by new technologies like the Artificial Intelligence and the tech companies' strategies. (Bremmer Ian, "Who runs the world?" GAERO media, 2023, <https://www.gzeromedia.com/by-ian-bremmer/who-runs-the-world> (20/11/2023) Taking into account the potentials that the two key players, the United States and China, possess in the digital order it seems that the digital status quo will remain for some time as an "East-West" issue rather than a global or state-oriented one. Therefore there rest an opportunity for Asia to have a say in this arena. The research question of this paper is about whether it is possible to reach a balance in the digital order now that China is one of the key players in the field. It is hypothesized that China as an economic and digital power has the potential to bring the Asian countries, almost the emerging economies, under the umbrella of Asian culture and identity and therefore bringing balance between the East and the West.

2. Theoretical Framework

The systemic shift within the global system necessitates an analytical framework which carries the analyses about the world system and the different explanations on it. The world system is formed by a group of international actors. One definition of international system is a state-centered one in which countries have interactions and strive for their national aims and national security. In a non-state centered definition of international system there is a group including political units and international actors that have interaction based on distinct behavioral patterns following certain rules. Stanley Hoffmann argues that international system is defined and described upon a relation pattern between main units of world politics, the goals they are searching, obligations and functions and the tools through which they fulfil the aims and obligation. (Hoffmann Stanley, International Systems and International Law, in Knorr, Klaus and Verba, Sidney, (eds.) , The International System, Princeton University Press,1961) Referring to the various definitions for the international system, it can be concluded the elements shaping the world system are: units, structure, process, external rules. According to the specific and general definitions on the international system it is comprised from two sets of

units: state and non-state actors. (Firouzabadi D. Seyed Jalal, Principles and Fundamentals of International Relations, Tehran, Samt Publications, 2016. P 109)

When it comes to the environment in which the actors play roles, the acting stage is comprised of both physical and social domains which means that all the events, conditions, apolitical human and non- human elements leave their trace on the behavior of international actors, their functions and the way the international system is orchestrated.(Firouzabadi, Principles and Fundamentals of International Relations, p.111) The third element of the international system is the structure on which different theories of IR have depict in its own way. Neorealist and neoliberal theoreticians believe that the way abilities are distributed shapes the international system through different structures whether economic or militarily. On the contrary the constructivists presume that the structure of international system has two edges at the same time: material and normative one. They believe that the most important structure that actors play upon is the non-material normative approach within which material resources and capabilities are defined. Process as the other element of the international system focuses on the patterns of interaction, in other words the way the actors are related to each other. Therefore in order to understand and explain the behavior of the international actors we need to consider the structure and the process thoroughly. The last element is the rules governing the relations between the actors such as national sovereignty, non-interference in internal affairs of other countries, territorial integrity and non-use of violence. (Firouzabadi, Principles and Fundamentals of International Relations, p. 115)

Having Chosen constructivism as the framework of this research, a meta- theoretical approach is applied to see the world and giving meaning to concrete surroundings including objects as the basis for ontology. (Onuf, Nicholas, Worlds of Our Making: The Strange Career of Constructivism in International Relations, trans. Homeirah Moshirzadeh, University of South Carolina Press 2002) Through ontology the constructivists define their epistemology which mean the way cognition is developed. They believe that there is a link between the reality and the value, unlike the positivists' viewpoint. (Moshirzadeh, Homeira. Development in International Relations Theories. Tehran: SAMT Publications, 2015, p. 21) Constructivism became a prominent theory as an aftermath of Cold War when main theories of IR fell short of predicting and explaining the end of it. Constructivism is distinctive because of three elements: Firstly, intersubjectively shared values, ideas and norms among the actors in international arena shape the global politics. Constructivists cast light on the intersubjective characteristic of knowledge and for that they focus on the social aspect of human life in which shared ideas like an ideational structure play a key role in forming behaviors. This is the point where this theory

chooses a path different from that of the main streams of IR like Neoliberalism in which the structure is made of a material structure.

Secondly, the ideational structure by nature are constitutive and dynamic which provides actors with an opportunity to redefine their interests and identities through interactions. This is another significant difference between this theory and the rationalist ones like neorealism and neoliberalism that have certain and definite views when it comes to interests and identities.

Thirdly, the mutual relationship between the actors and the structures in which both actors (agents) and structures are reproduced. In other words structures shape identities and interests of the actors and at the same time actors redefine and reshape the structures via their newly constituted interests and identities. So this reciprocal interaction leads to an emancipation from the existing challenges. Moreover constructivism highlights that reality has the potential to change upon different contexts of time and place. (Burchill, Scott, Andrew Linklater, Richard Devetak, Jack Donnelly, Terry Nardin, Matthew Paterson, Christian Reus- Smit, Jacqui True, *Theories of International Relations* (5th ed.), 2013, Red Globe Press

3. What is the role of technology is shaping an order?

Throughout history what makes a state powerful has heavily depended on innovation and technology. Prior to the Information Age, technology played a role in bringing leverage to the privileged countries regarding power with military dimension. Power was more militarily in essence and was displayed in the hard sphere.

Along the Cold War, the United States applied various offset strategies in order to tackle the Soviet Union peacefully through military strategy and technological innovation. Considering the fact that modern militaries and economies are redefined by digital infrastructure, future great power war shall be more a cyber-attack than other forms. (Schmidt Eric,” *Innovation Power: Why Technology Will Define the Future of Politics*”, *Foreign Affairs*, 2023, 38-52)

Digital support by the West in the Russia-Ukraine war had an enormous effect where Ukrainians defended their lands by not only the weapons provided by NATO but also western tech companies that played key roles in fending off Russian cyber-attacks, helping the Ukrainian leaders communicate with their soldiers on the front lines. (Bremmer Ian, “Who Runs the World?) Innovation power is the new force of international politics. It is the ability to invent, adopt and adapt new technologies. Innovation brings smart power to the scene, where both soft and hard power are under its influence. The military might is changing as a result of high-tech weapons system and new platforms and standards that has led to economic leverage and even global appeal. More will be brought by Artificial Intelligence through which new doors of

scientific discovery will be opened and the process of reshaping the world will be kicked off. (Schmidt, Innovation Power: Why Technology Will Define the Future of Politics”, 38-52)

At this point in history with China and the United States as the two key digital powers the ability to innovate faster and better, laying the ground for military, economic and cultural power is a game changer. The everlasting rule of global domination is technology innovation. One of the key technologies that determine the future order is Artificial Intelligence creating advantages in many various domains. As it happened in previous eras technologies shape geopolitics. Given the wars fought in recent years and the role technology played through innovation in drones such as the war in Ukraine and Nagorno-karabakh, it is presumed that future wars will be both waged and fought by humans and machines. (Schmidt, Innovation Power: Why Technology Will Define the Future of Politics”, 38-52)

As a result the cyber-space and what happens there and who controls it will be a key part of a strategy needed to win wars. Within the digital sphere cyber-attacks are defied by advancing cyber security whereas cyber risks or cyber threats might need a different approach. In the Artificial Intelligence Age, threats such as misinformation, disinformation and fake news may be key players in triggering a conflict, resentment, bigotry or hate among different people from different races, religions and nationalities. As James Adam put it in 2001 cyber-space is a new international battlefield where the losers and winner of military campaigns are determined. In the digital sphere what is at stake is not the land but the trust people have in markets, governments and national power. (Schneider Jacquelyn, A World Without Trust: The Insidious Cyberthreat, Foreign Affairs, 2022, 22-31) Therefore it is time to be cautious on how Artificial Intelligence is fed. In other words Artificial Intelligence is only good at the data we feed it with.

4. Why balance is needed in the digital order?

New dimensions have been added to the geopolitical arena as a result of China's marked status in technological advancement and economy. China's influence in the digital sphere is a pivotal point to be considered in the emerging global order. There is an ever-growing connection between the physical and digital worlds, at the same time a competition between the United States and China. Following the hunger the Western firms had to reach larger and richer markets, set the scene for China to develop communication networks and build its soft power on it and finally became a more available source of procurement by developed and developing countries. (Hilman Jonathan E., The Digital Silk Road, Reviewed by Areesha Anwer, <https://www.e-ir.info/2023/07/06/review-the-digital-silk-road/>, 2023, (20/11/2023)

Some scholars in the West believe that democracies should counter balance China's global operations and aspirations in the digital domain by creating coalitions by investing in research and development, developing technical standards and ethical norms in order to advance their shared interests. (Hilman Jonathan E., *The Digital Silk Road*)

Meanwhile the Digital Silk Road which can be considered as an augmentation of the Belt and Road Initiative in the digital space, has been successful in reducing inequality, triggering growth, supporting Small and Medium Enterprises in developing countries. The economic transition has been broadened through the Digital Silk Road and regional integrity accordingly. In a broader sense The Digital Silk Road carries the potential of forging connectivity among countries economically, geographically and socially. China has built new capacities by providing cheaper technology, accessibility and innovation compared to that of the West for developing countries. Projects such as smart city, e-governance, smart agriculture and also access to big data will support developing countries tackling with economic, social and environmental challenges. (Hilman, Jonathan E., *The Digital Silk Road*) Technology innovations give states the leverage over supply chains and the ability to make rule for others. This is more crucial for countries that rely on natural resources, trade or those that have to import rare or foundational goods. (Schmidt, *Innovation Power: Why Technology Will Define the Future of Politics*", 38-52)

Contrary to the economic horizon that is experiencing more integrity in a regional sense there lies a cultural jigsaw in Asia in terms of religions, norms, beliefs and ideas. So to maintain integrity in the real world there is the need to bring harmony and unity to the virtual world as well. In the West we have tech companies like Netflix and You tube spreading American or in other words western values while increasing the West's soft power. So for the Eastern states having a say at global level or having the ability to have an influence on the on-going international, regional or inter-regional affairs whether politically, economically or culturally there is the need to build connections and links on shared norms.

Today's world is more dependent on trust than any other time in history as a result of the role of information and digital technologies that are present in all fields like modern economies, societies, governments, and militaries. On one hand the users need to trust the data in all these fields and the way their data are stored free from manipulation. On the other hand there is the digital social media platforms that carry the potential of creating new trust dynamics around identity, privacy and validity. The digital dependent economy is more prone to the loss of trust if it experiences a malfunction due to cyber-attacks leading to distrust in the integrity of the whole system. In order to survive the erosion of distrust in economies, societies, governments,

and the international system more bonds and links are needed. (Schneider, A World Without Trust: The Insidious Cyberthreat, 2022, 22-31)

In an article titled “The End of Cyber-Anarchy: How to Build a New Digital Order” written by Joseph Nye in the Foreign Affairs magazine Nye he argues that the existing picture of the online world is an ungoverned dangerous one with repercussion for economies, geopolitics, democratic societies, and basic questions of war and peace. To tackle the digital disorder he believes norms should be created and that history shows for societies to learn how to respond to major disruptive technological changes in order to create rule for making the world safer, time is needed. He adds that for norms to become effective they have to become the common practice among states and the reason why the states comply with the norms are as such: coordination, prudence, reputational costs, and domestic pressure including public opinion and economic changes. He believes that economic change typically encourages the demand for new norms that contribute to efficiency and growth. He urges the United States make use of diplomacy and deterrence at the international level, a diplomatic component that embraces alliances among democracies, capacity building in developing countries and improving international institutions. He states that this strategy must lead to developing norms to protect American democracy.(Nye, Jr. Joseph S., The End of Cyber –Anarchy? How to Build a New Digital Order, Foreign Affairs, 2022, 32-42)

As a distinguished scholar of International Relations his prescription for the United States to tackle cyber anarchy is an in-depth and thorough strategy until when it is about the West. The question needed to be raised at this stage is more about who trusts who? Can all countries trust the United States as the sole key players and rule-maker?

5. How can a unified image of Asia be helpful in the digital space?

Firstly from a geopolitical perspective, this is the first time in history that the western civilization is witnessing this type of geopolitical division, one that is out of its control like the Cold War era. While Europe is dispersing, Eurasia is getting more intertwined and interconnected. Yet this closeness does not mean that Eurasia is about to see unity which Europe reached during the Cold War and the post- Cold War era. Instead due to the interactions between globalization, technology and geopolitics in which each of them becomes stronger the Eurasian region is turning into both a dynamic and meaningful being. Moreover the Mediterranean will become more unified because of the huge number of refugees moving from North Africa and the Levant towards Europe. The term “Global Island” as it was put by the British Geologist Helford Mackinder would not be an immature one when the world sees a dramatic interaction

across the Indian Ocean from Indochina to East Africa. Middle East in this regard carries lots of potentials as a transcontinental region. The waning West will play its part for an emerging global culture which spreads across continents following the disappearance of distance through technologies like roads, bridges, ports, vessels and fiber optic cables. However this is only one side of the story and there exist other aspects such as religion and culture that are affected by globalization and that may easily bear the fruits of fundamentalism as it happened in the case of the Islamic State through the internet and social media.

Secondly China's "Belt and Road Initiative" which signifies a new Silk Road just like the Medieval Silk Road is not a single trajectory but an extended trading network linking Europe with China both overland and across the Indian Ocean. Putting the focus on the characteristics of the Silk Road as it was during the Middle Ages such as its multicultural nature provides us with a perspective of what lies ahead in the future and as Robert D Kaplan puts it "a world more similar to one which the Venetian merchant Marco Polo explored in the late 13th century". Besides, the advance of technology builds momentum for a smaller, more permeable and complicated world with numerous, intractable and interconnected crises. (Kaplan D. Robert. (2017). The Return of Marco Polo's World and the U.S Military Response. Center for a New American Security, 2017, <https://stories.cnas.org/the-return-of-marco-polos-world-and-the-u-s-military-response>, (20/11/2023), p 7-8)

In the global digital order the Asian perspective is worth considering, because it is a viewpoint that covers a geography that contains 4.5 billion people. Asia's view is about economic growth, poverty eradication, trade integration, infrastructure investment, and becoming the factory floor of the world, leapfrogging in technologies, building up foreign exchange reserves, massive military modernization and youth – the majority of Asia's population is young and most of the young people in the world are Indian and Chinese millennials and generation Z in addition to those in South East Asia. They have grown up in a post-Cold War world prior to an era in which the West was dominant in setting the norms, rules with ideational leaders. Now Asians travel more, trade more with the rest of the world and there are more investment flows between Asia and outside Asia since the Cold War ended. It comes of no surprise to see the emergence of a new system, an Asian system. Until now the world has witnessed systems like a European system, NATO, a North American system but not an Asian one. Calling Asia a system does not carry with itself a sense of peaceful and trouble free connection but one with more tense and interdependent relationship while having the ability to manage itself without any reference to the rest of the world.

Besides what makes Asia important and crucial in other countries' calculations is the geopolitical landscape of Asia which is multi-polar and multi-civilizational in a sense that unlike Europe as a single level of analysis it is a multipolar system with no hegemon since the Mongols. (Khanna Parag interviewed by Robert D. Kaplan, Great Power Rivalry and the Evolving Relationships within Asia. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2012, <http://www.speaker.com/user/foreignpolicyresearchinstitute/ep1-Khanna-july-17>, 20/11/2023) This multi polarity characteristic brings with itself both challenges and opportunities and in order to turn the challenges into opportunities we need to focus on shared norms that carry with themselves a common legacy and identity, one that can also stand out and perform equally on the global stage next to the West.

Richard Hass, in his recent book "The World, A Brief History" classifies the world into six regions: Europe, East Asia and the Pacific, South Asia, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Americas. He evaluates the regions upon the role they may play in this century. Among all the regions he sees East Asia and the Pacific as the most populous region of the world which is likely to emerge as the main context for this century's history to shape with China, Japan, South Korea, and Indonesia as key players. As for South Asia he believes that its dominance by India will overshadow that of China's. However this region is prone to the rivalry between India and Pakistan alongside the chaotic situation in Afghanistan. The other part which he believes its scenarios will affect the world profoundly in terms of issues like energy and terrorism is the Middle East. Overall he assumes that the main difference that lingers between the regions will be religion, the changing demographics, and language. As for religion he points out about the Muslim population which will mainly be in the Middle East and also Indonesia, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. (Hass, Richard, The World: A Brief Introduction, New York: Penguin Press 2020, p. 34-35)

Michael O' Sullivan, in his book "The Levelling: What's next after Globalization?" argues that geopolitics, in the coming era will be dominated by three main players that are China-centric Asia, the Americas, and Europe. India. (Sullivan O', Michael. (2019). The Levelling: What's Next After Globalization. New York: Public Affairs, 2019, p.25) Undeniably Asia is and will be a region with a huge scope of affairs, economic, cultural and political. However considering the variety of religions, languages, tribes and sects, it is difficult to see Asia as a sole actor at international level.

Asia is a region in which the powers have been successful in promoting a geo-economic convergence through pragmatism. Though, there are frozen conflicts such as Palestine and South China Sea that need to be tamed and resolved since they carry the potential of explosion.

(Khanna, Asia in Times of Conflict, 2022) It is worth noting that the reasons behind these frozen conflicts are mainly geopolitical and ideological out of which many parts of Asia have witnessed fundamentalism as a backlash, one that poses a threat to media in forms of disinformation, misinformation and even hate speech. For that there is a need to carve out a collective identity and bring nations from different religious and ethnic backgrounds together. This is exactly where art can set the scene for togetherness.(Yousefian Ana, The Potentials of a Shared Taste of Beauty in Shaping a More Culturally Unified Asia in the Global Media Age, International Congress Full Papers Book, Future Dynamic in Asia, Arel USAM, 2022, 74-80) Unlike Europe or the West as a broader context, Asia is a continent with so many different languages, religions and types of governing as key drivers to form and shape a shared culture or identity. In recent decades Asia has been home to critical issues with a wide scope of influence having originated in clashes between identities and cultures. It is presumed that many of these clashes came to the surface as a result of globalization and digital revolution leading to a backlash motivated by an anti-West rhetoric. In many countries in Asia de-westernization has become a focal point notably in the Muslim ones. For that it is so complicated to reach a collective identity and culture necessary to give weight to the East in the global digital order. This is exactly where the need for acting as one actors in the digital domain based on shared norms and values. (Yousefian, The Potentials of a Shared Taste of Beauty in Shaping a More Culturally Unified Asia in the Global Media Age, 2022, 74-80)

6. Conclusion

For Asia to have an equal standing in the global media age, taking the new generations and their new lifestyles into account which is more or less virtual, it is essential to reach a common ground to tackle common concerns particularly in those parts of Asia dealing with issues such as fundamentalism or nationalism in a negative sense, that may be exacerbated by the use of the virtual space in which military power or hard power as it is put by Joseph Nye is not able act and the only source of power is the soft one. Asia has the potential to bring balance in the digital order by:

1. China as one of the key players in the digital order while making efforts in building geostrategic and digital connectivity, international prestige and combating extremism in Asia
2. Providing the Asians with an equal standing alongside the West in the global digital order, leading to a balance of presence in the virtual space

3. Eradicating threats like disinformation, misinformation, hate speech, bigotry and fundamentalism that hinder constructive and productive bilateral relationships between the West and the East
4. Replacing “the othering” with a collective identity built on a shared viewpoint, decreasing the potentials of intra and interstate conflicts in Asia
5. Promoting synergy, dialogue, engagement as the bases for building trust between the East and the West

Asia has the needed potentials economically, geopolitically, culturally to act a one player in the digital order but there is this need to bring harmony by building links and bonds on the shared values and norm since Asia won't be able to play bold if it has cracks inside.

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Rusya'nın ve NATO'nun Dinamik İlişkilerinde Oyun Teorisi Yaklaşımı

Nigora Khodzhamberdieva227

Özet

Uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında, Rusya ile NATO arasındaki etkileşimler güvenlik perspektifinden önemli bir rol oynamaktadır. Sovyetler Birliği'nin yıkılmasının ardından, Rusya'nın ekonomik ve siyasi zorluklarla mücadele etme süreci, 2000'lerden itibaren yeniden yapılanma çabalarıyla şekillenmiş ve böylelikle Rusya-NATO ilişkilerinin niteliğine önemli bir şekilde yansımıştır. Bu süreçte, NATO'nun Doğu Avrupa ülkelerini üyeliğe kabul etme kararı, ilişkilerin karmaşıklığını daha da artırmıştır.

Bu araştırma, uluslararası güvenlik ve oyun teorileri çerçevesinde Rusya-NATO ilişkilerini incelemektedir. 2007 Münih Güvenlik Konferansı'ndaki Rusya başkanı Vladimir Putin'in konuşması ile daha belirgin hale gelen taraflar arasındaki gerilimi vurgulamaktadır. Ayrıca, NATO'nun füze kalkanı projesi, Rusya-Gürcistan Savaşı ve Kırım'ın ilhaki sonrası Ukrayna krizi gibi olaylar, tarafların güvenlik stratejilerini etkilemede belirleyici olmuştur. Bu kriz dönemleri, Rusya ile NATO üyesi devletlerarasındaki stratejik farklılıkların ve çıkar çatışmalarının açıkça görülmesine neden olmuştur.

Bu çalışma, tarafların güvenlik stratejilerini anlamak için oyun teorisi yaklaşımını benimsemektedir. 2000'lerdeki gelişmeler, Korkak Tavuk Oyunu ve Mahkûm İkilemi gibi oyun teorisi kavramları kullanılarak analiz edilmektedir. 2004 yılında NATO'nun Doğu'ya doğru genişlemesi ve eski Doğu Bloku ülkelerini üyeliğe kabul etmesi; 2006-2007 Doğu Avrupa füze savunma sistemleri krizi ve 2008 Gürcistan Savaşı gibi olaylar, stratejik düşüncenin ve eylemlerin nasıl şekillendiğini anlamak amacıyla incelenmektedir.

Bu araştırma, tarafların stratejik kararlarını ve bu kararların temelinde yatan düşünce süreçlerini açığa çıkarmayı amaçlamaktadır. Aynı zamanda, güvenlik bağlamındaki önemli olayların birbirini nasıl etkilediğini ve stratejik düşüncenin nasıl şekillendiğini göstermeyi hedeflemektedir. Bu bağlamda, artan gerilim, stratejik rekabet ve çıkar çatışmaları gibi faktörler, Rusya-NATO ilişkilerinin güvenlik dinamiklerinin daha kapsamlı bir şekilde anlaşılmasına yardımcı olmaktadır.

Sonuç olarak, Rusya ile NATO arasındaki uluslararası güvenlik açısından kritik ilişkiler, oyun teorisi yaklaşımı kullanılarak daha derinlemesine incelenmektedir. Bu çalışma, tarafların güvenlik stratejilerinin ve bu stratejilerin temelinde yatan düşünce süreçlerinin anlaşılmasını hedeflemektedir. Ayrıca, Rusya-NATO ilişkilerinin güvenlik ve uluslararası istikrar bağlamında gelecekteki seyri konusunda önemli perspektifler sunmaktadır.

Anahtar kelimeler: Uluslararası İlişkiler, Rusya-NATO İlişkileri, Güvenlik Dinamikleri, Oyun Teorileri.

Abstract

In the context of international relations, interactions between Russia and NATO play a crucial role from a security perspective. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's process of grappling with economic and political challenges has been shaped by restructuring efforts since the 2000s, significantly influencing the nature of Russia-NATO relations. During this process, NATO's decision to admit Eastern European countries as members further complicated the relationships.

This research examines Russia-NATO relations within the framework of international security and game theories. It emphasizes the tension between the parties that became more pronounced with the speech of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the 2007 Munich Security Conference. Additionally, events such as NATO's missile defense project, the Russia-Georgia War, and the annexation of Crimea followed by the Ukraine crisis have been decisive in influencing the

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security strategies of the parties. These crisis periods have clearly revealed strategic differences and conflicting interests between Russia and NATO member states.

This study adopts a game theory approach to comprehend the security strategies of the parties. Developments in the 2000s are analyzed using game theory concepts such as the Chicken Game, Stag Hunt, and Prisoner's Dilemma. Events like NATO's eastward expansion in 2004 and the acceptance of former Eastern Bloc countries, the 2006-2007 Eastern European missile defense system crisis, and Georgian War in 2008 are examined to understand how strategic thinking and actions were shaped.

The research aims to unveil the strategic decisions of the parties and the thought processes underlying these decisions. It also aims to demonstrate how significant events in the security context influence each other and shape strategic thinking. Factors such as increasing tension, strategic competition, and conflicting interests contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the security dynamics in Russia-NATO relations.

In conclusion, critical international security relations between Russia and NATO are examined in-depth using a game theory approach. This study aims to understand the security strategies of the parties and the thought processes underlying these strategies. Furthermore, it provides important perspectives on the future course of Russia-NATO relations in the context of security and international stability.

Keywords: *International Relations, Russia-NATO Relations, Security Dynamics, Game Theories.*

Giriş

İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın galibi olarak çıkan Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD) ve Sovyetler Birliği (SSCB) arasındaki rekabet ve hegemon olma isteği, iki ülke arasında soğuk bir savaşın başlamasına neden olmuştur. Bu rekabet, askeri, ekonomik, siyasi ve birçok diğer alanda hissedilmiştir. Ancak, doğrudan sıcak bir çatışmaya dönüşmemesi nedeniyle bu döneme "soğuk savaş" adı verilmiştir.²²⁸ ABD ile SSCB, bu dönemde diğer ülkelerle ittifaklar kurarak üçüncü ülke topraklarında vekâlet savaşları da yürütmüşlerdir. Soğuk savaşın resmi başlama noktası olarak ise Winston Churchill'in 1946 Demir Perde konuşması kabul edilir²²⁹. Demir Perde konuşmasının ardından, ABD ve SSCB arasında sıfır toplamlı bir oyun başlamıştır; bir tarafın kazancı diğerinin mutlak kaybı olarak kabul edilmiş ve yapılan herhangi bir hareket, diğerine karşı olarak değerlendirilmiştir.

Batı Bloku'nun lideri ABD, 1949'da Kuzey Atlantik Antlaşması Örgütü'nü (NATO) askeri bir örgüt olarak kurmuş²³⁰, Doğu Bloku'nun lideri SSCB ise 1955 yılında Varşova Paktı'nı

²²⁸ Ralph B. Levering, *The Cold War: A Post-Cold War History*, 3rd edition, John Wiley & Sons, (2016), 20-24.

²²⁹ Winston Churchill, "Iron-Curtain Speech", *The National Archives*, 1946, <https://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/education/resources/cold-war-on-file/iron-curtain-speech/>, (5.10.2023).

²³⁰ "Founding Treaty", NATO, (2022), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_67656.htm, (19/11/2023).

kurmuştur²³¹. Ancak Varşova Paktı uzun süreli olmamış ve 1990'ların başında feshedilmiştir. Soğuk savaş döneminin sonu olarak nitelendirilen SSCB'nin 1991 yılında yıkılmasının ardından, Doğu Bloku'na karşı savunma örgütü olarak kurulan NATO'nun da feshedilmesini bekleyen Rusya, yanılığa düşmüştür. NATO, yıkılmamış, aksine yeni üye devletleri kabul ederek daha da genişleyip uluslararası arenada güçlü bir aktör haline gelmiş ve uluslararası barış operasyonlarında etkili bir rol oynamaya başlamıştır.

SSCB'nin yıkılmasının ardından Rusya, ekonomik ve sosyal sorunlarla uğraşmış ve uluslararası konjonktürde etkili bir oyuncu olamamıştır. 1990'ların başlarında Rusya, batı ile ilişkilerini düzeltmeye yönelmiş ve hatta NATO üyesi olmak için çaba sarf etmiştir. Ancak NATO, Rusya'yı üye olarak kabul etmemiş, ancak barış için ortaklık projeleri başlatmıştır. İki aktör arasındaki ilişki, iş birliği potansiyeli taşımasına rağmen, uzun süren güvensizlik sonucunda güven oluşturmakta zorluklar yaşamış ve zaman zaman işbirliği stratejik çatışmaya dönüşmüştür.

NATO ve Rusya arasında kurulan dinamik iş birliği, pragmatik düşünceye dayanmaktadır. Bu süreci anlamayı kolaylaştırmak ve sistemli hale getirmek amacıyla, bu çalışmada korkak tavuk oyunu ve mahkûm ikilemi gibi oyun teorilerine başvurulmuştur.

Oyun Teorileri

Oyun teorisi, ilk olarak ekonomi alanında geliştirilmiş olmasına rağmen, daha sonraki dönemlerde farklı disiplinlerdeki rekabeti açıklamak amacıyla kullanılmıştır. Bu bağlamda, uluslararası ilişkiler alanında özellikle soğuk savaş döneminde, rekabetin yoğun olduğu durumları anlamak için oyun teorileri benimsenmiştir²³². Oyun teorisi, genellikle iki pragmatik (faydacı) aktör arasındaki rekabete odaklanmaktadır. Oyuncular, oyunun sonunda maksimum fayda sağlama veya minimum zararla çıkma amacındadır ve bu amaç doğrultusunda belirli stratejiler uygularlar. Ancak, her bir oyuncu, sadece kendi stratejilerini değil, aynı zamanda rakiplerinin stratejilerini de dikkate alarak kararlarını şekillendirme durumundadır.²³³

Oyun, genellikle güvensizlik ortamında gerçekleşen, en az iki stratejiye sahip en az iki oyuncunun katılımını içeren bir etkileşim biçimini temsil eder. Bu bağlamda, oyun, sıfır toplamlı ve sıfır toplamlı olmayan, kooperatif veya kooperatif olmayan oyun olarak kategorize

²³¹“Подписан Варшавский Договор”, Президентская библиотека, (1955), <https://www.prlib.ru/history/619242>, (10.11.2023).

²³² Hector Correa, “Game Theory as an Instrument”, Graduate School of International Relations, Ritsumeikan University (立命館大学 国際関係研究科), (2001): 187-204.

²³³ John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, “Theory of Games and Economic Behavior”, (Princeton University Press: 1944).

edilir. Dolayısıyla, sıfır toplamlı olmayan durumlarda, yani bir oyuncunun kaybının diğer oyuncunun mutlak kazancı olmadığı durumlarda, işbirliği mümkün olabilir. Bu durum, oyuncular arasında koalisyonlar kurma potansiyelini ortaya koyabilir.

Her oyunda bir veya birden fazla Nash dengesi bulunur. Nash dengesi, oyuncuların en kötü ihtimalde bile en az zararlı oyunu tamamlama noktası olarak değerlendirilebilir²³⁴.

Korkak Tavuk Oyunu

Korkak Tavuk oyunu, ilk defa Kaliforniya gençleri arasında ortaya çıkan bir oyun türüdür²³⁵. Oyunun kurallarına göre, iki sürücü aynı şeritte birbirine doğru ilerler. Her oyuncu için dört olası sonuç bulunmaktadır. İlk durumda, A oyuncusu çarpışmadan kaçınarak diğer şeride geçer ve kaybeder; bu durumda A oyuncusu korkak tavuk olur ve B oyuncusu kazanmış olarak değerlendirilir. İkinci durumda ise, tam tersine, B oyuncusunun korkak tavuk olmasıyla oyun sona erer ve A oyuncusu kazanan olarak kabul edilir. Üçüncü durumda her iki oyuncu arabalarını durdurarak çarpışmadan kaçınır; bu durumda her iki oyuncu da korkak tavuk olarak değerlendirilir, ancak en az zararlı oyunu tamamlamış olurlar. Dördüncü ve en kötü durumda ise her iki oyuncu da şerit değiştirmeyip çarpışır.

Bu oyun sıfır toplamlı bir oyundur, çünkü bir oyuncunun kazancı diğerinin mutlak kaybıdır ve işbirliği mümkün değildir. Oyunda iki Nash dengesi bulunmaktadır. İlk dengede her iki oyuncu da durarak en az zararlı oyunu tamamlar. İkinci dengede ise her iki oyuncu da şerit değiştirmeme kararı alarak en kötü sonuca ulaşır. Nash dengesi, diğer oyuncuların kararına bağlı olmadan en pragmatik noktayı ifade eder. Bu durumda her iki oyuncu da diğerinin stratejisini veya ne yapacağını bilemez, ancak diğer oyuncu vazgeçip şerit değiştirirse kazanmış olur.

Uluslararası ilişkilerde en yaygın örneklerden biri, 1962 Küba Füze Krizi olarak kabul edilir. Bu olay, Soğuk Savaş döneminin doruk noktası olarak bilinir ve dünyayı nükleer savaşın eşiğine getirmiştir.

Korkak Tavuk Oyunu Perspektifinden Füze Kalkanı Sorunu

2000'lerin başından itibaren NATO, Doğu Avrupa ülkeleri ile yürütülen füze kalkanı projesini başlatmış ve 2005-2006 yıllarında Romanya²³⁶ ve Bulgaristan²³⁷ gibi eski Doğu Blok'u ülkeleri topraklarında füze savunma sistemleri konuşlandırmasını öngören anlaşma

²³⁴ John Nash, "Non-Cooperative Games", *Annals of Mathematics*, (1955): 44-46.

²³⁵ D. Degterev, A. Degterev, "Теория Игр и Международные Отношения", *Мировая Экономика И Международные Отношения*, (2001): 79-89.

²³⁶ "The United States and Romania: Strategic Partners for 25 Years", U.S. Department of State, (2005), <https://www.state.gov/the-united-states-and-romania-strategic-partners-for-25-years/>, (20.10.23).

²³⁷ "Bulgaria (06-612) – Agreement on Defense Cooperation", U.S. Department of State, (2006), <https://www.state.gov/06-612>, (12.10.23).

imzalamıştır. Daha sonra Macaristan ve Polonya ile benzer anlaşmalar imzalanmıştır. NATO, bu adımı üyelerinin ve müttefiklerinin savunmasını güçlendirmek amacıyla yapıldığını belirterek, bu sistemlerin yalnızca NATO üye ülkelerinin sınırlarında bulunduğunu ve başka bir ülkeye yönelik bir tehdit oluşturmadığını vurgulamıştır. Ancak, Rusya bu girişimi doğrudan bir tehdit olarak algılamış ve sonraki stratejilerini bu bağlamda şekillendirmiştir. Füze kalkanı meselesi, büyük ölçüde Rusya ile Batı arasında açık bir rekabetin yeniden canlanmasına işaret etmekte ve bu durum, Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki Küba Füze Krizi'nin stratejik unsurlarına benzerlik taşımaktadır.

Soğuk Savaş dönemindeki Küba Füze Krizi, taraflar arasında müzakereler sonucunda en uygun çözümle tamamlanmış ve SSCB'nin Küba'daki füze kalkanını kaldırmasıyla Batı ile SSCB arasında bir yumuşama sağlanmıştır. Ancak, NATO'nun Doğu Avrupa ülkelerindeki füze kalkanı projesi benzer bir olumlu sonuç doğurmamıştır. Bu durum, her iki tarafın çatışmadan kaçınmak yerine kendi stratejilerini sürdürme kararlılığını ve her iki tarafın da kendi stratejik pozisyonlarından vazgeçmeyerek çatışmayı sürdürdüğünü göstermektedir.

Bu sürecin bölgedeki istikrarsızlıkların sebeplerinden biri olduğu düşünülebilir. Takip eden Gürcistan Savaşı ve Ukrayna krizleri, her iki çatışmanın da Rusya için NATO üyeliğinin bir sorun teşkil ettiği perspektifinden değerlendirilebilir.

Farklı zamanlar, farklı süreçler ve farklı sonuçlar olsa da, her iki olay aynı amaç ve dünya liderliği peşinde olan rasyonel aktörlerin bulunduğu benzer niteliklere sahiptir. Fakat her oyun, sadece bir kez oynanır ve aynı koşullar altında olsa dahi ikinci kez oynandığında sonuçlar değişebilir, çünkü her iki taraf da önceki oyunun sonucuna ve çıkardığı derslere göre stratejilerini değiştirir ve farklı bir oyun ortaya çıkar²³⁸.

Mahkûm İkilemi

Mahkûmun İkilemi, işbirliği paradoksları içerisinde en bilinen oyun teorisi modelidir ve bireyin kendi çıkarları doğrultusundaki eylemlerin her zaman en olumlu sonuca yol açmadığını gösteren bir paradigmadır. Klasik mahkûmun ikilemi örneği, polisin tutukladığı iki suç çetesinin üyeleriyle ilgili bir hikâyedir. Bu çete üyeleri, organize bir soygunla suçlanmaktadır ancak polisin ellerinde somut kanıtlar olmadığı için eğer hiçbiri suçlamayı kabul etmezse, daha hafif bir suçlama ile bir yıl içinde serbest bırakılacaklardır.

Her bir mahkûm ayrı odada tutulmaktadır ve birbirleriyle iletişim kurmalarına izin verilmemektedir. Ancak özgürlüklerini geri kazanmak için birbirlerini ele verme teklif edilmektedir. Genel durum şu şekildedir: Eğer bir mahkûm susarsa ve diğeri suçunu anlatırsa,

²³⁸ Nigora Khodzhamberdieva, "Yeni Soğuk Savaş Tartışmaları Bağlamında Rusya-NATO İlişkileri (2014-2022)", (Yüksek Lisans Tezi, Ankara Hacı Bayram Veli Üniversitesi, 2023).

ilk mahkûm 5 yıl hapis cezası alacak, ikinci mahkûm ise cezadan muaf olacaktır. Tam tersi durumda ise, eğer her ikisi de birbirlerini ele verirse, her biri 2 yıl hapis cezasına çarptırılacaktır. Ancak her ikisi de sessiz kalırsa, her biri sadece bir yıl hapis cezasına çarptırılacaktır.

Bu oyunda en iyi seçenek “ihamet” etmektir. Daha avantajlı bir seçenek, susmak ve itiraf etmemektir, çünkü bu durumda işbirliği umuduyla daha az ceza alabilirler. Ancak bu durumda, her iki soyguncunun da, ortağının onu ele verme olasılığıyla karşı karşıya olduğu bir risk vardır. Bu nedenle, en rasyonel karar itiraf etmektir, çünkü bu durumda ortağın konuşup konuşmamasına bakılmaksızın maksimum cezadan kaçınılmış olunacaktır.

Güvensizlik ortamı nedeniyle, mahkûmlar kendileri için en avantajlı seçeneği seçmek yerine daha az avantajlı bir seçeneğe yönelmek zorunda kalırlar. Bu oyunda sadece bir Nash dengesi bulunmaktadır, o da diğer oyuncuya güvenmeyip onun ihanet edebileceği olasılığına karşı 'ihamet' etmektir.

1950 yılında matematikçiler Merrill Flood ve Melvin Dresher, her bir oyuncunun kendi çıkarını sağlayabileceği, ancak güven eksikliği nedeniyle kazancın miktarını bireysel olarak azalttığı bir oyun fikrini önermişlerdir. Bu fikir, matematikçi Albert W. Tucker tarafından genişletilerek "Mahkûm İkilemi" adını almıştır.²³⁹

Rusya-NATO İlişkileri: Stratejik Çatışma ve İşbirliği Potansiyeli

Rusya ve NATO arasındaki dinamik ilişkiler, mevcut durumda her iki tarafın stratejik çıkar çatışması içinde olmalarına rağmen, potansiyel bir işbirliği avantajına sahip olabilir. Bu durumun temel nedeni, uzun süren gegven duygusunun eksikliği, etkili iletişimsizlik ve ortak anlaşmaların yetersizliğidir. 1990'larda işbirliği çabalarına rağmen, 2000'lerin başına gelindiğinde durum daha olumsuz bir yöne evrilmiş, olası çatışma sebepleri artmış ve uluslararası konjonktürde iki aktör arasında daha fazla rekabet ortaya çıkmıştır.

Özellikle 2002 yılında NATO'nun Doğu Avrupa ülkelerinde füze kalkanı projesi ve sonrasında Doğu Avrupa ülkeleri olan Romanya, Bulgaristan, Macaristan ve Polonya'ya füzelerin yerleştirilmesi, iki aktör arasındaki anlaşmazlıklara neden olmuştur. Bu durum, Rusya Devlet Başkanı Putin'in 2007 yılındaki Münih Güvenlik Konferansı'nda yaptığı konuşma ile daha belirgin hale gelmiştir²⁴⁰. Putin, konuşmasında Amerika'nın hâkim olduğu tek kutuplu dünya düzeninin sürdürülemez olduğunu ve artık çok kutuplu bir dünya sisteminin var olduğunu vurgulayarak, Batı ile Rusya'nın farklı saflarda yer aldığını resmi olarak ifade etmiştir.

²³⁹ Martin Peterson, “The Prisoner’s Dilemma”, (Cambridge University Press, 2015).

²⁴⁰ “Выступление И Дискуссия На Мюнхенской Конференции По Вопросам Политики Безопасности /Мюнх Гүвенлик Конференсы”, Кремлин, (2007), <http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/24034>, (28.09.23).

2008 yılında yaşanan Gürcistan savaşı, bu konjonktürü değerlendirmek açısından önemlidir. Gürcistan'ın NATO üye adayı statüsünden sonra ortaya çıkan Gürcistan-Rusya savaşı sürecinde, ABD Gürcistan'a askeri yardım sağlamış ve hatta bu coğrafyada demokrasinin yayılmasına destek vereceğini açıklamıştır.²⁴¹ Daha sonra yaşanan Ukrayna krizinde de Batı ile Rusya arasındaki rekabet açıkça görülmüştür.

Mahkûm İkilemi, oyun teorisi bağlamında incelendiğinde, oyuncuların stratejik seçimleri ve karşılaştıkları zorluklar göz önüne alındığında, Rusya ile NATO arasındaki dinamik ilişkileri açıklamak için uygun bir model olabilir.

Tablo 1

Oyuncular/ Stratejiler	Rusya /İşbirliği	Rusya /Çatışma
NATO/ İşbirliği	(-1, -1)	(-10, 0)
NATO /Çatışma	(0, -10)	(-5, -5)

Yukarıda verilen tablo 1'e göre dört olası sonuç bulunmaktadır:

(-1, -1): Her iki taraf işbirliği yaparsa, her ikisi de minimum zarar eder. Her iki oyuncu da kendi stratejilerini değiştirerek güvensizliği önlemeye çalışır. Kısa vadede dezavantajlara yol açabilir. Bu durum, uzun vadeli işbirliği açısından daha avantajlı hal alabilir.

(-10, 0): Rusya işbirliği yaparken NATO çatışmayı tercih ederse, Rusya büyük bir zararla karşılaşırken NATO kar elde eder. Bu durumda Rusya hazırlıksız yakalanmış olur ve çatışmaya hazır olmadığı için daha dezavantajlı duruma düşer.

(0, -10): Rusya çatışmayı tercih ederken NATO işbirliği yaparsa, NATO büyük bir dezavantaj yaşar, ancak Rusya bir avantaj elde etmiş olur.

(-5, -5): Her iki taraf da çatışmayı tercih ederse, her iki taraf da ortak bir zarar görür. Bu durum, Mahkûm İkilemi'nin temel özelliğini yansıtır. Bu seçenek, Mahkûm İkilemi oyununda Nash Dengesi olarak bilinir. Her iki taraf da birbirine güvenmediği için en karlı değil, en rasyonel ve her durumda en az zararla karşılaşacakları seçeneği seçmelidir. -10 zarar en kötü olasılık ve 0 en iyi olasılıksa, en rasyonel olan -5 olarak kabul edilir.

Sıfır toplamlı, kooperatif olmayan Mahkûm İkilemi oyununda taraflar arasında işbirliği söz konusu değildir. Ancak oyun tekrarlanma olasılığının olması bazen işbirliğini olası kılmaktadır. Mahkûm İkilemi modelinde güvensizlik söz konusudur. Her iki oyuncunun birbirine

²⁴¹ "U.S.-Republic of Georgia Relations", C-Span, (2008), <https://www.c-span.org/video/?186669-1/us-republic-georgia-relations>, (15.11.23)

güvenmemesi ve ortak bir çıkar için işbirliği yapma potansiyeline rağmen, kısa vadeli çıkarlarını korumak adına çatışma seçeneklerini değerlendirmeleri durumunu yansıtmaktadır. Bu model Rusya ile NATO arasındaki güvenlik stratejilerinin karmaşıklığını ifade eder.

Sonuç

Uluslararası ilişkiler bağlamında, küresel aktörlerin aldığı kararlar ve bu aktörler arasındaki ilişkiler, dünya genelini etkileyebilecek bir kapasitededir. Bu ilişkiler, bölgesel ve küresel güvenlik açısından büyük öneme sahiptir. Sovyetler Birliği'nin çöküşü sonrasında, eski Doğu Blok'u ülkelerinin liberal demokrasi sistemini benimsemeye başlaması ve o dönemde zayıflamış olan Rusya'nın iç sorunlarla uğraşıyor olması, Batı'nın öncülüğündeki askeri örgüt NATO'nun doğuya doğru genişlemesini tetiklemiştir. Bu genişleme, komünizmin etki alanında olan ülkeleri üyeliğe dâhil etmişti ve bu sayede olası bir Rus hegemonyasının dünya çapında tekrar güç kazanmasına karşı etki alanının sınırlanmasını amaçlamıştır.

1990'lı yıllarda ilişkiler düzelmeye başlamış olmasına rağmen, uzun süren güvensizlik sonrasında güven oluşturulamamıştır. Her iki aktör de, diğerinin hamlesini kendisine karşı bir strateji olarak görmüş ve güçlenmek istemiştir. Bu çerçevede, 2005-2006 yılları arasında NATO'nun eski Doğu Bloku ülkeleri Romanya ve Bulgaristan ile füze kalkanı yerleştirilmesine dair yapılan anlaşmalar, Rusya tarafından olumsuz karşılanmış ve tepkiye sebep olmuştur.

2007 yılında Almanya'nın Münih şehrinde düzenlenen güvenlik konferansında Rusya Devlet Başkanı'nın konuşması, Batı ile Rusya arasındaki ilişkileri daha da zedelemiş ve rekabeti artırmıştır. Sonrasında yaşanan bölgesel krizlerde, özellikle Gürcistan ve Ukrayna, ABD'nin desteklediği ve bu ülkelere NATO üye adaylığı statüsü verildiği bir dönem yaşanmıştır. Bu durum, özellikle Rusya'nın “yakın çevre” politikası çerçevesinde, çevresindeki ülkeleri bir tampon bölgesi olarak görmesi ve güvenlik stratejisi uygulamasıyla çatışmaya sebep olmuştur. Rusya, özellikle Ukrayna ve Gürcistan'ın NATO üyeliğine karşı çıkmıştır.

Oyun teorisi perspektifinden bakıldığında, NATO ile Rusya arasındaki stratejik çatışmanın temelinde güvensizlik ortamında uzun vadeli düşünce yerine kısa vadeli kar elde etme olasılığı ve güvensizlik ortamında daha çok ihanet seçeneğinin tercih edilmesi yatar. Ancak, oyunun devam edeceğinin bilinmesi üzerine zaman zaman işbirliği de gözlemlenmiştir. Bu iki aktör arasındaki ilişkiler, bölgesel ve küresel güvenlik açısından büyük etkiler yaratma potansiyeline sahiptir.

Tarafların stratejik kararları ve bu kararların temelinde dünya liderliği düşüncesi, tarafların en karlı değil, en rasyonel kararlar almalarına neden olmuştur. Bu rekabet sonucunda, çoğu zaman kooperatif olmayan ve sıfır toplamlı bir oyunda yer alan iki taraf ortaya çıkmıştır. Güvenlik

bağlamında, olaylar birbirini etkileyerek füze kalkanı sorunu Gürcistan Savaşı'nın ortaya çıkmasına kadar varan süreci etkilemiştir. Uluslararası ilişkiler ve güvenlik istikrarı açısından önem arz eden Rusya ve NATO ilişkileri, bu süreçteki gelişmelerle birlikte belirginleşmiştir.

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The Role of Energy in the Ukraine War

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Abstract

The war in Ukraine is considered one of the most important events in the world after the Cold War. A war that has not ended nearly two years after its beginning. A very important thing about the war in Ukraine is that it is multidimensional. In fact, this war had several reasons such as political, economic and security in line with numerous repercussions. Considering the presence of Russia as a supplier of natural gas, especially for Europe, it is obvious that the most critical factor in this conflict is energy. Accordingly, in this article, an attempt has been made to answer this question, what was the role of energy in the Ukrainian war? Based on the theoretical framework of energy security and using a hybrid methodology, the hypothesis of the article is that the increase in Russian financial reserves as a result of the increase in energy prices and thus the increase in its economic power in the years before the war on the one hand and Europeans' dependence on energy on the other hand can play a decisive role in Russia's decision to an attack on Ukraine. The history of Russian foreign policy toward EU has already shown that energy can be used as a political weapon by Moscow to achieve political and military goals. Also, the findings of the article indicate that the energy debate has had the most important impact on the war in Ukraine, which is not only aimed at the European countries or the two countries involved in the war, but also caused serious disturbances in the war.

Keywords: Energy Security, Ukraine War, NATO, Russia, Natural Gas

1. Introduction

Energy, especially after the industrial revolution and the expansion of factories, has received much attention. An important point regarding energy use is that Vincent Churchill's order that warships use oil instead of coal for fuel has caused more attention to energy, especially oil. In addition, energy, especially oil and natural gas, has been the cause of many political events and wars in different parts of the world(Woodward,2022).

The Ukrainian War is one of the most critical events in the history of international relations after the collapse of the Soviet Union. An incident that was not only focused on the political and military dimension but included much wider dimensions. It is not wrong that if we consider the war in Ukraine as another cold war, we will see a blockade between East and West in the world(Shah,2022). The war between Russia and Ukraine has been necessary because the two countries involved have been influential in the energy field (Sokhanvar,2023). Russia has rich

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energy reserves, especially in the field of natural gas, which, according to the available statistics, ranks as one of the most natural gas reserves in the world.

On the other hand, European countries need to import gas from Russia due to shortages in natural gas, which has caused Europe's dependence on Russia in the field of natural gas (Cherepovitsyn, 2023). On the other hand, Ukraine played a transit role for Europe and Russia, transporting Russian natural gas to Europe. It is not wrong to consider Ukraine as a bridge or gateway to Europe for Russia. This issue has made the energy aspect of the war in Ukraine more prominent, and we can consider the energy factor as one of the main reasons for starting the war between the two countries.

The increase in Russia's income due to the expansion of exports and production of natural gas in this country increased the power and wealth of Russia, which was thought to increase Russia's aggressive approach and spirit on the one hand and the other hand, due to Europe's need for Russian gas. that the war will end very soon. However, the role of energy caused the intensity and spread of this war. In this article, an attempt has been made to answer the question of what was the role of energy in the Ukraine war? We use the framework of the theory of energy security and the hybrid methodology. The findings of the research point to the fact that the increase in Russian income and the need for Europe caused Russia's wrong impression that they would quickly conclude by emphasizing the energy dimension, which turned out to be wrong. Energy plays a vital role in the beginning, continuation, and end of the war, which is the most critical factor in the war in Ukraine.

2. Literature review

Many articles have yet to be written about the importance and role of energy in the Ukraine war due to the novelty of the issue. For this reason, similar articles and those close to it have been used and studied in this section.

The first article reviewed is entitled European energy politics after Ukraine: The road ahead written by Osička and Černoč. In this article, the authors state that by invading Ukraine and arming its gas to Europe, Russia has turned natural gas into an unreliable and expensive renewable energy. The authors argue that the war and the uncertainty about the natural gas it produced will play an essential role in the future development of Europe's energy transition. Reducing energy vulnerability and faster decarbonization will be pursued as key policy goals, likely at the expense of further developing the EU's integrated energy market under its current design. We may also see Europe and more governments in energy matters as solutions to the crisis require levels of coordination and resource mobilization that individual member states or

private actors cannot provide. In the conclusion, the authors state that the European Union has the resources, the knowledge base, and the determination to turn the crisis into an opportunity. However, Europe's response in case of incoherence or mismanagement may worsen the situation and cause a political crisis and, ultimately, a crisis of legitimacy.

The second article studied in this section is titled Energy Resources and Markets – Perspectives on the Russia–Ukraine War, written by Johannesson and Clowes. The authors have stated in this article that this article explains the reasons for the start of the Russia-Ukraine war in 2014 from the perspective of energy and energy markets, based on the resource dependence theory and the conceptual framework outlined by Jeffrey D. Colgan. Research findings show that Russia is heavily dependent on gas export revenues to Ukraine and the EU, but also that Ukraine's energy reserves and pipeline system can potentially be a direct competitive threat to Russia's energy exports. This article argues that this was the underlying cause and the main causal pathway leading to Russia's annexation of Crimea and the subsequent war in eastern Ukraine.

The following article is entitled Russia's war on Ukraine, European energy policy responses, and implications for sustainable transformations written by Kuzemko et al. In this paper, the authors argue that Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 sent a shock wave across Europe and revealed the continent's dependence on a geopolitical enemy. Energy is strongly linked to the ongoing battle: Europe has committed to phasing out Russian fossil fuel imports. At the same time, Russia has cut gas supplies to several countries and significantly reduced gas flows to others. The authors analyze what energy policy responses to the crisis have meant: environmental sustainability, energy equity, and social justice. In doing so, there is strong potential to accelerate the supply of clean energy across Europe, the implications of fossil fuel phasing out, negative implications for sustainable transitions in the Global South, significant implications for energy equity within and outside Europe, and the relative return of government. As an energy actor, reframing energy as a geopolitical security concern tends to obscure and downplay other energy policy goals in acute crises.

The last article studied in this section is titled Influence of Russia-Ukraine War on the Global Energy and Food Security, written by Xi-Yin Zhou et al. In this article, the authors argue that the Russia-Ukraine war has affected and further affected global energy and food security. However, the exact penetration degree, critical vulnerabilities, and penetration process are still unclear. The nodes of failure are always countries with low economic scale and political position. The results tell us that we need to reinforce the importance of increasing production capacity and energy types to withstand the risk of war between Russia and Ukraine. Global

international organizations are also required to strengthen the balancing function of global energy and food security demand between large and small countries. We must pay more attention to small African and Asian countries to deal with this danger.

As we can see, the article has not specifically addressed the role of energy in the Ukrainian war, so this article is of great importance.

3. Theoretical framework

The theoretical framework of energy security has received more attention in recent decades due to the promotion and importance of energy globally. It has become a critical issue in international relations. Also, countries are well aware of the role of energy in domestic and international developments. energy security as the supply of sufficient and reliable energy for the demand sector (Gitelman,2023). On the other hand, there are other definitions regarding energy security. The most important of these definitions regarding energy security is from the International Energy Agency, which considers energy security as uninterrupted access to energy resources at an economically justifiable price (<https://www.iea.org/topics/energy-security>). The critical issue in both definitions is access to energy at a reasonable price and permanently, which is the most critical existing principle of energy security. On the other hand, some believe that energy security includes the four principles of availability, affordability, accessibility, and acceptability (Luty,2023).

As mentioned, the concept of energy security has wide dimensions. One of the most critical aspects of energy security theory is the security of supply. This concept is used for countries that import or buy energy, meaning that the buying country is sure to provide and access a sufficient and long-term amount of energy. On the other side, there is also the concept of demand security for producing countries. Security of demand means that the producing countries are sure of permanent and long-term customers for the sale of their energy carriers and know that they can be sure of the sale of their energy for the next few years (Malki, 2016). To better understand the security of supply and demand, we give an example in this regard. As a producing country, Iran seeks to maintain the security of its demand and a suitable customer such as China can be used to stabilize the security of supply. On the other hand, China considers Iran an energy exporting country to ensure security and tries to provide part of its energy needs through Iran.

In addition, energy security has taken on broader dimensions in recent years, including environmental issues (Wang,2023). Countries of the world, especially European countries, are trying to replace renewable energies and use them due to environmental problems and pollution

caused by fossil fuels. For this reason, we can consider environmental security and sustainable development as a part of energy security. (Shakya,2023)

In this article, considering the issue of energy, the theoretical framework of energy security has been used, on the one hand, by examining Europe's dependence on Russian natural gas, and on the other hand, Russia's need to export natural gas, considering its dependence on the resulting revenues. Moreover, its effects on global energy security have been analyzed.

4. Historical background of the Russian and Ukraine relations

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the State Council of Ukraine declared independence. The country's referendum was held on December 1, and 93.3% voted for independence, and 62% voted for Kravchuk's presidency (Khodunov,2022). The most important event after the declaration of independence of Ukraine can be considered the Orange Revolution in this country, a critical incident that has overshadowed the history and political currents of this country in recent years. In 2004, Viktor Yanukovich and Yushchenko became presidential candidates. Yanukovich was pro-Russia, and Yushchenko was pro-West. With Yanukovich's victory, doubts about Russia's interference and the integrity of the election increased. This caused Yushchenko's supporters to come to the streets with the support of the United States of America and demand the cancellation of the election and its re-holding, which they finally succeeded in doing. By re-holding the elections, Yushchenko won by obtaining 52% of the votes against Yanukovich's 44%, which indicated the duality of the Ukrainian society in favoring the West and Russia (Shevsky,2022). This event can be considered an essential point of confrontation between the West and Russia in the history of Ukraine.

Another important event after the country's independence from the Soviet Union was the separation of Crimea from it. In 2014, following the dissatisfaction of the people of Russian descent in Ukraine, a ground was created for Russian forces to enter this region under the pretext of supporting the people of Crimea. On March 16, 2014, a referendum on Crimea's accession to Russia was held, and 96% of the votes were awarded to Crimea's accession to Russia (Ryabushkin,2022). On March 18, 2014, Putin signed the annexation document of Crimea to Russia. This action of Russia was met with various reactions from countries. Western countries and the United States of America condemned this action of Russia and called this incident a military occupation.

Many things are discussed as the reasons for the start of the war in Ukraine. The political, security, and energy reasons are the most important reasons for starting the war in Ukraine. The most important reason for the start of the war is the change in Ukraine's national security

strategy in 2020. The strategy signed by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, according to which cooperation and membership in NATO has become the primary goal of this country. In addition, reclaiming the Crimean Peninsula and annexing this region to Ukraine has been one of the main goals of Ukraine's national security strategy (Demir, 2022). Russia believes that Ukraine's membership in NATO and the deployment of its military forces can be a severe threat to Moscow's national security. Moscow considers its surrounding areas as its private life. Naturally, it does not want NATO and Russia's main rival, the United States of America, to have a presence and influence on Russia's borders. One of the most important reasons for the start of the war in Ukraine was energy (Mohd,2022).

5.Russia's oil and natural gas reserve

As mentioned before, the issue of energy, especially oil and gas, is very important in the world. Naturally, the countries that have significant oil and natural gas resources have a special place in Hahan. According to table number one, Russia has 19% of the world's natural gas reserves, which is a very high percentage for a country(BP world statics 2022). In other words, Russia owns one fifth of the world's natural gas. This issue caused the great importance of the war in Ukraine in the field of energy and especially natural gas. The disruption in the production and export of a country like Russia caused the global energy market to undergo changes that led to an increase in price and a decrease in supply in this regard.

Table 1:natural gas total proved reserves

Natural gas Total proved reserves	At end 2000 Trillion cubic meters	At end 2010 Trillion cubic meters	At end 2019 Trillion cubic meters	At end 2020 Trillion cubic meters	Trillion cubic feet	Share of total
Iran	25.4	32.3	32.1	32.1	1133.6	17.1%
USA	4.8	8.3	12.6	12.6	1320.5	6.7%
Russian Federation	33.2	34.1	37.6	37.4	1320.5	19.9%
Qatar	14.9	25.9	24.7	24.7	871.1	13.1%
Turkmenistan	1.8	13.6	13.6	13.6	480.3	7.2%

Source:BP

After this, we will examine the amount of natural gas production of several countries with the largest natural gas reserves in the world. It is obvious that Russia, having huge reserves of

natural gas, is also a very large producer and exporter of natural gas in the world. As the main arm of Russia in the field of natural gas, Gazprom is known as a super company in the world. In table number two, it can be seen that Russia is the second largest producer of natural gas in the world after the United States of America. A very important point in this regard is that Russia has very little domestic consumption and this has increased Russia's ability to export natural gas to Europe and other countries.

Table 2:Natural gas Production

Natural gas: Production in billion cubic meters	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	Share 2021
Iran	199.3	213.9	224.9	232.9	249.5	256.7	6.5%
USA	727.4	746.2	840.9	928.1	915.9	934.2	23.7%
Russian Federation	589.3	635.6	669.1	679.0	637.3	701.1	16.6%
Qatar	174.8	170.5	175.2	177.2	174.9	177.0	4.4%
Turkmenistan	63.2	58.7	61.5	63.2	66.0	79.3	1.5%

Source: BP

6.Russia and Ukraine and Europe natural gas trade

6.1.Gas dispute of 2008–2009

The 2009 gas crisis began with the failure to reach an agreement on gas prices and supplies 2009. On January 1, 2009, the export of 90 million cubic meters of natural gas per day to Ukraine was completely suspended at 10:00 MSK. Exports intended for transfer to the European Union continued with a volume of 300 million cubic meters per day (de Jong,2013). On January 2, 2009, Hungary, Romania, and Poland they were reported that pressure in their pipelines had decreased. Bulgaria also reported a declining natural gas supply, affecting natural gas shipments to Turkey, Greece, and Macedonia. In addition, the British government announced that it is preparing to tap into its gas reserves after gas pressure from the continent eases.

On December 28, 2009, the Slovakian government announced that Russia warned it would stop oil supplies to Slovakia, Hungary, and the Czech Republic over a transit price dispute with

Ukraine. However, the next day, Ukraine's Naftohaz issued a statement confirming that Russia agreed to a 30% increase in the transit fees through Ukraine (De Jong,2010).

6.2.Gas crises in 2014

In April 2014, for the third time since 2006, Putin announced in an open letter that Europe would face an increased risk of another gas shortage if Ukraine defaulted on its nearly \$2 billion debt. In June 2014, Gazprom cut off natural gas to its neighboring country. Ukrainian Prime Minister Arseniy P. Yatsenyuk, although disputed by Russia, believes that recent events are politically connected to Russia's annexation of Crimea and its military invasion of Ukraine. It is not about gas; it is a general plan to destroy Ukraine," Yatsnyuk said. As of October 2014, as winter approaches, no resolution to the gas dispute has been reached (Van de Graaf,2017).

The main point regarding the gas crisis 2014 was political issues, especially the issue of the Crimean Peninsula, which caused the conflict between Russia and Ukraine over natural gas and the interruption of its flow.

6.3.Ukraine war

The Russia–EU gas dispute flared up in March 2022 following the invasion of Ukraine in late February. Russia and the major EU countries clashed over the payment for pipeline natural gas exported to Europe by Russia's Gazprom.

In June, Russia cut the gas flow to Germany by more than half, and in September of that year, it stopped it altogether. On September 26, 2022, the Nord Stream 1 and 2 gas pipelines ruptured with evidence of sabotage.


August 2023, Russian pipeline gas exports continued to flow via Ukraine to Slovakia, Austria, and Italy, as well as to non-EU Moldova; via the Turk Stream pipeline, Russian gas continued to flow to Greece, Hungary, and Croatia, as well as several non-EU countries in Europe, while Europe imported record volumes of liquefied natural gas from Russia in 2022, with Spain being one of the key importers of Russian LNG (Osička,2022).

With the start of the war in Ukraine, it was natural that the amount of Russian natural gas exports from the transit route of Ukraine would decrease. In fact, two countries were involved in the war of two countries producing and transiting natural gas to Europe. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been an essential route for the export of Russian natural gas due to the passage of many Russian pipelines through this country. As can be seen in chart number one, we are witnessing a downward trend in Russian natural gas exports from Ukraine. In general, as shown in picture number one and two, it can be understood that Russian gas exports decreased in 2014 and after the Crimean peninsula crisis, and then faced a significant

increase. With the start of the Corona pandemic and the worldwide quarantine, we again saw a decrease in the export of Russian natural gas, and this trend decreased with the start of the Ukraine war, which was also influenced by the sanctions of Western countries and the unwillingness to buy natural gas from Russia.

Chart 1:annual gas transit volume through ukraine


Figure 1: Annual gas transit volume through Ukraine



Source: Naftogaz.

Source:naftogaz.com

Chart 2: Russia natural gas transit via Ukraine(bcm)




Source: Expro.com.ua

In picture one, we see the multitude of pipelines created to transfer natural gas from Russia to Ukraine and then to Europe. An issue that took from the very high geopolitical and geographical

importance of Ukraine for access to Europe. On the other hand, considering the economy dependent on the income from the sale of oil and especially natural gas, it is obvious that Russia tries not to let the route of its pipelines in Ukraine come under the influence of Western countries and the United States of America, and somehow these countries away from these areas.

Picture 1: Russia's natural gas pipeline



Source: Gazprom.com

As mentioned in the previous section, the main route of Russian natural gas export is to Europe. This issue goes back to the collapse of the Soviet Union, which caused Europe to depend on Russia in the field of energy supply.


In the past years, Russia has used this issue as a weak point for Europe to achieve its goals and uses energy as a political weapon(Stoelzel Chadwick,2023). European countries are suitable for exporting natural gas to Europe due to Russia's proximity to these countries and the necessary infrastructure in this field. Before the Ukraine war, European countries highly depended on importing natural gas from Europe.

As you can see in pictures two and three, the degree of dependence of European countries on Russian gas can be seen, which shows the high dependence of European countries on Russian natural gas. This caused Russia to estimate that by putting pressure on Europe, it could achieve its goals regarding its desired areas in Ukraine, which failed.

Picture 2: Russia gas dependence

Russian gas dependence

(Russian gas as a share of total energy consumption, 2020, percent)




Source: IMF staff calculations.



Source: IMF staff calculations

Chart 3: European countries depend on Russia gas



Source: statista.com

7. Role of energy in Russia's foreign policy

When discussing the politicization of energy resources, some imported resources are different in the Kremlin. The reason for this issue is simple: the gas sector is much more dependent on a rigid resource infrastructure than the oil sector. Most gas supplies are still delivered through pipelines that can only serve a limited area, and building takes much time, countries dependent on a particular pipeline are locked into a problematic supply pattern (Jirušek,2022).

Since Hirschman's classic study, economic influence theorists have pointed to several factors that successfully enable a state to use its economic power against others. First, it is advantageous for the initiating state to have a larger economy than the target state. This allows it to survive any economic conflict better. By this essential measure, Russia outperforms its neighbors in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Second, it is beneficial if the initiating state has a smaller percentage of its trade with the target than with the target. Russia is also in a similar position to its smaller and economically weak neighbors. These conditions force the target state into what Cohen and Nye describe as asymmetric interdependence (Edwards,2022).

Russia acts simultaneously as a producer, exporter, importer, consumer, and energy transit country. Global political and economic factors, regional and bilateral developments, and energy market dynamics influence Russia's foreign energy policy. This diverse role in the energy sector is visible in the development of neighboring countries. CIS2 countries, the countries of the former Soviet Union, despite their independence, are often still in Russia's sphere of influence, where Russia has legitimate interests and is considered its sphere of influence. However, Russia's opportunities to use energy exports to the CIS as a political "weapon" are limited (Arbatova,2019). The Russian Federation is vulnerable to disruptions in its transmission to the European Union by Ukraine and depends on this country for gas exports to Europe. The transit pipeline connecting Russia and Ukraine was built while the two countries were part of the Soviet Union as a transit and supply pipeline. Any disruption of internal resources may cause problems for external transit, as the pressure in the pipeline will change.

Beyond these general criteria, however, are factors directly related to Russia's oil and gas prowess. First, oil and gas are products for which it is tough to find substitutes. This is true for all oil and gas importing countries like the United States but especially for Russia's energy trading partners. It's clear, the former Soviet Union deliberately tied its republics and satellite states into a web of oil and gas dependence. All pipelines passed through Russia, and the housing, industry, and transportation of the former Soviet bloc were built to work with Russian

oil and gas. Such a monopoly position gives Russia great market power over its customers (Kaki,2019).

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has increasingly returned to the world stage as a major player. After a significant decline under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, the Putin era saw a resurgence of Russian power. Russia's ability to use its oil and gas reserves as a foreign policy tool is critical to this power.

The strengthened position of Russia was related to the stability of the political system during the two terms of the presidency of Vladimir Putin and the high price of energy in the world market, especially oil. The result of these two factors was that Russia almost doubled its real GDP in the last decade. Oil and gas have been essential factors in Russia's foreign policy in the past fifteen years. Energy policy itself is a complex question. This includes oil and gas fields and energy infrastructure (Godzimirsk,2022). The relationship between energy policy and foreign policy is often interpreted through energy security, defined from a supplier or customer perspective. After the gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine (during 2005-2006 and 2008-2009), the issue of energy security was mentioned in the political discourse in Russia and the European Union.

Recent examples of this power's role include petro-carrots (using oil and gas to reward allies) and petro-sticks (using resources to punish governments that defy the Kremlin). Countries such as Georgia, Ukraine, and the Baltic states have been punished with supply disruptions and higher prices after their governments turned westward. Conversely, those who remained Kremlin-friendly—such as Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine before 2005, and the small states of Abkhazia, North Ossetia, and Transnistria—received abundant oil and gas at subsidized prices (Newnham,2011).

However, while Russian oil and gas may be vital to its partners, oil and gas revenues are vital to Russia. This allows Russian customers to exert compensatory pressures, especially when oil and gas prices are low. Now, we will examine the state of reserves and oil and natural gas production in Russia to know this country's place in world energy.

8. Conclusion

As mentioned in the article, the article plays a vital role worldwide. From the past until now, energy has been a crucial and critical issue that has caused many wars and political conflicts. The war in Ukraine was also one of the events in which energy played a key role.

Energy played a role in the Ukrainian war in two ways. Due to Russia's economic dependence on revenues from oil and incredibly natural gas sales, energy plays a prominent role. In recent years, due to the increase in natural gas production and the creation of new pipelines, Russia has increased its natural gas exports to different regions of the world, especially Europe. This has led to the expansion of influence and dependence of European countries on Russian natural gas and the strengthening of Gazprom's position in the world. This caused Russia's income from the sale and export of natural gas to increase.

This increase in income has caused Russia to turn aggressively in its foreign policy. The increase in the income of this country caused this country to shift from a less aggressive policy to an aggressive policy. An issue that has also been mentioned in economics is that the increase in economic income leads to an aggressive and expansionist approach. This made Russia want to attack Ukraine. In addition, Ukraine's proximity to the West and NATO was hazardous for Russia. As mentioned in the article, Ukraine is the main transit route of Russian natural gas to Europe, and the influence of the West in this country can create risks for the export of Zosia gas. An issue that was one of the main reasons for Russia's attack on Ukraine.

On the other hand, Russia was of the view that Europe is very dependent on gas imported from Russia; soon after Russia's attack on Ukraine, European countries are trying to reach an agreement with Russia so that their energy security is not jeopardized. The calculations turned out to be wrong, and Europe, in addition to the sanctions on Russian oil and gas, has tried to supply its energy needs and imports through LNG from Qatar or other routes.

A point that showed that Russia's calculations regarding the use of energy as a political weapon were not successful to some extent, and based on the theory of energy security, European countries are seeking to diversify their energy import route to reduce the dependence and role of Russia. This issue shows that energy played a key and fundamental role in the Ukrainian war.

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Ukrainian Conflict and its Impact on Regional Security in Northeast Asia

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Abstract

This article is devoted to a very important and pressing problem of today - military security in Northeast Asia, in the context of the Ukrainian conflict. Events in Ukraine certainly influenced the entire international agenda and security threats both on a global scale and at the regional level. The Northeast Asia region was no exception. The author analyzes, on the one hand, the features of this region, the features of the security structure that has developed in it. On the other hand, the author analyzes the consequences for the military security of the region that have developed recently (after 2022)

Keywords: *Northeast Asia, military security, Ukrainian conflict, China, security architecture, North Korea*

1. Introduction

In the 1990-2000s, during the collapse of the bipolar system, the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the process of building a new World Order, the illusion began to arise that threats to military security began to fade into the background, that they remained a relic of the past, including number of the twentieth century, but not the twenty-first. Hence the emergence of a large number of theories that substantiate the greater relevance at the moment of non-military threats (in particular, the theory of securitization).

However, as the further development of international relations, especially the second decade of the 21st century, has shown, threats to military security are still relevant and pressing. And it's still too early to write them off. This became especially noticeable after the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine in February 2022.

Traditionally, the Northeast Asia region includes countries such as China and Taiwan, Japan, North Korea, the Republic of Korea and Mongolia. However, in our opinion, this list must be supplemented with regions of the Russian Far East, which geographically, strategically, and now also politically, gravitate towards this region.

Northeast Asia is a unique region in terms of world politics, economics, and national, regional and global security issues. The first feature is the small number of countries that are included in this subregion. The second is that Northeast Asia is home to two of the world's three largest economies (China and Japan) and, in addition, three of the four so-called "Asian tigers." The third feature is the complete absence of an institutional framework on regional security issues, and even some of their individual rudiments. And if earlier this was typical for the entire Asia-

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Pacific region, now, more than 30 years after the collapse of the bipolar system, only for Northeast Asia (the ARF for security functions successfully in Southeast Asia, the South Pacific is also actively institutionalized with the United States). The fourth feature is the presence in the region of one of the main troublemakers of the last decades and a threat to the military security of the region - North Korea. The fifth feature is the presence of a huge number of territorial disputes between the countries of the region. The sixth feature is the presence of persistent hostility of the countries and societies of the region towards Japan, caused by the particular cruelty of Japanese troops during the Second World War. Seventh - Northeast Asia countries are the largest consumer of energy resources and the main global polluter of the environment, the locomotive of nuclear energy development and the main source of innovation and new technologies.

In my work, I used structural-functional, systemic and hermeneutical approaches, the combination of which made it possible to study security threats in their political dimension in a comprehensive manner.

Thus, the structural functionalism of T. Parsons made it possible to consider security not only as a goal, but also as a value category for the countries of the Northeast Asia region²⁴⁵.

P. Ricoeur's hermeneutics made it possible to analyze the regional security system in Northeast Asia as a kind of consensus formed in the course of the struggle of state and non-state actors who differently understand and interpret security threats in a given region²⁴⁶.

The study also used comparative and historical approaches, which made it possible to analyze the features of the formation of the "agenda" for regional security in Northeast Asia, as well as how national approaches to ensuring security in the region were transformed over time and how, in parallel, they themselves changed threats.

2. "Security architecture" and traditional threats to military security in Northeast Asia

I will say a few words about the security architecture of the region after the Second World War. The region has not developed any security and cooperation mechanisms. This is explained by the presence there of territorial disputes and intractable crisis and conflict situations (primarily the situation on the Korean Peninsula), dating back to the Second World War. This is also explained by the harsh confrontation during the Cold War between the USSR and the USA, which resulted first in the Korean War and then in the conflict in Vietnam.

²⁴⁵ Parsons T. The system of modern societies. – M.: Aspect – Press, 1998. PP. 8-24

²⁴⁶ Ricoeur P. Conflict of interpretations. Essays on hermeneutics. – M.: Kanon-press, 2002. P.36-39

The maintenance of relative balance and balance of power was ensured in the region through bilateral alliances and agreements. Between the USA and Japan, the USA and South Korea, the USA and Taiwan, the USSR and the DPRK, China and the DPRK.

After the end of the Cold War, there were repeated attempts to change the situation, to create multilateral structures and security mechanisms in the region, both from China, Russia and the United States. However, this essentially ended in nothing.

Threats to military security in Northeast Asia, potential and real, have been inextricably linked over the past 25 years with North Korea, especially with the rise to power of its new leader, Kim Jong-un. The nuclear missile tests of the DPRK and the nuclear program of this country in general are of very serious concern, first, to its neighbors in the region - Japan and the Republic of Korea, as well as the entire international community. In addition, the nuclear status has actually become for Pyongyang a way of survival, nuclear blackmail, and receiving economic assistance in exchange for a temporary refusal to test new missiles. At the same time, Pyongyang's unpredictable behavior, the presence of serious economic problems within the country, the reluctance to compromise on the part of the new US administration and the holding of numerous military exercises in Northeast Asia make the situation around North Korea explosive. There are no guarantees that the young leader of the DPRK, in a situation of lack of choice and the reluctance of world powers to negotiate with him, will not use nuclear weapons first, thereby provoking a severe regional, and possibly a world war.

The presence of territorial disputes between almost all states in the region: China with the Republic of Korea and Japan, China and Taiwan with Japan, Russia with Japan, the Republic of Korea with Japan and China, as well as in relation to the jurisdiction of Taiwan. Only North Korea and Mongolia remained aside from the actually identified territorial disagreements. However, North Korea, which considers the entire Korean peninsula as its own territory (as in the opposite direction from the Republic of Korea) is also, de facto, part of the existing disagreements. Perhaps the hottest and most dangerous issue from the point of view of threats to military security is the independence and jurisdiction of the island of Taiwan. In the context of a confrontational 2022, China can risk launching a military operation against independent Taipei, which will inevitably lead to a full-scale conflict, at least at the regional level.

The trend in recent years toward the militarization of the entire region also adds risks and threats to military security. The deployment of US missile defense systems in the Republic of Korea and Japan, in principle, violates the existing status quo and leads to a very serious distortion of

the existing system of strategic stability²⁴⁷. China and Russia are rearming and qualitatively changing their armed forces in the regions located in the border areas. The Northeast Asia subregion holds the record for the number of military exercises.

3. The impact of the Ukrainian conflict on global and regional security in Northeast Asia

With the beginning of a new stage of confrontation between Russia and Western states, and even more so with the beginning of the Ukrainian conflict, the situation began to change significantly both in the sphere of global security and in its regional dimension in Northeast Asia.

The Ukrainian conflict, which began 10 years ago and moved into the active phase of hostilities in 2022, has very serious consequences for all regions of the globe and for the entire global agenda.

- 1) Aspects of military, traditional security have again come to the fore. And non-military threats have somewhat faded into the background.
- 2) The entire existing system of international law and security architecture is threatened. We stand on the verge of chaos and anarchy in international relations
- 3) The arms race begins again, which in modern conditions of globalization can have the most unpredictable consequences
- 4) Increasing levels of conflict in various regions of the globe (the most recent examples are Nagorno-Karabakh and the Gaza Strip)
- 5) Increased risks of man-made, environmental and humanitarian disasters
- 6) The beginning of a new stage of the Cold War or Cold War 2.0, which could lead to a new world conflict.

In fact, Russia has opened a “Pandora’s box” that greatly influences the entire global security agenda; it will face even more chaos, unpredictability and instability.

If we turn directly to the North-East Asia region, then the consequences for the sphere of military security are also very noticeable here. And which also become extremely dangerous for the situation in the region.

An active process of rapprochement between Russia and North Korea has begun. The North Korean leader became the only head of state who not only supported Moscow’s actions, but also recognized the new territories that became part of Russia as Russian. This situation opens up a whole window of opportunity for Pyongyang. Overcoming the negative consequences of

²⁴⁷ “Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD)” https://www.mod.go.jp/en/d_architecture/missile_defense/index.html (20.09.2023)

international sanctions, receiving economic assistance, as well as financing further nuclear missile development and testing. In recent years, there has been progress in resolving the Korean nuclear program and minimizing the threats posed by this country. Now all these efforts will be nullified with the help of Russia and China.

There has been a tendency to transform bilateral alliances in the region into trilateral ones. On the one hand, the process of forming the Moscow-Beijing-Pyongyang alliance has begun. On the other hand, the United States will strive to create a triple alliance Washington - Tokyo - Seoul, with the unification of 2 Missile Defense systems located in these countries²⁴⁸.

China's military rhetoric regarding the island of Taiwan has intensified. It is unlikely that Beijing will decide to begin military operations in this direction, but an increase in the level of tension and conflict potential is taking place. This leads to sub-regional military build-up, constant military exercises, etc.

In 2022, Japan dramatically changed its military doctrine. Tokyo has openly proclaimed a course towards creating an offensive capability that would make it possible to strike the territory of China and the DPRK. To create a threat to its neighbors, Tokyo intends first of all to purchase Tomahawk cruise missiles from the United States as quickly as possible. At the same time, Japan will modernize its own ballistic missiles, increasing their range to more than a thousand kilometers. In the 2030s, Tokyo intends to equip its troops with its own hypersonic weapons. This is a very important event for the region. Japan, which had remained pacifist for almost 80 years, began to arm itself again. At the same time, the region still remembers very well the atrocities that Japan carried out during the war, and this event is perceived with caution.

China has stepped up efforts to re-equip its army and navy, as well as to create a network of its military bases outside China's borders.

Northeast Asia is a region with a very high potential for military security threats. In the presence of territorial disputes, disputes and discussions about modern international relations, in the context of the conflict between Russia and Western countries, the trade war between the United States and China, the threat of military conflicts has never been higher. It is necessary to continue efforts to create multilateral security institutions and reduce tension in the region.

4. Conclusion

The trend in recent years toward the militarization of the entire region also adds risks and threats to military security. The deployment of US missile defense systems in the Republic of Korea

²⁴⁸ “THAAD Terminal High-Altitude Area Defence, United States of America, army-technology,” <http://www.army-technology.com/projects/thead/5.2022> (15.09.2023)

and Japan, in principle, violates the existing status quo and leads to a very serious distortion of the existing system of strategic stability. China and Russia are rearming and qualitatively changing their armed forces in the regions located in the border areas. In addition, it looks quite likely that China and the Far Eastern regions of Russia will deploy their own national missile defense systems, aimed both against potential adversaries from overseas and, perhaps in the near future, against each other.

In addition, the Northeast Asia subregion holds the record for the number of military exercises and the involvement of countries in the region. They run practically non-stop all year round, and all countries participate in them (with the exception of Mongolia and Taiwan).

All of the above suggests that the level of threats to military security is very high, and they are not even potential, but real.

Northeast Asia is one of the most complex and explosive parts of the world, capable of instantly plunging most world powers into regional or global conflict. This predetermines the need for increased attention to the problems and threats to the military security of NVA. Since the end of the Cold War, military threats have not disappeared. They just transformed and became less accentuated. However, at the same time, they are less predictable and almost uncontrollable. Adds to the state of uncertainty and the lack of the necessary (proper) institutional environment, which exists in other regions of world politics.

Recently, the “security architecture” has been changing. Judging by the current trend, bilateral alliances will be replaced by trilateral alliances in the region, and with an openly military orientation.

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